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How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?
Open accessAbstract
We investigated the effects of Facebook's and Instagram's feed algorithms during the 2020 US election. We assigned a sample of consenting users to reverse-chronologically-ordered feeds instead of the default algorithms. Moving users out of algorithmic feeds substantially decreased the time they spent on the platforms and their activity. The chronological feed also affected exposure to content: The amount of political and untrustworthy content they saw increased on both platforms, the amount of content classified as uncivil or containing slur words they saw decreased on Facebook, and the amount of content from moderate friends and sources with ideologically mixed audiences they saw increased on Facebook. Despite these substantial changes in users' on-platform experience, the chronological feed did not significantly alter levels of issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or other key attitudes during the 3-month study period.
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TL;DR
A large randomized experiment on Facebook and Instagram during the 2020 US election found that switching users from algorithmic to reverse-chronological feeds substantially changed on-platform experience and reduced time spent and online political engagement. However, the chronological feed did not significantly alter issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or self-reported offline participation/turnout over the 3-month study.
Key findings
- Chronological feeds reduced platform use: Facebook users in the Algorithmic Feed group spent 73% more time daily than US monthly active users, versus 37% more in the Chronological Feed group (p < 0.005); Instagram values were 107% versus 84% more (p < 0.005). Likes fell from 6.7% to 3.1% of exposures on Facebook and from 1.4% to 0.9% on Instagram (p < 0.005).
- Content exposure shifted: political content increased; Facebook untrustworthy-source content rose from 2.6% to 4.4% (+68.8%, p < 0.005), uncivil content fell from 3.2% to 1.8% (−43.0%, p < 0.005), and moderate/mixed-audience content rose from 22.6% to 30.9% (+36.7%, p < 0.005). On Instagram, untrustworthy-source content rose from 1.3% to 1.6% (+22.1%, p < 0.005).
- Primary political attitudes showed no significant treatment effects: issue polarization, affective polarization, election knowledge, and news knowledge did not differ significantly (p ≈ 1 for polarization; p > 0.63 for knowledge). Self-reported political participation and turnout also showed no significant differences (Facebook p = 1.0 for both; Instagram p = 1.0 and p = 0.64).
- On-platform political engagement declined strongly (Facebook −0.117 SD, p < 0.005; Instagram −0.090 SD, p < 0.005), while Facebook users in the Chronological Feed clicked more on political news from likely partisan sources (0.107 SD, p < 0.01).
Methods
- Randomized controlled experiments within Facebook and Instagram during the 2020 US presidential election. Consenting US users aged ≥18 were recruited via survey invitations atop their feeds in August 2020 and randomly assigned to status quo Algorithmic Feed or reverse-chronological Chronological Feed, active 24 September to 23 December 2020. Ads were not affected; about 80% of material presented was manipulated.
- Analytic samples: Facebook n = 23,391; Instagram n = 21,373, comprising participants who completed the first two surveys and at least one of the subsequent three waves. Participants completed five surveys and consented to on-platform activity and passive off-platform tracking.
- Preregistered on OSF. Main estimand was the population average treatment effect (PATE), weighted by predicted ideology, friend count, number of political pages followed, and days active; unweighted sample average treatment effects (SATE) were also reported. Effects were estimated for feed content, attitudes, knowledge, and participation, with multiple-comparison adjustment for primary hypotheses.
Limitations
- The paper states the design estimates direct individual effects only and cannot speak to “general equilibrium” effects: it cannot capture whether algorithms shape societal incentives, content producers, campaigns, or feedback from users outside the sample whose behavior was shaped by algorithmic rankings. Scaling the intervention to all users might produce different results.
- The paper states possible explanations for null downstream effects include the approximately 3-month intervention being too short, the specific polarized US election context, and the particular alternative ranking system used; results may not generalize to other political systems or ranking systems. Mechanisms involving knowledge, cross-cutting exposure, and coordination/information costs could not be directly tested because mediators were post-treatment.
- The paper notes the sample was more active than average monthly active users, and the unweighted sample overrepresented users aged 30–44, white, female, liberal, higher-income, and college-educated; PATE weighting was designed to address this. Attrition was 19.5% for posttreatment waves but did not differ significantly by treatment group. Instagram also lacked ideology and political-news classifications for some measures.
