Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations
Open accessAbstract
What, if anything, is epistemically wrong with beliefs involving accurate statistical generalizations about demographic groups? This paper argues that there is a perfectly general, underappreciated epistemic flaw which affects both ethically charged and uncharged statistical generalizations. Though common to both, this flaw can also explain why demographic statistical generalizations give rise to the concerns they do. To identify this flaw, we need to distinguish between the accuracy and the projectability of statistical beliefs. Statistical beliefs are accompanied by an implicit representation of the statistic's modal profile. Their modal profile determines the circumstances in which they can legitimately be projected to unobserved instances. Errors in that implicit content can be compatible with the accuracy of the “bare” statistic, whilst systematically leading to downstream errors in reasoning, in a manner which reveals an epistemic flaw with an important aspect of the belief state itself.
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It inaccurately suggests generalizability or 'projectability' where the data may not support it.
“It inaccurately suggests generalizability or 'projectability' (Munton [2019]) where the data may not support it.”
From Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms (2023) · cites this paper as Munton [2019]
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Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms
Peters, U. (2023) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/715001 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
- Authors
- Munton, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Munton, Jessie
- ORCID
- Munton, Jessie
- Venue
- Philosophical Issues
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2019-09-24
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 228-240
- ISSN
- 1533-6077 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-2237
- OpenAlex
- W2974962262
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 44.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Philosophical Issues (publishedVersion)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Keywords
- statistical generalization, accuracy, projectability, modal profiles, population statistics, reasoning errors
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