Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection

The total number of slips reported in inner speech remained comparable to the number that occurs in outer speech.

“While the phonemic bias was not found, the total number of slips reported in inner speech remained comparable to the number that occurs in outer speech (p.534).”

• cites Oppenheim & Dell, 2008 sourceSupported

There are no known reports of people who lose the capacity to silently complete rhyme judgment tasks but still report being able to speak silently to themselves or having 'the little voice in the head'.

“However, there are no known reports of this kind.”

The neurobiological properties by which contentful mental states might be typed are not arbitrarily related to the representational contents they carry.

“The neurobiological properties by which contentful mental states might be typed are not going to be arbitrarily related to the representational contents they carry, any more than the functional or inferential role of a mental state will be arbitrarily related to its content.”

The proposals linking inner speech to metacognition rely on unworkable conceptions of the content and structure of inner speech episodes.

“However, their proposals all rely upon unworkable conceptions of the content and structure of inner speech episodes.”

• Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain

  “This paper argues that these accounts of why and how inner speech aids metacognition cannot be correct as they stand, because they rely on unworkable conceptions of the representational contents and structure of inner speech episodes.”

The lexical bias is not a bias to slip to a semantically related word; it is just a bias to slip to some word or other, as opposed to non-words.

“But the lexical bias is not a bias to slip to a semantically related words; it is just a bias to slip to some word or other, as opposed to non-words.”

Like visuolexicalizations, inner speech episodes may trigger conceptual thoughts without themselves bearing conceptual semantic contents.

“Like visuolexicalizations, inner speech episodes may trigger conceptual thoughts without themselves bearing conceptual semantic contents.”

One cannot coherently claim that two tokens of the same type of inner speech episode have different contents.

“So one cannot coherently claim that two tokens of the same type of ISE have different contents.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Mental states are typically typed by their representational content or functional/inferential role.

We lack grounds for holding that, when thinking about such internal representations and their contents, we are thinking about representations that occur in a natural language.

“Thus, we lack grounds for holding that, when thinking about such internal representations (and their contents), we are thinking about representations that occur in a natural language.”

If we individuate inner speech episodes by functional or inferential role, there is no single inferential or functional role to be associated with reasoning both about the sound of a sentence and Jones's deserving justice.

“Yet surely there is no single inferential or functional role to be associated with reasoning both about the sound of that sentence and Jones's deserving justice.”

Inner speech is very useful in judging rhymes and in similar auditory-phonetic tasks such as judging homophones.

“First, inner speech is very useful in judging rhymes, and in similar auditory-phonetic tasks (such as judging homophones).”

If the ISE 'Jones deserves justice' represents the utterance 'Jones deserves justice' as having a certain meaning, then it still does not represent-still is not about-Jones deserving justice.

“If (by hypothesis) the ISE 'Jones deserves justice' represents the utterance 'Jones deserves justice' as having a certain meaning, then it still does not represent-still is not about-Jones deserving justice.”

The analogy to written words fails for the idea that some tokens of a single type of inner speech episode do not represent word sounds.

“Setting aside the empirical reasons already given for thinking there are no purely semantic (token) ISEs, it is important to see that the analogy to written words fails.”

It would be a miraculous coincidence if every inner speech episode token that represented the sound of a word 'X' was realized by a neurological state that also sometimes realized a state that represented Xs.

“Yet it would be a miraculous bit of coincidence if every ISE-token that represented the sound of a word 'X' was realized by a neurological state that also sometimes realized a state that represented Xs (substitute 'dog' 'sky' 'heat' or whatever you like for 'X').”

The important role inner speech plays in working memory is compatible with the impoverished view of its contents.

“So the important role that inner speech plays in working memory is compatible with the impoverished view of its contents.”

If we individuate mental states by their content, the attachment view leaves us with a very strange representation: a single state with contents that pull in different directions.

“If we individuate mental states by their content, it seems we are left with a very strange representation-a single state with contents that pull in different directions.”

Performance is only mildly affected when sequences of words are semantically but not phonetically related.

“Interestingly, performance is only mildly affected when the sequences of words are semantically (but not phonetically) related (e.g., huge big long wide tall).”

Carruthers' suggestion that when the ISE 'dog' is interpreted the content DOG is attached to it would be a mistake, because the word 'dog' does not have the property of being a dog.

“But the cognitive system would be making a mistake if it did, since the word 'dog' does not have the property of being a dog”

The co-occurrence view is a viable option.

“By contrast, the co-occurrence view is a viable option.”

Such rhyme questions are easily answered through the use of inner speech, even when the pairs involve non-words that the subject has never before seen.

