Consciousness and welfare subjectivity
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many philosophers tacitly accept the View: consciousness is necessary for being a welfare subject. That is, in order to be an eligible bearer of welfare goods and bads, an entity must be capable of phenomenal consciousness. However, this paper argues that, in the absence of a compelling rationale, we are not licensed to accept the View, because doing so amounts to fallacious reasoning in theorizing about welfare: insisting on the View when consciousness is not in fact important for welfare value in a systematic and significant way is objectionably “consciousist.” As a result, the View does not advance our understanding of the value of consciousness. The paper further diagnoses why we may be attracted to the View, and what we should accept instead.
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Citations
Cites
The Humean Theory of Motivation
SMITH, M. (1987) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcvi.381.36 · Cited by 1,005
Consciousness and Moral Status
Shepherd, J. (2018) · doi:10.4324/9781315396347 · Cited by 161
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6 · Cited by 36
“For a defense of the view that aspects beyond conscious experience qualify as welfare goods, see Bradford (2022).”
BackgroundBirch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Bradford, G.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2022-09-16
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 905-921
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W4297445868
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 10.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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