Affect, Not Ideology
Abstract
The current debate over the extent of polarization in the American mass public focuses on the extent to which partisans’ policy preferences have moved. Whereas “maximalists” claim that partisans’ views on policies have become more extreme over time (Abramowitz 2010), “minimalists” (Fiorina and Abrams 2009) contend that the majority of Americans remain centrist, and that what little centrifugal movement has occurred reflects sorting, i.e., the increased association between partisanship and ideology. We argue in favor of an alternative definition of polarization, based on the classic concept of social distance (Bogardus 1947). Using data from a variety of sources, we demonstrate that both Republicans and Democrats increasingly dislike, even loathe, their opponents. We also find that partisan affect is inconsistently (and perhaps artifactually) founded in policy attitudes. The more plausible account lies in the nature of political campaigns; exposure to messages attacking the out-group reinforces partisans’ biased views of their opponents.
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Observational approaches do not allow researchers to separate the impact of obtaining factual knowledge from the effect of other variables that are typically correlated with both domain-specific political knowledge and attitude polarization.
“These observational approaches raise a critical inferential challenge, as they do not allow researchers to separate the impact of obtaining factual knowledge from the effect of other variables that are typically correlated with both domain-specific political knowledge and attitude polarization, such as the intensity of one’s political group identity11, one’s pre-existing factual beliefs21, or one’”
From Factual knowledge can reduce attitude polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [22]
Selective exposure to like-minded information would likely result in affective polarization, a process in which individuals develop diverging evaluations of attitude objects in a partisan context.
“Second, selective exposure to like-minded information would also likely result in affective polarizationa process of opinion formation in which individuals develop diverging evaluations of attitude objects (e.g., in-group vs. out-group candidates) in a partisan context (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016;Iyengar et al., 2012;Levendusky, 2018).”
From Do Search Algorithms Endanger Democracy? An Experimental Investigation of Algorithm Effects on Political Polarization (2020) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
There is an increasing tendency that people, especially partisans, defend the in-group and dislike the out-group.
“Recent work on public opinion suggests that there is an increasing tendency that people, especially partisans, defend the in-group and dislike the out-group (Iyengar et al., 2012;Levendusky, 2018).”
From Do Search Algorithms Endanger Democracy? An Experimental Investigation of Algorithm Effects on Political Polarization (2020) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
Ideological polarization can contribute to affective or pernicious polarization.
“it may boost accountability and decrease corruption but can also contribute to the aforementioned harmful forms of polarization”
From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
Ideological polarization of political parties increases partisanship.
“Firstly, ideological polarization of political parties was shown to increase partisanship (Iyengar et al., 2012;Lupu, 2015)”
From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes (2012) were the first authors to coin the term 'affective polarization'.
“De acuerdo a nuestra búsqueda, Iyengar, Sood y Lelkes (2012) son los primeros autores en acuñar el término”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar, Sood y Lelkes (2012)
Varios investigadores en ciencia política sostienen que la polarización afectiva refleja ese proceso en un estado de hiperactividad.
“Varios investigadores en ciencia política sostienen que la polarización afectiva refleja ese proceso en un estado de hiperactividad (Garrett et al., 2014;Iyengar et al., 2012;Van Babel y Pereira, 2018).”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
Using the thermometer measure, Iyengar et al. (2012) show that polarization in the US has grown steadily in recent decades.
“Utilizando esta medida, Iyengar et al. (2012) muestran como la polarización en EEUU ha ido creciendo sostenidamente en las últimas décadas.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Iyengar et al. (2012) mostraron que la creciente hostilidad entre los líderes demócratas y republicanos a partir de campañas agresivas contribuyó a la polarización afectiva en EEUU en las últimas décadas, medida a partir de cambios en la distancia social tolerada y el nivel de cercanía afectiva.
“En su trabajo pionero realizado a partir de datos de encuestas en series de tiempo, Iyengar et al. (2012) mostraron que la creciente hostilidad entre los líderes demócratas y republicanos a partir de campañas agresivas contribuyó a la polarización afectiva en EEUU en las últimas décadas, medida a partir de cambios en la distancia social tolerada y el nivel de cercanía afectiva.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
The growth in US affective polarization is due to increasingly lower affect toward the opposing party.
