Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness—valenced or affective experience—is essential to consciousness’s moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper, I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value.
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Sentience is commonly thought to be sufficient for moral status.
“This matters ethically, as sentience is commonly thought to be sufficient for moral status (for discussion, see Shepherd, 2024).”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Shepherd, 2024
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- Authors
- Shepherd, J.
- Affiliations
- Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ES)
- Corresponding author
- Shepherd, Joshua
- ORCID
- Shepherd, Joshua
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2024-01-12
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 3005-3015
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- PMC
- PMC11614978
- OpenAlex
- W4390824871
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 28
- FWCI
- 14.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- H2020 European Research Council (757698)
- Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, emotional experience, well-being, moral status, zombies
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