New physicians: A natural experiment in market organization
Abstract
The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have failed, while others have succeeded, they provide a natural experiment that permits the hypothesis to be tested. The new evidence also suggests directions in which modifications of existing procedures might be considered.
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Those responsible for maintaining the NRMP responded conscientiously to this societal change and modified the system's algorithm to place couples more fairly.
“those responsible for maintaining the system responded conscientiously to this societal change and modified the system's algorithm to place couples more fairly [Roth 1990].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1990
The original design of the NRMP Admissions Algorithm did not deal well with the changing social conditions when significant numbers of dual-career couples participated in the match.
“Although the original design of the Admissions Algorithm did not deal well with the changing social conditions (when significant numbers of dual-career couples participated in the match)”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1990
The original NRMP Admissions Algorithm placed married couples at a disadvantage in achieving an optimal placement compared with their single peers.
“At this point, it was discovered that the original Admissions Algorithm placed married couples at a disadvantage in achieving an optimal placement as compared with their single peers [Roth 1984;1990].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1990
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- Authors
- Roth, A. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Pittsburgh (US)
- Corresponding author
- Roth, Alvin E.
- ORCID
- Roth, Alvin E.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 1990-12-14
- Volume
- 250
- Issue
- 4987
- Pages
- 1524-1528
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2050963707
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 13.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Medical Education and Admissions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
- Keywords
- National Resident Matching Program, centralized matching, physician employment, residency training, labor market organization, market failure, matching markets
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Economic Competition, Employment, United Kingdom, Hospitals, Information Centers, Internship and Residency, Personnel Staffing and Scheduling Information Systems, United States, Program Evaluation, History, 20th Century
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