“Esto se debe a que el grado de afecto hacia el partido opositor es cada vez más bajo.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Iyengar et al. (2012) propusieron en la última década la noción de polarización afectiva para describir el creciente desagrado y hostilidad entre grupos de partidarios políticos en algunas sociedades modernas, diferenciándolo de la mera divergencia de creencias y opiniones.
“En la última década, la literatura en ciencia política ha introducido un nuevo concepto denominado "polarización afectiva" para caracterizar una forma de polarización política en la que predominan actitudes de favoritismo por el propio grupo y desprecio hacia el grupo rival.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
When the analysis is restricted to those two terms, the result persists.
“No obstante, cuando el análisis se restringe a esos dos términos, el resultado persiste.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
In contrast, affect toward one's own party has remained relatively stable over recent decades.
“En contraste, el grado de afecto hacia el partido propio se ha mantenido relativamente estable a lo largo de las últimas décadas.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
In 1960, only 4-5% were bothered by their child marrying someone from the opposing party, while by 2010 the figure rose to 33% among Democrats and 50% among Republicans.
“En 1960, sólo al 4-5% le resultaba molesto que su hijo se case con alguien del partido opuesto, mientras que para 2010 esa cifra saltó al 33% en los demócratas y al 50% en los republicanos (Iyengar et al., 2012).”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
Iyengar et al. (2012) show that Americans express increasing negativity at the prospect of their child marrying someone from the opposing party.
“En su estudio pionero, Iyengar y colaboradores (2012) muestran que los americanos expresan cada vez más negatividad ante la perspectiva de que su hijo se case con alguien del partido contrario.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Iyengar et al. (2012) compared two surveys, one in 1960 and one in 2008 in the US, and found that in-group bias of attributing more positive traits to one's own party and out-group bias of assigning more negative traits to rival party members grew exponentially from one period to the other.
“Por ejemplo, Iyengar et al. (2012) compararon dos encuestas del tipo mencionado, una realizada en 1960 y otra en 2008 en EEUU, y encuentran que el sesgo in-group de adscribir más rasgos positivos hacia los del propio partido y el sesgo out-group de asignar más rasgos negativos a los miembros del partido rival crecieron exponencialmente de un período al otro.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Iyengar et al. (2012) show that while affective polarization is increasing over time, ideological polarization is stable.
“Aunque Iyengar y colaboradores no reportan el resultado de la correlación, sí muestran que mientras la polarización afectiva es creciente con el paso del tiempo, la polarización ideológica es estable.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Researchers in the area intend to distinguish affective (or attitudinal) polarization from ideological polarization.
“Particularmente, es claro que los investigadores del área pretenden distinguir la polarización afectiva (o actitudinal) de la polarización ideológica (Iyengar et al., 2012).”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
La polarización política implica el dominio de la identidad partidaria o ideológica sobre otras formas de identificación y acción política.
“La polarización política implica el dominio de la identidad partidaria/ideológica sobre otras formas de identificación y acción política (Iyengar et al,2012)”
From ¿Es válido atribuir la polarización política a la comunicación digital? Sobre burbujas, plataformas y polarización afectiva (2020) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al,2012
The political divide has remained relatively stable in the United States in terms of issue positions, while many other indicators point to a significant increase in partisan polarization and animosity in the mass public.
“While the political divide has remained relatively stable in the United States in terms of issue positions (33), many other indicators point to a significant increase in partisan polarization and animosity in the mass public (18, 34): Democrats and Republicans are growing increasingly cold to each other, coming to dislike or even disdain their partisan opponents (15).”
From How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting (2022) · cites this paper as [15]
Partisanship is emerging as an important social identity under which many societal divisions and conflicts are coming to align.
“Many scholars link these negative feelings to shifts in identity, with partisanship emerging as an important social identity under which many societal divisions and conflicts are coming to align (15–18).”
From How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting (2022) · cites this paper as [15]
Iyengar et al. (2012) grounded affective polarization in Tajfel and Turner's (1979) social identity theory, treating partisanship as a social identity.
“Iyengar et al. (2012) grounded affective polarization in Tajfel and Turner's (1979) social identity theory: partisanship is a social, not simply a political, identity.”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Sorting causes partisans to "dislike, even loathe" one another.
“sorting causes partisans to “dislike, even loathe” one another (15)”
From How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting (2022) · cites this paper as [15]
Scholars have often used party feeling thermometers and social distance items to measure affective polarization.