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“on the Facebook platform, users in the Chronological Feed con-dition clicked more frequently on political news content from likely partisan sources (0.107 SD, p < 0.01).”
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“On Instagram, we did not find a meaningful change in the proportion of users’ feeds with uncivil content (1.6 versus 1.6%)”
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In the paper
“the average number of visits by Face-book users to reddit.com and youtube.com in-creased in the Chronological Feed group by 52% (16.2 visits, p < 0.005) and 21% (50.1 visits, p < 0.05), respectively.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“and decreased even further (by approximately one-half) in the Chronological Feed on Facebook (0.019%, p < 0.005).”
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In the paper
“using on-platform measures of political engagement—for example, posting or likingcon-tent classified as political, sharing that you voted, and mentioning politicians and candidates run-ning for office on social media—we found strong evidence that the Chronological Feed had a negative impact on both platforms (Facebook, −0.117 SD, p < 0.005; Instagram, −0.090 SD, p < 0.005).”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“Users also participated less in online forms of political engagement.”
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- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
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“On the other hand, other research has failed to find long-term changes in user beliefs due to social media ranking algorithms [26,27,29,38]”
From Twitter's Algorithm: Amplifying Anger, Animosity, and Affective Polarization (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“While prior work made important advances in randomized controlled trials on the Facebook and Instagram algorithms (37), these experiments could only proceed with negotiated support from Meta's executives-an arrangement that may limit the scope and independence of scientific work.”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [37]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“They found no significant impact on users' affective polarization.”
From Twitter's Algorithm: Amplifying Anger, Animosity, and Affective Polarization (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Similarly, recent large-scale experiments on Facebook and Instagram found no evidence that reduced exposure to in-party sources or a simpler reverse-chronological algorithm affected polarization and political attitudes (37,23) during the 2020 U.S. election.”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [37]
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“Since we did not preregister this analysis, we minimize the number of subjective modeling decisions by considering the same participant characteristics and following a similar reweighting procedure as the Facebook and Instagram Election studies (23,37).”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [37]
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Self-citationDynamics of algorithmic content amplification on TikTok
Baumann, F., Arora, N., Rahwan, I., & Czaplicka, A. (2026) · EPJ Data Science · doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-026-00629-2 · Cited by 72
The Puzzle of Misinformation: Exposure to Unreliable Content is Higher among the Better Informed
Zhou, A. Y., Tian, Y., & González‐Bailón, S. (2022) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/14614448231196863 · Cited by 14
“There is very little research measuring exposure on social media platforms (recent exceptions are González-Bailón et al., 2023, Guess et al., 2023, Nyhan et al., 2023).”
Self-citationThe Economics of Social MediaPreprint
Aridor, G., Durán, R. J., Levy, R., & Song, L. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4708840 · Cited by 21
Perceptions and Concerns About Misinformation on Facebook in Canada, France, the US, and the UK
Boulianne, S., & Hoffmann, C. P. (2024) · International Journal of Public Opinion Research · doi:10.1093/ijpor/edae048 · Cited by 20
Ideology and polarization set the agenda on social media
Loru, E., Galeazzi, A., Bonetti, A., Sangiorgio, E., Marco, N. D., Cinelli, M., Falkenberg, M., Baronchelli, A., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2025) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-025-19776-z · Cited by 30
“However, their engagement-driven business models and the dynamics of online interactions have raised concerns about their broader social impacts [5, 6], including their role in deepening polarization [7–9], propagating misinformation [10– 12], and amplifying hate speech [13–17].”
The right to audit and power asymmetries in algorithm auditing
Urman, A., Smirnov, I., & Lasser, J. (2024) · EPJ Data Science · doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00454-5 · Cited by 12
Influence of Facebook algorithms on political polarization tested
García, D. (2023) · Nature · doi:10.1038/d41586-023-02325-x · Cited by 18
Wang, S., Huang, S., Zhou, A., & Metaxa, D. (2024) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3687046 · Cited by 11
Contesting personalized recommender systems: a cross-country analysis of user preferences
Starke, C., Metikoš, L., Helberger, N., & de Vreese, C. H. (2024) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2024.2363926 · Cited by 23
“Recent studies suggest that changing the underlying design of the Facebook and Instagram algorithms reduced user exposure to polarizing content and time spent on these platforms (Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023).”