“Such questions are easily answered through the use of inner speech, even when the pairs involve non-words that the subject has never before seen.”

There is no plausible case for the idea that propositional contents are attached to representations of sounds in the way necessary for the two contents to be carried by one and the same mental state.

“There is no plausible case to be made for the idea that propositional contents are 'attached' to representations of sounds in the way necessary for the two contents to be carried by one and the same mental state.”

It is very hard to see how such a representation could figure in truth-preserving inferences.

“It is very hard to see how such a representation could figure in truth-preserving inferences.”

Conrad and Hull (1964) found that sequences of phonologically similar letters are recalled less accurately than dissimilar sequences.

“In a seminal study, Conrad and Hull (1964) found that sequences of phonologically similar letters-B D T G C P-are recalled less accurately than dissimilar sequences, such as F K Y W R Q.”

• cites Conrad and Hull (1964) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Positing inner speech episodes with exclusively semantic contents would commit one to the existence of a class of inner speech episodes that would not be useful in judging rhymes.

“Further, positing ISEs with exclusively semantic contents would commit one to the existence of a class of ISEs that would not be useful in judging rhymes.”

A standard test among psychologists for whether someone's inner speech is intact is to present visually dissimilar word pairs and ask them to silently judge whether they rhyme.

“A standard test among psychologists for whether someone's inner speech is intact is to present them with visually dissimilar word pairs-e.g., 'ate' and 'eight'-and ask them to (silently) judge whether they rhyme (Feinberg, Gonzalez Rothi, & Heliman, 1986;Geva, Bennett, Warburton, & Patterson, 2011).”

• cites Feinberg, Gonzalez Rothi, & Heliman, 1986Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Geva, Bennett, Warburton, & Patterson, 2011 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Theorists offer no reason to think that the propositional contents associated with inner speech themselves occur in a natural language.

“With respect to the third-that inner speech has important structural characteristics of representations that occur in a natural language-it is argued that the theorists in question offer no reason to think that the propositional contents associated with inner speech themselves occur in a natural language.”

The fact that phonetically similar words create slips at all in inner speech strongly suggests that phonemes are represented by inner speech.

“First, the fact that phonetically similar words create slips at all in inner speech still strongly suggests that phonemes are represented by inner speech.”

There are only two promising ways of understanding the contents of inner speech.

“These critical remarks follow from a broader positive thesis to be defended here, which is that there are only two promising ways of understanding the contents of inner speech.”

All inner speech episodes represent word sounds at a minimum.

“In this section I wish only to establish that all ISEs have auditoryphonetic contents at a minimum.”

• Also stated in: § 2.2 Does all Inner Speech Represent Word Sounds? · boosted

  “Yet there is ample evidence that, even outside of auditory phonological tasks, ISEs represent word sounds.”

• Also stated in: § 2.3 A point about mental state individuation · boosted

  “there is strong empirical support for the idea that all ISEs represent word sounds”

If we individuate an inner speech episode by the neural properties of its representational vehicle, a single type of neurobiological state will not have a causal profile appropriate for ascribing to it two very different sets of representational properties simultaneously.

“And a single type of neurobiological state will not have a causal profile appropriate for ascribing to it two very different sets of representational properties-some relating to fine-grained phonological properties, others to things like justice-simultaneously.”

There is ample evidence that, even outside auditory phonological tasks, inner speech episodes represent word sounds.

“Yet there is ample evidence that, even outside of auditory phonological tasks, ISEs represent word sounds.”

• cites Conrad and Hull (1964) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Baddeley (1966) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Once we properly understand the relationship between the sensory and propositional contents of inner speech, there is no reason to think that propositional thoughts are only conscious when occurring in the form of inner speech.

“With respect to the second-that inner speech is the only really obvious case of conscious propositional thought-the response is that, once we properly understand the relationship between the sensory and propositional contents of inner speech, there is no reason to think that propositional thoughts are only conscious when occurring in the form of inner speech.”

The proposals linking inner speech to metacognition require inner speech episodes to have both auditory-phonological contents and propositional/semantic content.

“The core problem is that they require inner speech episodes to have both auditory-phonological contents and propositional/semantic content.”

• Also stated in: § 3. In Search of a Place for Semantic Content · plain

  “All three require that ISEs have propositional contents, and so are incompatible with the impoverished view (which has it that the content of ISEs is exhausted by their auditory phonological component).”

Any theory that wishes to give inner speech a special metacognitive role must do so in a way consistent with understanding its content and structure in one of the two viable ways.