“Beginning with Iyengar et al. (2012), scholars have often used two measures that were included in surveys long before theories of affective polarization emerged: party feeling thermometers and social distance items.”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Estas inercias de interacción contribuyen a un aumento de la polarización y la hostilidad intergrupal, impulsando emociones negativas hacia quienes se identifican con grupos opuestos.
“Estas inercias contribuyen a un aumento en los niveles de polarización y hostilidad intergrupal, impulsando las emociones negativas hacia aquellos que se identifican con grupos opuestos (Iyengar, Sood y Lelkes, 2012).”
From Homofilia, polarización afectiva y desinformación en Twitter. Caso de estudio sobre la crisis migratoria #Openarms (2021) · cites this paper as Iyengar, Sood y Lelkes, 2012
Iyengar et al. (2012) found that the difference in social distance between the parties was highly significant (p < .01) and Republicans maintain greater social distance from Democrats.
“they find “The difference in social distance between the parties was highly significant (p < .01)…Republicans maintain greater social distance from Democrats” (418).”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Las creencias amplificadas y percepciones segregadas sobre el mundo forman la base para tomar actitudes.
“Las creencias amplificadas y percepciones segregadas sobre el mundo forman la base para tomar actitudes (Iyengar et al., 2012).”
From Homofilia, polarización afectiva y desinformación en Twitter. Caso de estudio sobre la crisis migratoria #Openarms (2021) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
Extremity in issue opinions is not a necessary condition for affective polarization.
“and that extremity in issue opinions is not a necessary condition for affective polarization”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
Affective polarization is largely distinct from the ideological divide.
“Rather, we argue that affective polarization is largely distinct from the ideological divide”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
Affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016.
“and ( b ) affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
Americans have become increasingly averse to the prospect of their child marrying someone from the opposing party.
“Iyengar et al. (2012) show that Americans have become increasingly averse to the prospect of their child marrying someone from the opposing party.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
The change in affective polarization is not that people like their own party more over time; rather, there is an increase in out-party animus, especially in recent years.
“It is particularly noteworthy that ( a ) the change is not that people like their own party more over time; rather, there is an increase in out-party animus, especially in recent years”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
Affective polarization (the difference between mean in-party feeling and mean out-party feeling) shows a significant increase over time, mainly due to an increase in animus against the out-party.
“We also plot affective polarization ( gray line )-the difference between mean in-party feeling and mean out-party feeling-which shows a significant increase over time (Iyengar et al. 2012), mainly due to an increase in animus against the out-party.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party.
“Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
Republicans are especially sensitive to crossparty marriage.
“with Republicans especially sensitive to crossparty marriage”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
In 1960, only 4-5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010.
“In 1960, only 4-5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, pp. 416-18).”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. 2012
The percentage of Americans who would be somewhat or very unhappy if their child married someone of the opposite party has increased by about 35 percentage points over the last 50 years.
“According to Iyengar et al. (2012), the percentage of Americans who would be somewhat or very unhappy if their child married someone of the opposite party has increased by about 35 percentage points over the last 50 years”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al. (2012)
Affective polarization occurs when members of different social groups or political parties hold strong positive or negative attitudes or feelings about the groups themselves, owing to in-party love and/or out-party animus.
“Finally, affective polarization (Fig. 1c) occurs when members of different social groups (or political parties) hold strong positive or negative attitudes (or feelings) about the groups themselves (not just their policy preferences49,79), owing to ‘in-party love’ and/or ‘out-party animus’80.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [79]
Campaigns increase the manifestation of social and affective identity.
“Se coincide en la importancia de las campañas como fenómenos que aumentan la manifestación de la identidad social y afectiva (Iyengar et al., 2012;Rodríguez et al., 2022).”
From Polarización en Twitter/X: análisis del debate generado por los medios de comunicación durante las elecciones locales y autonómicas del 28-M 2023 en España (2026) · cites this paper as Iyengar et al., 2012
El elemento constitutivo del proceso de polarización se desprende de las percepciones y miradas hacia 'el otro' político que van tejiendo la hostilidad afectiva entre grupos.
“Desde la perspectiva de Iyengar, el elemento constitutivo del proceso de polarización se desprende de las percepciones y miradas hacia "el otro" (político) que van tejiendo la hostilidad afectiva entre grupos.”