InfluentialWhy Misinformation Must Not Be IgnoredPreprint
Ecker, U. K. H., Tay, L. Q., Roozenbeek, J., et al. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/8a6cj · Cited by 10
The Effect of Downvotes on Content Creation: Evidence from Social MediaPreprint
Deolankar, V., Fong, J., & Sriram, S. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4522092 · Cited by 10
Electoral Irregularities in the World’s Largest DemocracyPreprint
Das, S. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4512936 · Cited by 11
Algorithmic Amplification of Politics and Engagement Maximization on Social Media
Bouchaud, P. (2024) · Studies in computational intelligence · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-53503-1_11 · Cited by 23
Kim, J., Popowski, L., Fang, A., Pyle, C., Freeman, G., Kelly, R., Lee, A. Y., Liu, F., Smith, A. D. R., To, A., et al. (2024) · ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) · doi:10.1145/3678884.3681833 · Cited by 19
A Normative Framework for Assessing the Information Curation Algorithms of the Internet
Lazer, D. M. J., Swire‐Thompson, B., & Wilson, C. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231186779 · Cited by 18
“…consumption on Facebook (González-Bailón et al., 2023), although disentangling algorithmic drivers from other affordances of Facebook is nearly impossible; but (2) that changing the algorithm for three months did not have significant effects on attitudes (Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023).”
Self-citationToxic Content and User Engagement on Social Media: Evidence from a Field ExperimentPreprint
Beknazar-Yuzbashev, G., Jiménez-Durán, R., McCrosky, J., & Stalinski, M. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5130929 · Cited by 12
How to break information cocoons
Santos, F. P. (2023) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-023-00758-7 · Cited by 9
Schüz, B., & Jones, C. M. (2024) · Bundesgesundheitsblatt - Gesundheitsforschung - Gesundheitsschutz · doi:10.1007/s00103-024-03836-2 · Cited by 10
“…nur einen kleinen Anteil des Informationsangebots auf Social Media aus, allerdings konsu-mieren und verbreiten einige wenige und sehr spezifische Gruppen den Großteil der Falschinformation – hier wird nicht nur von „Supersharern“, sondern zunehmend auch von „Superconsumern“ gesprochen [8].”
BackgroundCharting multidimensional ideological polarization across demographic groups in the USA
Ojer, J., Carcamo, D. P., Pastor‐Satorras, R., & Starnini, M. (2025) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-025-02251-0 · Cited by 29
“Very recently, however, this hypothesis has been disputed, after observing that changing Facebook’s feed algorithm to reduce exposure to like-minded content does not seem to reduce the political polarization of users 14–16 .”
Karell, D., & Sachs, J. D. (2023) · Socius Sociological Research for a Dynamic World · doi:10.1177/23780231231212108 · Cited by 14
In Defense of ‘Surveillance Capitalism’
Königs, P. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00804-1 · Cited by 14
Social Media for Activists: Reimagining Safety, Content Presentation, and Workflows
Luther, A., Heuer, H., Geise, S., Haunss, S., & Breiter, A. (2025) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3706598.3713351 · Cited by 15
“Another explanation could be, that because they already regularly receive reports of hate speech through their form of activism, they want to avoid any additional encountering of hate speech.”
Ünlü, A., & Kotonen, T. (2024) · Scandinavian Political Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12270 · Cited by 14
Ludwig, K., Müller, P., Nikolajevic, N., & Grote, A. (2025) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2024.2435998 · Cited by 19
“…does not necessarily decrease news content heterogeneity (Hüllmann & Sensmeier, 2022; Jürgens & Stark, 2022; Kitchens et al., 2020; Michiels et al., 2023), others found evidence supporting this assumption, particularly so with regards to the Facebook algorithm (Guess et al., 2023; Levy, 2021).”
How AI sources can increase openness to opposing views
Lu, L., Tormala, Z. L., & Duhachek, A. (2025) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-025-00791-z · Cited by 24
Followers do not dictate the virality of news outlets on social media
Sangiorgio, E., Cinelli, M., Cerqueti, R., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae257 · Cited by 14
“Furthermore, many platforms implement algorithms designed to prioritize user engagement that might alter information spreading (25 – 27 ), thereby exacerbating ideological divisions (28 – 30).”
