The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Citations
Cites
Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35090060 · Cited by 3,302
Rational imitation in preverbal infants
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415755a · Cited by 1,391
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The Social Brain: Neural Basis of Social Knowledge
Adolphs, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163514 · Cited by 1,827
“…(because pointing with one's elbow doesn't make sense normally), but they do show a preference to eat from the bowl if a human points with an elbow while holding something else with both hands (because in that case the hands are not free to point and using the elbow makes sense) (Wood et al. 2007).”
Rizzolatti, G., Cattaneo, L., Fabbri-Destro, M., & Rozzi, S. (2014) · Physiological Reviews · doi:10.1152/physrev.00009.2013 · Cited by 496
Investigating Action Understanding: Inferential Processes versus Action Simulation
Brass, M., Schmitt, R. M., Spengler, S., & Gergely, G. (2007) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.11.057 · Cited by 395
Conceptual Challenges and Directions for Social Neuroscience
Adolphs, R. (2010) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.006 · Cited by 270
Marmoset prosociality is intentional
Burkart, J. M., & van Schaik, C. P. (2020) · Animal Cognition · doi:10.1007/s10071-020-01363-6 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2007-09-07
- Volume
- 317
- Issue
- 5843
- Pages
- 1402-1405
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2152300001
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 29.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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