From “TE AMO, TE ODIO: DAME MÁS”*Polarización afectiva en la opinión pública argentina (2023) · cites this paper as Iyengar, Sood y Lelkes (2012)
Scholars have made a conceptual distinction between issue polarization (an ideological, policy-based political divide) and affective polarization (dislike, distrust, and general animosity of political partisans toward the other political side).
“Scholars have made the conceptual distinction between issue polarization—an ideological, policy-based political divide, and affective polarization, i.e. dislike, distrust, and general animosity of political partisans toward the other political side (5, 61, 62).”
From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [61]
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Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-5486
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Sorted by citations
The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 · Cited by 3,317 · see citing works
“In 1960, only 4–5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, pp. 416–18).”
InfluentialSelf-citationFear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12152 · Cited by 2,452 · see citing works
“…Iyengar1 and Sean J. Westwood2 1Chandler Chair of Communication and Professor of Political Science Stanford University Building 120, Room 110 450 Serra Mall Stanford, CA 94305-2050 2Post-Doctoral Researcher Princeton University 308 Robertson Hall Princeton, NJ 08544 July 6, 2014 Contents”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationMason, L. (2015) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12089 · Cited by 1,367 · see citing works
The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics
Flynn, D. J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2017) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12394 · Cited by 1,183 · see citing works
“Ingroup members are, for instance, more likely to be perceived as holding common interests (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998) and to be viewed warmly (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012).”
BackgroundColleoni, E., Rozza, A., & Arvidsson, A. (2014) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/jcom.12084 · Cited by 1,151 · see citing works
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation
DRUCKMAN, J. N., PETERSON, E., & SLOTHUUS, R. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000500 · Cited by 1,569 · see citing works
“This is the type of dynamic uncovered by Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) who find that negative campaigning between parties, which stems from increased polarization, is “an especially important contextual factor that heightens the salience of partisan identity.””
BackgroundMcCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764218759576 · Cited by 1,023 · see citing works
“Negative campaigns differentiating one party or candidate from another by attacking the integrity of the opponent are found to increase negative partisanship and affective polarization (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016; Iyengar et al., 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century
Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001 · Cited by 978 · see citing works
“…of Democrats and Republicans about their ownpartyhavechangedverylittle,theirfeelingsabouttheopposing party havebecome much more negative (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Greenberg, 2004; Jacobson, 2007; Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2013, 2015; Abramowitz, 2015; Huddy et al., 2015).”
Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity
HUDDY, L., MASON, L., & AARØE, L. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000604 · Cited by 1,415 · see citing works
“The greater emotionality of strong partisans, especially their greater anger in response to threat, helps explain the vitriolic nature of current party politics (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012).”
BackgroundMethodThe Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion
Bolsen, T., Druckman, J. N., & Cook, F. L. (2014) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9238-0 · Cited by 891 · see citing works
The welfare effects of social media
Allcott, H., Braghieri, L., Eichmeyer, S., & Gentzkow, M. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20190658 · Cited by 857 · see citing works
Media and Political Polarization
Prior, M. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242 · Cited by 1,125 · see citing works
“Overall evaluations of parties have diverged (e.g., Prior 2007, p. 222), and party identifiers rate the opposing party increasingly negatively while not raising evaluations of their own party (Iyengar et al. 2012).”
BackgroundOut of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples
Argyle, L. P., Busby, E. C., Fulda, N., Gubler, J. R., Rytting, C., & Wingate, D. (2023) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1017/pan.2023.2 · Cited by 783 · see citing works
“Further, people often talk about their own political party in more positive ways than the other party, in line with other research [29, 30].”
ResultTucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan, B. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3144139 · Cited by 1,222 · see citing works
Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization
Martin, G. J., & Yurukoglu, A. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160812 · Cited by 666 · see citing works
“Some authors, such as Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes ( 2012 ) , define polarization in “affective” terms, meaning subjective feelings of hostility toward opposing partisans.”
Political homophily in social relationships: evidence from online dating behavior
Huber, G. A., & Malhotra, N. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/687533 · Cited by 664 · see citing works
OSMUNDSEN, M., BOR, A., VAHLSTRUP, P. B., BECHMANN, A., & PETERSEN, M. B. (2021) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421000290 · Cited by 614 · see citing works
“First, sharing news stories could reflect motivations to help one’s preferred party against opposing parties in the increasingly polarized electoral competition (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Lelkes and Westwood 2017).”
