The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
“Bluewashing” the Firm? Voluntary Regulations, Program Design, and Member Compliance with the United Nations Global Compact
Abstract
Voluntary programs have emerged as important instruments of public policy. We explore whether programs lacking monitoring and enforcement mechanisms can curb participants’ shirking with program obligations. Incentive-based approaches to policy see monitoring and enforcement as essential to curb shirking, while norm-based approaches view social mechanisms such as norms and learning as sufficient to serve this purpose. The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), a prominent international voluntary program, encourages firms to adopt socially responsible policies. Its program design, however, relies primarily on norms and learning to mitigate shirking. Using a panel of roughly 3,000 U.S. firms from 2000 to 2010, and multiple approaches to address endogeneity and selection issues, we examine the effects of Compact membership on members’ human rights and environmental performance. We find that members fare worse than nonmembers on costly and fundamental performance dimensions, while showing improvements only in more superficial dimensions. Exploiting the lack of monitoring and enforcement, UNGC members are able to shirk: enjoying goodwill benefits of program membership without making costly changes to their human rights and environmental practices.
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Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Delmas, M. A., & Burbano, V. C. (2011) · California Management Review · doi:10.1525/cmr.2011.54.1.64 · Cited by 3,441
Movements, Markets and Fields: The Effects of Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns on U.S. Firms, 1993-2000
Bartley, T., & Child, C. (2011) · Social Forces · doi:10.1093/sf/sor010 · Cited by 185
Cited by
Aragòn-Correa, J. A., Marcus, A. A., & Vogel, D. (2020) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2018.0014 · Cited by 468
Wickert, C., Scherer, A. G., & Spence, L. J. (2016) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.12209 · Cited by 434
Corporate involvement in Sustainable Development Goals: Exploring the territory
van der Waal, J. W. H., & Thijssens, T. (2020) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119625 · Cited by 402
Organizations' engagement with sustainable development goals: From cherry‐picking to SDG‐washing?
Heras‐Saizarbitoria, I., Urbieta, L., & Boiral, O. (2022) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.2202 · Cited by 350
CSR-Washing is Rare: A Conceptual Framework, Literature Review, and Critique
Pope, S., & Wæraas, A. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2546-z · Cited by 297
Metadata
- Authors
- Berliner, D., & Prakash, A.
- Venue
- Policy Studies Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-10-27
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-138
- ISSN
- 0190-292X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2164547633
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 57.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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