How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?
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Abstract
We investigated the effects of Facebook's and Instagram's feed algorithms during the 2020 US election. We assigned a sample of consenting users to reverse-chronologically-ordered feeds instead of the default algorithms. Moving users out of algorithmic feeds substantially decreased the time they spent on the platforms and their activity. The chronological feed also affected exposure to content: The amount of political and untrustworthy content they saw increased on both platforms, the amount of content classified as uncivil or containing slur words they saw decreased on Facebook, and the amount of content from moderate friends and sources with ideologically mixed audiences they saw increased on Facebook. Despite these substantial changes in users' on-platform experience, the chronological feed did not significantly alter levels of issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or other key attitudes during the 3-month study period.
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TL;DR
A large randomized experiment on Facebook and Instagram during the 2020 US election found that switching users from algorithmic to reverse-chronological feeds substantially changed on-platform experience and reduced time spent and online political engagement. However, the chronological feed did not significantly alter issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or self-reported offline participation/turnout over the 3-month study.
Key findings
- Chronological feeds reduced platform use: Facebook users in the Algorithmic Feed group spent 73% more time daily than US monthly active users, versus 37% more in the Chronological Feed group (p < 0.005); Instagram values were 107% versus 84% more (p < 0.005). Likes fell from 6.7% to 3.1% of exposures on Facebook and from 1.4% to 0.9% on Instagram (p < 0.005).
- Content exposure shifted: political content increased; Facebook untrustworthy-source content rose from 2.6% to 4.4% (+68.8%, p < 0.005), uncivil content fell from 3.2% to 1.8% (−43.0%, p < 0.005), and moderate/mixed-audience content rose from 22.6% to 30.9% (+36.7%, p < 0.005). On Instagram, untrustworthy-source content rose from 1.3% to 1.6% (+22.1%, p < 0.005).
- Primary political attitudes showed no significant treatment effects: issue polarization, affective polarization, election knowledge, and news knowledge did not differ significantly (p ≈ 1 for polarization; p > 0.63 for knowledge). Self-reported political participation and turnout also showed no significant differences (Facebook p = 1.0 for both; Instagram p = 1.0 and p = 0.64).
- On-platform political engagement declined strongly (Facebook −0.117 SD, p < 0.005; Instagram −0.090 SD, p < 0.005), while Facebook users in the Chronological Feed clicked more on political news from likely partisan sources (0.107 SD, p < 0.01).
Methods
- Randomized controlled experiments within Facebook and Instagram during the 2020 US presidential election. Consenting US users aged ≥18 were recruited via survey invitations atop their feeds in August 2020 and randomly assigned to status quo Algorithmic Feed or reverse-chronological Chronological Feed, active 24 September to 23 December 2020. Ads were not affected; about 80% of material presented was manipulated.
- Analytic samples: Facebook n = 23,391; Instagram n = 21,373, comprising participants who completed the first two surveys and at least one of the subsequent three waves. Participants completed five surveys and consented to on-platform activity and passive off-platform tracking.
- Preregistered on OSF. Main estimand was the population average treatment effect (PATE), weighted by predicted ideology, friend count, number of political pages followed, and days active; unweighted sample average treatment effects (SATE) were also reported. Effects were estimated for feed content, attitudes, knowledge, and participation, with multiple-comparison adjustment for primary hypotheses.
Limitations
- The paper states the design estimates direct individual effects only and cannot speak to “general equilibrium” effects: it cannot capture whether algorithms shape societal incentives, content producers, campaigns, or feedback from users outside the sample whose behavior was shaped by algorithmic rankings. Scaling the intervention to all users might produce different results.
- The paper states possible explanations for null downstream effects include the approximately 3-month intervention being too short, the specific polarized US election context, and the particular alternative ranking system used; results may not generalize to other political systems or ranking systems. Mechanisms involving knowledge, cross-cutting exposure, and coordination/information costs could not be directly tested because mediators were post-treatment.
- The paper notes the sample was more active than average monthly active users, and the unweighted sample overrepresented users aged 30–44, white, female, liberal, higher-income, and college-educated; PATE weighting was designed to address this. Attrition was 19.5% for posttreatment waves but did not differ significantly by treatment group. Instagram also lacked ideology and political-news classifications for some measures.
