Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions
Abstract
Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game,
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Adding punishment can stabilise cooperation by reducing the benefit of defection.
“Adding punishment can stabilise cooperation by reducing the benefit of defection (Henrich 2006; Boyd and Richerson 1992).”
From Cultural Evolution of Religion, Spirituality and Ritual: Impacts On Human Cooperation (2024) · cites this paper as Henrich 2006
Cites
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,416 · see citing works
Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution
Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2004) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226712130.001.0001 · Cited by 2,793 · see citing works
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 881 · see citing works
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Bering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458 · see citing works
Mean Gods Make Good People: Different Views of God Predict Cheating Behavior
Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2011) · International Journal for the Psychology of Religion · doi:10.1080/10508619.2011.556990 · Cited by 318 · see citing works
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000655 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Self-citationSocial Diversity and Social Preferences in Mixed-Motive Reinforcement Learning
McKee, K. R., Gemp, I., McWilliams, B., Duèñez-Guzmán, E. A., Hughes, E., & Leibo, J. Z. (2020) · International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems · doi:10.65109/dnuf7773 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Cooperation without punishment
Battu, B., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Dasgupta, N., & Musolesi, M. (2025) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-025-09698-5 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“However, cooperating can often appear illogical for individuals, especially in situations known as social dilemmas that embody conflicts between individual-payoff maximizing choices and group-payoff maximizing choices [4, 19].”
Cultural Evolution of Religion, Spirituality and Ritual: Impacts On Human Cooperation
McNamara, R. A. (2024) · KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie · doi:10.1007/s11577-024-00937-3 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Adding punishment can stabilise cooperation by reducing the benefit of defection (Henrich 2006; Boyd and Richerson 1992).”
Gupta, P., Zhong, Q., Yakura, H., Eisenmann, T., & Rahwan, I. (2026) · Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems · doi:10.65109/czdc3237 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Instead, people act based on local heuristics, and cooperation emerges over time through normative values, punishment, and other social mechanisms [9].”
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-04-07
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5770
- Pages
- 60-61
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W1547239602
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 40.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, reputation, public goods game, spatial games, human institutions
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Cultural Evolution, Games, Experimental, Group Processes, Humans, Punishment, Social Behavior, Social Sciences
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