Cited by 27Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataSecurity and Verification in Computing

Model poisoning attacks against distributed machine learning systems

Tomsett, Richard, Chan, Kevin S., Chakraborty, Supriyo·2019·Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Multi-Domain Operations Applications

Abstract

Future military coalition operations will increasingly rely on machine learning (ML) methods to improve situational awareness. The coalition context presents unique challenges for ML: the tactical environment creates significant computing and communications limitations while also having to deal with an adversarial presence. Further, coalition operations must operate in a distributed manner, while coping with the constraints posed by the operational environment. Envisioned ML deployments in military assets must be resilient to these challenges. Here, we focus on the susceptibility of ML models to be poisoned (during training) or fooled (after training) by adversarial inputs. We review recent work on distributed adversarial ML, and present new results from our own investigations into model poisoning attacks on distributed learning systems without a central parameter aggregation node.

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Crossref · 10.1117/12.2520275

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36 of 36 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • If local algorithms are not encrypted, or the updates are not securely aggregated, data can leak or algorithms can be tampered with, reconstructed or stolen through parameter inference.

    “In case the local algorithms are not encrypted, or the updates aren't securely aggregated, data can leak or algorithms can be tampered with 51 , reconstructed or stolen (parameter inference), which is unacceptable from the viewpoint of intellectual property, patent restrictions or asset protection.”

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Authors
Tomsett, R., Chan, K. S., & Chakraborty, S.
Affiliations
  • IBM (United Kingdom) (GB)
  • DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory (US)
  • IBM (United States) (US)
Venue
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Multi-Domain Operations Applications
Publisher
SPIE
Published
2019-05-10
Pages
46
OpenAlex
W2946559073
Cited by
27
References
37
Citations by year
2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 3
FWCI
1.24
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Multi-Domain Operations Applications (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
model poisoning, distributed learning, adversarial learning, adversarial training, federated learning, situational awareness, machine learning robustness

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