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In the paper
“on the Facebook platform, users in the Chronological Feed con-dition clicked more frequently on political news content from likely partisan sources (0.107 SD, p < 0.01).”
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In the paper
“On Instagram, we did not find a meaningful change in the proportion of users’ feeds with uncivil content (1.6 versus 1.6%)”
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In the paper
“the average number of visits by Face-book users to reddit.com and youtube.com in-creased in the Chronological Feed group by 52% (16.2 visits, p < 0.005) and 21% (50.1 visits, p < 0.05), respectively.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“and decreased even further (by approximately one-half) in the Chronological Feed on Facebook (0.019%, p < 0.005).”
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In the paper
“using on-platform measures of political engagement—for example, posting or likingcon-tent classified as political, sharing that you voted, and mentioning politicians and candidates run-ning for office on social media—we found strong evidence that the Chronological Feed had a negative impact on both platforms (Facebook, −0.117 SD, p < 0.005; Instagram, −0.090 SD, p < 0.005).”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“Users also participated less in online forms of political engagement.”
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- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
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“On the other hand, other research has failed to find long-term changes in user beliefs due to social media ranking algorithms [26,27,29,38]”
From Twitter's Algorithm: Amplifying Anger, Animosity, and Affective Polarization (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“While prior work made important advances in randomized controlled trials on the Facebook and Instagram algorithms (37), these experiments could only proceed with negotiated support from Meta's executives-an arrangement that may limit the scope and independence of scientific work.”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [37]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“They found no significant impact on users' affective polarization.”
From Twitter's Algorithm: Amplifying Anger, Animosity, and Affective Polarization (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
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In the citing paper
“Similarly, recent large-scale experiments on Facebook and Instagram found no evidence that reduced exposure to in-party sources or a simpler reverse-chronological algorithm affected polarization and political attitudes (37,23) during the 2020 U.S. election.”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [37]
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“Since we did not preregister this analysis, we minimize the number of subjective modeling decisions by considering the same participant characteristics and following a similar reweighting procedure as the Facebook and Instagram Election studies (23,37).”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [37]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Guess, A. M., Malhotra, N., Pan, J., Barberá, P., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., González-Bailón, S., Kennedy, E., Kim, Y. M., Lazer, D., Moehler, D., Nyhan, B., Rivera, C. V., Settle, J., Thomas, D. R., Thorson, E., Tromble, R., Wilkins, A., Wojcieszak, M., Xiong, B., de Jonge, C. K., Franco, A., Mason, W., Stroud, N. J., & Tucker, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- Meta (United States) (US)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Northeastern University (US)
- Dartmouth College (US)
- William & Mary (US)
- Syracuse University (US)
- George Washington University (US)
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Meta, Menlo Park, CA, USA.
- Center for Media Engagement (US)
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Guess, Andrew M.
- ORCID
- Guess, Andrew M.
- Malhotra, Neil
- Pan, Jennifer
- Barberá, Pablo
- Brown, Taylor
- Dimmery, Drew
- Freelon, Deen
- Gentzkow, Matthew
- González-Bailón, Sandra
- Kennedy, Edward
- Kim, Young Mie
- Lazer, David
- Moehler, Devra
- Nyhan, Brendan
- Settle, Jaime
- Thomas, Daniel Robert
- Thorson, Emily
- Tromble, Rebekah
- Wilkins, Arjun
- Wojcieszak, Magdalena
- Mason, Winter
- Stroud, Natalie Jomini
- Tucker, Joshua A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2023-07-28
- Volume
- 381
- Issue
- 6656
- Pages
- 398-404
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W4385298751
- Cited by
- 363
- References
- 66
- Citations by year
- 2026: 124 · 2025: 113 · 2024: 89 · 2023: 33
- FWCI
- 169.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Carolina Digital Repository (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- UNC Libraries
- Funders
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- American Association for the Advancement of Science
- William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
- John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
- John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
- University of Wisconsin-Madison
- Charles Koch Foundation
- York University
- Nutrition Obesity Research Center, University of North Carolina
- Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
- National Opinion Research Center
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- Facebook, Instagram, 2020 US presidential election, political campaigns, political polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, user engagement, content exposure
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Attitude, Humans, Politics, Friends, Social Media
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Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.