The DOI matches its Crossref record; 125 of the 125 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
Open accessAbstract
What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the construction of a minimal theory of mind. Minimal theory of mind is rich enough to explain systematic success on tasks held to be acid tests for theory of mind cognition including many false belief tasks. Yet minimal theory of mind does not require representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, as such. Minimal theory of mind may be what enables those with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication, such as infants, chimpanzees, scrub‐jays and human adults under load, to track others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs.
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Cites
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition
Tomasello, M. (2009) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjsf4jc · Cited by 6,368
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
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Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1107621 · Cited by 2,350
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Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010 · Cited by 1,592
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Psychological reasoning in infancy
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & Bian, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115033 · Cited by 263
Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test
Kano, F., Krupenye, C., Hirata, S., Tomonaga, M., & Call, J. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1910095116 · Cited by 247
Theory of mind in animals: current and future directions
Krupenye, C., & Call, J. (2019) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1503 · Cited by 180
The violation-of-expectation paradigm: A conceptual overview.
Margoni, F., Surian, L., & Baillargeon, R. (2024) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000450 · Cited by 127
A fine-grained comparison of pragmatic language understanding in humans and language models
Hu, J., Floyd, S., Jouravlev, O., Fedorenko, E., & Gibson, E. (2023) · Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · doi:10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.230 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- BUTTERFILL, S. A., & APPERLY, I. A.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-10-31
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 606-637
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W1930725873
- Cited by
- 623
- References
- 125
- FWCI
- 67.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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