A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There are possible artificially intelligent beings who do not differ in any morally relevant respect from human beings. Such possible beings would deserve moral consideration similar to that of human beings. Our duties to them would not be appreciably reduced by the fact that they are non-human, nor by the fact that they owe their existence to us. Indeed, if they owe their existence to us, we would likely have additional moral obligations to them that we don’t ordinarily owe to human strangers – obligations similar to those of parent to child or god to creature. Given our moral obligations to such AIs, two principles for ethical AI design recommend themselves: (1) design AIs that tend to provoke reactions from users that accurately reflect the AIs ’ real moral status, and (2) avoid designing AIs whose moral status is unclear. Since human moral intuition and moral theory evolved and developed in contexts without AI, those intuitions and theories might break down or become destabilized when confronted with the wide range of weird minds that AI design might make possible. Word count: approx 11,000 (including notes and references), plus one figure
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Citations
Cites
I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE
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Gunkel, D. J. (2012) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8975.001.0001 · Cited by 449
Basl, J. (2014) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0122-y · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“We believe that the argument can succeed on a variety of 2 On sub-human AI and animal rights, see especially Basl 2013, 2014.”
Background
Cited by
Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism
Danaher, J. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00119-x · Cited by 264
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Self-citationUnderstanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“This concerns particularly two questions: First, there is a recent debate on robot rights and the moral status of AI systems (Gunkel 2018; Ladak 2023; Moosavi 2023; Müller 2021; Schwitzgebel and Garza 2015; Shevlin 2021).”
BackgroundHow to Treat Machines that Might Have Minds
Agar, N. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-019-00357-8 · Cited by 33
Long, R., Sebo, J., Butlin, P., Finlinson, K., Fish, K., Harding, J., Pfau, J., Sims, T., Birch, J., & Chalmers, D. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.00986 · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwitzgebel, E., & Garza, M.
- Venue
- Midwest Studies In Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 98-119
- ISSN
- 0363-6550 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2180168674
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 6.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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