“The paper concludes that any theory that wishes to give inner speech a special metacognitive role must do so in a way that is consistent with understanding its content and structure in one of these two ways.”

To the extent that inner speech has sensory character, it prevents inner speech from carrying the sort of propositional contents it must in order to play the envisioned metacognitive roles.

“With respect to the first idea-that inner speech has sensory character-it is argued that, to the extent this is true, it prevents inner speech from carrying the sort of propositional contents it must in order for it to play the envisioned metacognitive roles.”

In cases of aphasia where patients lose the ability to complete silent rhyme judgment tasks, they also describe themselves as having lost inner speech.

“To the contrary, in cases of aphasia where patients lose the ability to complete the silent rhyme judgment tasks, they also describe themselves as having lost inner speech (Levine, Calvano, & Popovics, 1982).”

• cites Levine, Calvano, & Popovics, 1982 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

This very general bias is predicted by any account that holds that it is the function of inner speech episodes to represent words.

“This very general bias is predicted by any account that, like the impoverished view, holds that it is the function of ISEs to represent words.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: It is the function of inner speech episodes to represent words.

If inner speech is especially valuable to metacognition, we do not currently understand why it is.

“The result is that, if inner speech is especially valuable to metacognition, we do not currently understand why it is.”

• Also stated in: § 3. In Search of a Place for Semantic Content · hedged

  “We still lack an understanding of why inner speech aids metacognition (if it does).”

Their occurring in a natural language cannot be what explains their supposed role in metacognition.

“Their occurring in a natural language cannot be what explains their (supposed) role in metacognition.”

Languages, and representational and computational systems generally, cannot function with symbols that mean two different things whenever they occur.

“Languages, and representational (and computational) systems generally, cannot function with symbols of that kind.”

If the co-occurrence view is true, then the reasons theorists have offered for why inner speech is especially linked to metacognition cannot be correct.

“However, Sections 3.2-3.4argue that, if the co-occurrence view is true, then the reasons theorists have offered for why inner speech is especially linked to metacognition cannot be correct.”

The subject-predicate attachment view returns the wrong result for Frankish as well.

“Yet this view returns the wrong result for Frankish as well.”

If the co-occurrence view is right, we no longer have any reason to hold that the reflection on inner speech episodes that Frankish and others appeal to is reflection upon representations that occur in a natural language.

“But note that, if the co-occurrence view is right, we no longer have any reason to hold that the reflection on inner speech episodes that Frankish and others appeal to is reflection upon representations that occur in a natural language.”

On the co-occurrence view, our propositional thoughts do not occur in a natural language.

“However, on the co-occurrence view (which, I am now assuming, is the only workable view on which ISEs have propositional contents), our propositional thoughts do not occur in a natural language.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The co-occurrence view is the only workable view on which inner speech episodes have propositional contents.

Once we distinguish between a state that represents the sound of the English sentence 'Jones deserves justice' and another that means that Jones deserves justice, there is no reason to think that the latter occurs in English.

“Once we have distinguished between two mental states-one that represents the sound of the English sentence 'Jones deserves justice' (but does not itself occur in English), and another that means that Jones deserves justice, there is no reason to think that the latter occurs in English.”

Neither the impoverished view nor the semantically rich view leaves us with a clear picture of why inner speech would be especially involved in metacognition.

“Neither, however, leaves us with a clear picture of why inner speech would be especially involved in metacognition.”

The idea that ISEs represent sentences as being sayings that thus and such is at odds with the phenomenology of inner speech.

“Finally, the idea that ISEs represent sentences as being sayings that thus and such is at odds with the phenomenology of inner speech.”

To the extent that we had metacognitive awareness of ISEs, it would only be metacognitive awareness of thoughts about the meanings of various sentences-not thoughts about people, places, and non-linguistic things.

“So, to the extent that we had metacognitive awareness of ISEs, it would only be metacognitive awareness of thoughts about the meanings of various sentences-not thoughts about people, places, and (non-linguistic) things.”

ISEs would not be capable of carrying the contents of the vast majority of our propositional thoughts.

“ISEs would not, in fact, be capable of carrying the contents of the vast majority of our propositional thoughts.”

Whatever features natural language representations may have, they cannot serve to explain why inner speech would have any special connection to metacognition.

“So, whatever features natural language representations may have, they cannot serve to explain why inner speech would have any special connection to metacognition.”

The paper has argued that the pieces do not fit together when it comes to explaining why inner speech, as such, would be especially involved in metacognition.

“However, this paper has argued that the pieces do not fit together when it comes to explaining why inner speech, as such, would be especially involved in metacognition.”