BackgroundThe Dark Side of Social Media: Recommender Algorithms and Mental Health
Mandile, S. (2026) · CESifo · doi:10.65864/0209bsp0yi · Cited by 9
Rossi, L., Segerberg, A., Arminio, L., & Magnani, M. (2024) · Environmental Communication · doi:10.1080/17524032.2024.2420787 · Cited by 9
“While recent research has pointed to the role played by algorithmically curated feeds in the creation of informational echo chambers (González-Bailón et al., 2023; Guess et al., 2023), we emphasize that exposure to alternative sources is only part of the story.”
The Effect of Deactivating Facebook and Instagram on Users’ Emotional State
Allcott, H., Gentzkow, M. A., Wittenbrink, B., Cisneros, J. C., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., González‐Bailón, S., Guess, A. M., Kim, Y. M., et al. (2025) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w33697 · Cited by 21
Self-citationSzymkowiak, A., & Antoniak, M. A. (2024) · International Journal of Wine Business Research · doi:10.1108/ijwbr-11-2023-0068 · Cited by 17
The place of content ranking algorithms on the AI risk spectrum
Bayer, J. (2024) · Telecommunications Policy · doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2024.102741 · Cited by 10
Online disinformation in the 2020 U.S. election: swing vs. safe states
Pratelli, M., Petrocchi, M., Saracco, F., & Nicola, R. D. (2024) · EPJ Data Science · doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00461-6 · Cited by 12
“The entropy-based null-model for bipartite network discounting the information of the degree sequence is known as Bipartite Configuration Model (BiCM, [32]).”
BackgroundMethodDeMora, S. L., Samayoa, J. A. G., & Albarracín, D. (2024) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2024.117031 · Cited by 7
Una campaña audiovisual: análisis de las elecciones generales del año 2023 en redes sociales
Díaz, J. B. (2024) · Anàlisi · doi:10.5565/rev/analisi.3690 · Cited by 21
Affective and interactional polarization align across countriesPreprint
Falkenberg, M., Zollo, F., Quattrociocchi, W., Pfeffer, J., & Baronchelli, A. (2023) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/ngsb6 · Cited by 16
Mont’Alverne, C., Arguedas, A. R., Banerjee, S., Toff, B., Fletcher, R., & Nielsen, R. K. (2024) · The International Journal of Press/Politics · doi:10.1177/19401612241292700 · Cited by 9
“Our study joins those that also found null or limited effects associated with partisan news consumption (Guess et al. 2023; Weeks et al. 2021; Wojcieszak et al. 2023).”
Personality, networks, and heterogeneous discussion on Facebook
Boulianne, S., & galipeau, T. (2024) · Journal of Information Technology & Politics · doi:10.1080/19331681.2024.2340624 · Cited by 8
“Guess et al. (2023) worked with Meta to examine how changes to the algorithm influence exposure to content in the context of the 2020 US Election.”
Auditing the audits: evaluating methodologies for social media recommender system audits
Bouchaud, P., & Morales, P. R. (2024) · Applied Network Science · doi:10.1007/s41109-024-00668-6 · Cited by 24
“…providing their data (Hargreaves et al. 2018; Bouchaud et al. 2023; Milli et al. 2023), on non-public proprietary data (Huszár et al. 2021; Guess et al. 2023), or more easily using, so-called “sock-puppet“ accounts, where researchers programmatically interact with the platform with fake…”
BackgroundRickert, T. (2024) · Rhetoric Society Quarterly · doi:10.1080/02773945.2024.2407263 · Cited by 9
Declining information quality under new platform governance
Ozturan, B., Quintana, A., Grinberg, N., Ognyanova, K., & Lazer, D. M. J. (2025) · Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review · doi:10.37016/mr-2020-176 · Cited by 9
Self-citationCountering Misinformation Early: Evidence from a Classroom-Based Field Experiment in India
AMAR, P., Badrinathan, S., Chauchard, S., & Sichart, F. (2025) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055425101184 · Cited by 9
“17 We also analyzed heterogeneous effects for household mobile internet access as previous work indicates that prior exposure to media and the internet can influence how individuals interact with misinformation (Guess et al., 2023).”