BackgroundThe Parties in Our Heads: Misperceptions about Party Composition and Their Consequences
Ahler, D. J., & Sood, G. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/697253 · Cited by 586 · see citing works
“Partisanship also fuels animus and distrust across party lines, with roughly a third of partisans describing the other side as “a threat to the nation’s well-being” (Pew 2014) and nearly as many aghast at the idea of an out-party supporter marrying into their family (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationAffective Polarization in Multiparty Systems
Wagner, M. (2021) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102199 · Cited by 593 · see citing works
Reiljan, A. (2020) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12351 · Cited by 592 · see citing works
One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments Strengthen Partisanship
Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12485 · Cited by 521 · see citing works
“Citizens could use these cues to perceive their party identity as a singular social identity (Huddy et al., 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2016; Nicholson, 2012) that encompasses their ideological, ethnic, and religious affiliations.”
BackgroundPolitical Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation
Leeper, T. J., & Slothuus, R. (2014) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12164 · Cited by 722 · see citing works
Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America
Barber, M. J., & Pope, J. C. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000795 · Cited by 516 · see citing works
How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization
Rogowski, J. C., & Sutherland, J. L. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-015-9323-7 · Cited by 503 · see citing works
The role of (social) media in political polarization: A systematic review
Kubin, E., & von Sikorski, C. (2021) · Annals of the International Communication Association · doi:10.1080/23808985.2021.1976070 · Cited by 610 · see citing works
“The second is affective polarization, which is based on work considering the role of identity in politics (Mason, 2018), and how identity salience within groups (e.g. political parties) can exacerbate out-group animosity (e.g. Gaertner et al., 1993; Iyengar et al., 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialWhat do we measure when we measure affective polarization?
Druckman, J. N., & Levendusky, M. S. (2019) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfz003 · Cited by 615 · see citing works
The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect
Lelkes, Y., Sood, G., & Iyengar, S. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12237 · Cited by 476 · see citing works
Self-citationAmerican Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective
Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108914123 · Cited by 481 · see citing works
Resilience to Online Disinformation: A Framework for Cross-National Comparative Research
Humprecht, E., Esser, F., & Aelst, P. V. (2020) · The International Journal of Press/Politics · doi:10.1177/1940161219900126 · Cited by 476 · see citing works
Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-01012-5 · Cited by 463 · see citing works
Educating for Democracy in a Partisan Age
Kahne, J. E., & Bowyer, B. T. (2016) · American Educational Research Journal · doi:10.3102/0002831216679817 · Cited by 474 · see citing works
Kalla, J., & Broockman, D. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000363 · Cited by 458 · see citing works
Yarchi, M., Baden, C., & Kligler-Vilenchik, N. (2021) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2020.1785067 · Cited by 437 · see citing works
“In the same vein, the marginalization of outgroups in digital communication networks has been tied to an erosion of empathy (Wojcieszak, 2010) and an increase of negative relational attitudes (Iyengar et al., 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialNisbet, E. C., Cooper, K. E., & Garrett, R. K. (2015) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716214555474 · Cited by 437 · see citing works
Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media
Spohr, D. (2017) · Business Information Review · doi:10.1177/0266382117722446 · Cited by 530 · see citing works
“Iyengar and others consider this trend of negative sentiment towards the opposing ideological group based on the concept of social distance (Bogardus, 1947) a better, ‘more diagnostic, indicator of mass polarisation’ than pure policy-based division and voting patterns (Iyengar et al., 2012, p. 406).”
BackgroundConfirmation bias, ingroup bias, and negativity bias in selective exposure to political information
Knobloch-Westerwick, S., Mothes, C., & Polavin, N. (2020) · Communication Research · doi:10.1177/0093650217719596 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
“…is as strong as the preference for attitude-consistent content (Garrett, 2009) and how the confirmation bias may foster political polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012; Stroud, 2010), the current view is that information users generally approach political messages with a confirmation bias.”
BackgroundIdeologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities
Mason, L. (2018) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfy005 · Cited by 550 · see citing works
Mass polarization: Manifestations and measurements
Lelkes, Y. (2016) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfw005 · Cited by 591 · see citing works
Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Taddy, M. (2019) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta16566 · Cited by 381 · see citing works
Shin, J., & Thorson, K. (2017) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/jcom.12284 · Cited by 481 · see citing works
Scientific communication in a post-truth society
Iyengar, S., & Massey, D. S. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1805868115 · Cited by 374 · see citing works
Self-citationElusive consensus: Polarization in elite communication on the COVID-19 pandemic
Green, J., Edgerton, J. F., Naftel, D., Shoub, K., & Cranmer, S. (2020) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abc2717 · Cited by 378 · see citing works
Causes and Consequences of Polarization
Barber, M. J., & McCarty, N. (2015) · Solutions to Political Polarization in America · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316091906.002 · Cited by 375 · see citing works
The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate
Webster, S. W., & Abramowitz, A. I. (2017) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x17703132 · Cited by 557 · see citing works
“Thus, according to Iyengar et al. (2012), Americans “increasingly dislike, even loathe, their opponents” but this same partisan affect is “inconsistently (and perhaps artifactually) founded in policy attitudes” (p. 405).”
BackgroundInfluentialSocial Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization
Barberá, P. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.004 · Cited by 373 · see citing works
“This alternative conceptualization of polarization is often called “ affective polarization ” (Iyengar et al. 2012 ) or “ psychological polarization ” (Settle 2018 ) as opposed to “ ideological polarization, ” which would be limited to divergence of political views.”
Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?
Levendusky, M. S. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/693987 · Cited by 492 · see citing works
“For example, the average rating given to members of the opposing party on the 100-point feeling thermometer scale used by the National Election Study dropped 15 degrees between 1988 and 2008 (Iyengar et al. 2012, 412– 13; see also Abramowitz and Webster 2016).”
MethodInfluentialDivided by the vote: Affective polarization in the wake of the Brexit referendum
Hobolt, S. B., Leeper, T. J., & Tilley, J. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123420000125 · Cited by 496 · see citing works
DellaPosta, D., Shi, Y., & Macy, M. (2015) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/681254 · Cited by 440 · see citing works
“Recent evidence suggests that even the choice of partisan marital partners has become divisive: Democrats and Republicans increasingly report that they would be upset if their children married someone of the opposite party ðIyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012Þ.”
BackgroundA Cross-Cutting Calm: How Social Sorting Drives Affective Polarization
Mason, L. (2016) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfw001 · Cited by 413 · see citing works
(Mis)perceptions of Partisan Polarization in the American Public
Levendusky, M. S., & Malhotra, N. (2016) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfv045 · Cited by 356 · see citing works
Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain
Gest, J., Reny, T. T., & Mayer, J. D. (2017) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414017720705 · Cited by 355 · see citing works
How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?
Guess, A. M., Malhotra, N., Pan, J., Barberá, P., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., et al. (2023) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abp9364 · Cited by 363 · see citing works
The tie that divides: Cross‐national evidence of the primacy of partyism
Westwood, S. J., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R., Miller, L., & Strijbis, O. (2017) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12228 · Cited by 347 · see citing works
“(12)Explanations for the shift toward ideologically polarized parties in the absence of strong social cleavages include institutional developments, most notably, the adoption of primary elections to nominate candidates as well as the prolonged and often hostile tenor of American political campaigns (Iyengar et al. 201…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe Strengthening of Partisan Affect
Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12487 · Cited by 527 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Economic Consequences of Partisanship in a Polarized Era
McConnell, C., Margalit, Y., Malhotra, N., & Levendusky, M. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12330 · Cited by 432 · see citing works
Political Beliefs affect Compliance with COVID-19 Social Distancing OrdersPreprint
Painter, M., & Qiu, T. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3569098 · Cited by 322 · see citing works
Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view
Porter, T., & Schumann, K. (2018) · Self and Identity · doi:10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861 · Cited by 314 · see citing works
Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization
Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2024) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_01160 · Cited by 457 · see citing works
“If there are two parties and all respondents state their affect towards both, then affective polarization Π is the difference between weighted mean own-party affect and weighted mean other-party affect, as in Iyengar et al. (2019).4 We obtain data on various potential explanatory variables at the level of the country…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialBoxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1706588114 · Cited by 467 · see citing works
“Examples include affect polarization (6) and straight-ticket voting (13).”
BackgroundThe Limits of Partisan Prejudice
Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/688223 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
“Despite this work in psychology, the majority of the political science literature suggests, although does not formally test, that partisanship is a special case where punitive behavior is especially prevalent and acceptable (e.g., see Bishop 2009; Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).”
