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Systematic inequality and hierarchy in faculty hiring networks

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Clauset, Aaron, Arbesman, Samuel, Larremore, Daniel B. · 2015 · Science Advances

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

An analysis of networks of graduate-to-faculty hires reveals systematic hiring biases and patterns.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/sciadv.1400005

Cites

44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Fig. 1 Prestige hierarchies in faculty hiring networks. (Top) Placements for 267 computer science faculty among 10 universities, with placements from one particular university highlighted. Each arc (u,v) has a width proportional to the number of current faculty at university v who received their doctorate at university u (≠v). (Bottom) Prestige hierarchy on these institutions that minimizes the total weight of “upward” arcs, that is, arcs where v is more highly ranked than u.
Fig. 1 Prestige hierarchies in faculty hiring networks. (Top) Placements for 267 computer science faculty among 10 universities, with placements from one particular university highlighted. Each arc (u,v) has a width proportional to the number of current faculty at university v who received their doctorate at university u (≠v). (Bottom) Prestige hierarchy on these institutions that minimizes the total weight of “upward” arcs, that is, arcs where v is more highly ranked than u.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 Inequality in faculty production. (A) Lorenz curves showing the fraction of all faculty produced as a function of producing institutions. (B and C) Complementary cumulative distributions for institution out-degree (faculty produced) and in-degree (faculty hired). The means of these distributions are 21 for computer science, 70 for business, and 29 for history.
Fig. 2 Inequality in faculty production. (A) Lorenz curves showing the fraction of all faculty produced as a function of producing institutions. (B and C) Complementary cumulative distributions for institution out-degree (faculty produced) and in-degree (faculty hired). The means of these distributions are 21 for computer science, 70 for business, and 29 for history.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Faculty placement distributions. (A) Network visualizations for computer science, business, and history (top to bottom) showing central positions for institutions in the top 15% of prestige ranks (highlighted; vertex size proportional to ko). (B and C) Estimated probability density functions for relative change in prestige (doctoral to faculty institution) for (B) the top 15% and (C) the remaining institutions, showing a common but right-skewed structure.
Fig. 3 Faculty placement distributions. (A) Network visualizations for computer science, business, and history (top to bottom) showing central positions for institutions in the top 15% of prestige ranks (highlighted; vertex size proportional to ko). (B and C) Estimated probability density functions for relative change in prestige (doctoral to faculty institution) for (B) the top 15% and (C) the remaining institutions, showing a common but right-skewed structure.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Fig. 4 Core-periphery patterns. (A to C) For several institutions within each disciplinary hiring network, we highlight the tree of shortest paths rooted at each u within this network (black) for (A) computer science, (B) business, and (C) history (vertex size is proportional to out-degree, and lighter colors indicate higher prestige). As prestige increases (left), the paths in these trees contract, reflecting a more central network position, increased faculty production, and better faculty placement.
Fig. 4 Core-periphery patterns. (A to C) For several institutions within each disciplinary hiring network, we highlight the tree of shortest paths rooted at each u within this network (black) for (A) computer science, (B) business, and (C) history (vertex size is proportional to out-degree, and lighter colors indicate higher prestige). As prestige increases (left), the paths in these trees contract, reflecting a more central network position, increased faculty production, and better faculty placement.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. R. L. Geiger Knowledge and Money (Stanford University Press Palo Alto CA 2004).
  2. National Research Council Data-Based Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States (National Academies Press Washington DC 2010).
  3. M. Newman Networks: An Introduction (Oxford Univ. Press Oxford 2010).
  4. R. A. Hanneman, The prestige of Ph.D. granting departments of sociology: A simple network approach. Connections 24, 68–77 (2001).
  5. S. Bowles S. N. Durlauf K. Hoff Eds. Poverty Traps (Princeton Univ. Press Princeton NJ 2006).
  6. M. Clarke A. P. Sanoff M. Savino A. Usher College and University Ranking Systems: Global Perspectives and American Challenges (Institute for Higher Education Policy Washington DC 2007) pp. 9–21.
  7. National Research Council Research Doctorate Programs in the United States: Continuity and Change (National Academies Press Washington DC 1995).
  8. G. Leef, M. Lowrey, Do college rankings mean anything? Inquiry 17, 1–9 (2004).
  9. E. Grimson, Dangers of rankings with inaccurate data. Comput. Res. News 22, 1–4 (2010).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Clauset, A., Arbesman, S., & Larremore, D. B.
Affiliations
  • Santa Fe Institute (US)
  • Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Kansas City, MO 64110, USA.
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Clauset, Aaron
Venue
Science Advances
Published
2015-02-06
Volume
1
Issue
1
Pages
e1400005-e1400005
ISSN
2375-2548 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2102017123
Cited by
624
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 60 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 74 · 2022: 60 · 2021: 64 · 2020: 62 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 68 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 10
FWCI
42.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc
Locations
  • Science Advances (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (20120085)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › scientometrics and bibliometrics research
  • Social Sciences › Education › Higher Education Governance and Development
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Research, Science, and Academia
Keywords
faculty hiring, academic job market, institutional prestige, social inequality, gender inequality in academia, academic careers, research productivity, academic hierarchy

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Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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