Null effects of social media ads on voter registration: Three digital field experiments
(2024) · doi:10.1177/20531680231225316 · Cited by 6
“Even major changes to the Facebook online experience, such as changes to media feed algorithms, do not impact turnout (Guess et al., 2023), polarisation, or political knowledge (Nyhan et al., 2023).”
BackgroundThe influence of coordinated behavior on toxicity
Loru, E., Cinelli, M., Tesconi, M., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2024) · Online Social Networks and Media · doi:10.1016/j.osnem.2024.100289 · Cited by 12
“According to recent studies, such systems can challenge democracy in various ways [4, 5, 6].”
BackgroundBouchaud, P. (2024) · Journal of Computational Social Science · doi:10.1007/s42001-024-00255-w · Cited by 10
“The Gini coefficient G ( I ) is 28.3 % [ 27.9,28.7 ] higher than G ( P ) in engagement maximization timelines, and 23.3 % [ 22.9,23.6 ] higher than G ( P ) in reverse-chronological timelines.”
InfluentialTian, Y., & González‐Bailón, S. (2025) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/14614448251341496 · Cited by 9
“…constitutes a very small fraction of the media content consumed (Allen et al., 2020; Wojcieszak et al., 2024), it can still lead to reinforced demand, particularly on digital platforms with algorithmic forms of curation (González-Bailón et al., 2023; Guess et al., 2023a; Huang and Yang, 2024).”
Self-citationMassey, P. M., Murray, R. M., Chiang, S. C., Russell, A. M., & Yudell, M. (2023) · JMIR Public Health and Surveillance · doi:10.2196/49881 · Cited by 12
Allen, L. K., DeLiema, D., & Kendeou, P. (2025) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2025.2588213 · Cited by 10
“…this means that top-ranked search results and recommended content are shaped not only by user intent, but also by commercial incentives and optimization strategies that frequently amplify dominant narratives, ideological conformity, or polarizing content (Flaxman et al., 2016; Guess et al., 2023).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Guess, A. M., Malhotra, N., Pan, J., Barberá, P., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., González-Bailón, S., Kennedy, E., Kim, Y. M., Lazer, D., Moehler, D., Nyhan, B., Rivera, C. V., Settle, J., Thomas, D. R., Thorson, E., Tromble, R., Wilkins, A., Wojcieszak, M., Xiong, B., de Jonge, C. K., Franco, A., Mason, W., Stroud, N. J., & Tucker, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- Meta (United States) (US)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Northeastern University (US)
- Dartmouth College (US)
- William & Mary (US)
- Syracuse University (US)
- George Washington University (US)
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Meta, Menlo Park, CA, USA.
- Center for Media Engagement (US)
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Guess, Andrew M.
- ORCID
- Guess, Andrew M.
- Malhotra, Neil
- Pan, Jennifer
- Barberá, Pablo
- Brown, Taylor
- Dimmery, Drew
- Freelon, Deen
- Gentzkow, Matthew
- González-Bailón, Sandra
- Kennedy, Edward
- Kim, Young Mie
- Lazer, David
- Moehler, Devra
- Nyhan, Brendan
- Settle, Jaime
- Thomas, Daniel Robert
- Thorson, Emily
- Tromble, Rebekah
- Wilkins, Arjun
- Wojcieszak, Magdalena
- Mason, Winter
- Stroud, Natalie Jomini
- Tucker, Joshua A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2023-07-28
- Volume
- 381
- Issue
- 6656
- Pages
- 398-404
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W4385298751
- Cited by
- 363
- References
- 66
- Citations by year
- 2026: 124 · 2025: 113 · 2024: 89 · 2023: 33
- FWCI
- 169.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Carolina Digital Repository (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- UNC Libraries
- Funders
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- American Association for the Advancement of Science
- William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
- John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
- John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
- University of Wisconsin-Madison
- Charles Koch Foundation
- York University
- Nutrition Obesity Research Center, University of North Carolina
- Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
- National Opinion Research Center
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- Facebook, Instagram, 2020 US presidential election, political campaigns, political polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, user engagement, content exposure
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Attitude, Humans, Politics, Friends, Social Media
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-28, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-28 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.