InfluentialFrenemies: How Social Media Polarizes America
Settle, J. E. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108560573 · Cited by 377 · see citing works
Persily, N., Tucker, J. A., Guess, A. M., Lyons, B. A., Barberá, P., Siegel, A. A., Woolley, S., Fowler, E. F., Franz, M. M., Ridout, T. N., et al. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960 · Cited by 464 · see citing works
Does Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?
Levendusky, M., & Malhotra, N. (2016) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2015.1038455 · Cited by 419 · see citing works
“This should decrease positive affect for members of the opposing party and increase affective polarization, or a personal dislike of the opposition (Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, in press; Mason, 2012, 2015).”
BackgroundHow digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting
Törnberg, P. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2207159119 · Cited by 288 · see citing works
Fear, Anger, and Voting for the Far Right: Evidence From the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks
Vasilopoulos, P., Marcus, G., Valentino, N. A., & Foucault, M. (2018) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12513 · Cited by 236 · see citing works
Self-Fulfilling Misperceptions of Public Polarization
Ahler, D. J. (2014) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381614000085 · Cited by 168 · see citing works
Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
Is Deliberation an Antidote to Extreme Partisan Polarization? Reflections on “America in One Room”
Fishkin, J. S., Siu, A., Diamond, L. J., & Bradburn, N. M. (2021) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421000642 · Cited by 277 · see citing works
Prior, M., Sood, G., & Khanna, K. (2015) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00014127 · Cited by 418 · see citing works
“…with early work on voting behavior, none more influential than The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960), and continuing at a steady pace (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012; Lodge and Hamill, 1986; Rahn, 1993; Taber and Lodge, 2006), documentation of partisanship as the structuring force in U.S.…”
BackgroundSelf-citationPartisanship as a Social Identity: Implications for Polarization
West, E. A., & Iyengar, S. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09637-y · Cited by 265 · see citing works
Self-citationGarrett, R. K., Gvirsman, S. D., Johnson, B. K., Tsfati, Y., Neo, R., & Dal, A. (2014) · Human Communication Research · doi:10.1111/hcre.12028 · Cited by 351 · see citing works
“Affective polarization, as operationalized by Iyengar et al. (2012), has at least two dimensions: favorability and social distance.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialWhere ‘fake news’ flourishes: a comparison across four Western democracies
Humprecht, E. (2018) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2018.1474241 · Cited by 254 · see citing works
The Home as a Political Fortress: Family Agreement in an Era of Polarization
Iyengar, S., Konitzer, T., & Tedin, K. L. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/698929 · Cited by 254 · see citing works
“Most dramatic is the increase in the percentage of partisans who express reservations over the prospect of a son or daughter marrying an out-group partisan—from single digits in the 1960s to a quarter of the electorate in the twentyfirst century (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDoes affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Maybe not
Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., & Westwood, S. J. (2023) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12719 · Cited by 297 · see citing works
The effect of partisanship and political advertising on close family ties
Chen, M. K., & Rohla, R. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaq1433 · Cited by 321 · see citing works
Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know®
McCarty, N. (2019) · doi:10.1093/wentk/9780190867782.001.0001 · Cited by 280 · see citing works
Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2019) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/pmn7h · Cited by 241 · see citing works
Self-citationIdentity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Align with Their Politics
Egan, P. J. (2019) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12496 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
Wojcieszak, M., & Warner, B. R. (2020) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2020.1760406 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
The Moral Roots of Partisan Division: How Moral Conviction Heightens Affective Polarization
Garrett, K. N., & Bankert, A. (2018) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s000712341700059x · Cited by 233 · see citing works
Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2015) · Political Geography · doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.11.003 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Saura, J. R., Soriano, D. R., & Palacios‐Marqués, D. (2021) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2021.102331 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
“According to Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) and Reyes-Me-nendez et al. (2020), this allows for measuring log-likehood to determine the importance of the identified topics in the overall analyzed content.”
BackgroundPolarization in the contemporary political and media landscape
Wilson, A. E., Parker, V. A., & Feinberg, M. (2020) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.07.005 · Cited by 220 · see citing works
Kim, J. W., Guess, A. M., Nyhan, B. J., & Reifler, J. (2021) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1093/joc/jqab034 · Cited by 221 · see citing works
“Specifically, partisan strength and political involvement are associated with negative affect towards the opposing party (Iyengar et al. 2012) and adopting extreme policy attitudes (Taber & Lodge 2006).”
BackgroundPluralistic Collapse: The “Oil Spill” Model of Mass Opinion Polarization
DellaPosta, D. (2020) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/0003122420922989 · Cited by 219 · see citing works
“…and Brewer 2002) suggest such a collapse of previously cross-cutting identities will likely reduce outgroup tolerance and might thereby account for the increasingly harsh tenor of political disagreement perceived by scholars of affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundA Three-Decade Retrospective on the Hostile Media Effect
Perloff, R. M. (2015) · Mass Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/15205436.2015.1051234 · Cited by 219 · see citing works
Understanding Polarization: Meanings, Measures, and Model Evaluation
Bramson, A., Grim, P., Singer, D. J., Berger, W. J., Sack, G., Fisher, S., Flocken, C., & Holman, B. (2017) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/688938 · Cited by 216 · see citing works
“…laboratory studies on media influence and attitude change all in search of a better understanding of central mechanisms (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Ura and Ellis 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Großer and Palfrey 2013; Lauderdale 2013; Levendusky 2013;…”
BackgroundThe Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity
Dias, N., & Lelkes, Y. (2022) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12628 · Cited by 338 · see citing works
The Politics of Beauty: The Effects of Partisan Bias on Physical Attractiveness
Nicholson, S. P., Coe, C. M., Emory, J., & Song, A. V. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-016-9339-7 · Cited by 210 · see citing works
“4; Iyengar et al. 2012; Levendusky 2009).”
InfluentialThe Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity in the United States
Orr, L., & Huber, G. A. (2019) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12498 · Cited by 208 · see citing works
“The magnitude of this difference has grown since 1960, and discrimination on the basis of partisanship may have surpassed racial discrimination in some contexts (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).”
BackgroundInfluentialLink recommendation algorithms and dynamics of polarization in online social networks
Santos, F. P., Yphtach Lelkes, B., & Levin, S. A. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102141118 · Cited by 216 · see citing works
“Recent results indicate that opinion divergence can evolve concurrently with outgroup bias (12, 13), which suggests combining opinions with dynamics on strategies, norms, reputations, and out-group/ingroup cooperation (74–77)—in line with some works in this Special Feature on polarization, cooperation, and group ident…”
BackgroundPolitical Psychology in the Digital (mis)Information age: A Model of News Belief and Sharing
Van Bavel, J. J., Harris, E. A., Pärnamets, P., Rathje, S., Doell, K. C., & Tucker, J. A. (2021) · Social Issues and Policy Review · doi:10.1111/sipr.12077 · Cited by 213 · see citing works
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda
Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.003 · Cited by 284 · see citing works
How Empathic Concern Fuels Political Polarization
Simas, E. N., Clifford, S., & Kirkland, J. H. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000534 · Cited by 209 · see citing works
Psychological Barriers to Bipartisan Public Support for Climate Policy
Van Boven, L., Ehret, P. J., & Sherman, D. K. (2018) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691617748966 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Social learning and partisan bias in the interpretation of climate trends
Guilbeault, D., Becker, J., & Centola, D. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · doi:10.1073/pnas.1722664115 · Cited by 188 · see citing works
Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. (2015) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/679749 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
Hasell, A., & Weeks, B. E. (2016) · Human Communication Research · doi:10.1111/hcre.12092 · Cited by 246 · see citing works
“Partisan media can be polarizing and influence attitudes toward those with opposing views (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Cryderman, 2013; Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar et al., 2012; Levendusky, 2013b; Stroud, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Bolsonaro Voter: Issue Positions and Vote Choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections
Rennó, L. R. (2020) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.1017/lap.2020.13 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Partisan Professionals: Evidence from Credit Rating Analysts
Kempf, E., & Tsoutsoura, M. (2021) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13083 · Cited by 199 · see citing works
- Authors
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- National Research Foundation (ZA)
- Venue
- Public Opinion Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-09-01
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 405-431
- ISSN
- 0033-362X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5331
- OpenAlex
- W2124751389
- Cited by
- 2,748
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 355 · 2025: 381 · 2024: 351 · 2023: 256 · 2022: 293 · 2021: 267 · 2020: 244 · 2019: 154 · 2018: 162 · 2017: 101 · 2016: 70 · 2015: 44 · 2014: 36 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 199.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Public Opinion Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- political polarization, partisan affect, social distance, partisanship, ideology, policy attitudes, outgroup hostility, political campaigns
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