The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Understanding adverse events: human factors.
Open accessAbstract
(1) Human rather than technical failures now represent the greatest threat to complex and potentially hazardous systems. This includes healthcare systems. (2) Managing the human risks will never be 100% effective. Human fallibility can be moderated, but it cannot be eliminated. (3) Different error types have different underlying mechanisms, occur in different parts of the organisation, and require different methods of risk management. The basic distinctions are between: Slips, lapses, trips, and fumbles (execution failures) and mistakes (planning or problem solving failures). Mistakes are divided into rule based mistakes and knowledge based mistakes. Errors (information-handling problems) and violations (motivational problems) Active versus latent failures. Active failures are committed by those in direct contact with the patient, latent failures arise in organisational and managerial spheres and their adverse effects may take a long time to become evident. (4) Safety significant errors occur at all levels of the system, not just at the sharp end. Decisions made in the upper echelons of the organisation create the conditions in the workplace that subsequently promote individual errors and violations. Latent failures are present long before an accident and are hence prime candidates for principled risk management. (5) Measures that involve sanctions and exhortations (that is, moralistic measures directed to those at the sharp end) have only very limited effectiveness, especially so in the case of highly trained professionals. (6) Human factors problems are a product of a chain of causes in which the individual psychological factors (that is, momentary inattention, forgetting, etc) are the last and least manageable links. Attentional "capture" (preoccupation or distraction) is a necessary condition for the commission of slips and lapses. Yet, its occurrence is almost impossible to predict or control effectively. The same is true of the factors associated with forgetting. States of mind contributing to error are thus extremely difficult to manage; they can happen to the best of people at any time. (7) People do not act in isolation. Their behaviour is shaped by circumstances. The same is true for errors and violations. The likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the nature of the task and by the local workplace conditions. These, in turn, are the product of "upstream" organisational factors. Great gains in safety can ve achieved through relatively small modifications of equipment and workplaces. (8) Automation and increasing advanced equipment do not cure human factors problems, they merely relocate them. In contrast, training people to work effectively in teams costs little, but has achieved significant enhancements of human performance in aviation. (9) Effective risk management depends critically on a confidential and preferable anonymous incident monitoring system that records the individual, task, situational, and organisational factors associated with incidents and near misses. (10) Effective risk management means the simultaneous and targeted deployment of limited remedial resources at different levels of the system: the individual or team, the task, the situation, and the organisation as a whole.
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Brennan, T. A., Leape, L. L., Laird, N. M., Hebert, L., Localio, A. R., Lawthers, A. G., Newhouse, J. P., Weiler, P. C., & Hiatt, H. H. (1991) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejm199102073240604 · Cited by 4,627
Leape, L. L., Brennan, T. A., Laird, N., Lawthers, A. G., Localio, A. R., Barnes, B. A., Hebert, L., Newhouse, J. P., Weiler, P. C., & Hiatt, H. (1991) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejm199102073240605 · Cited by 3,711
Brennan, T. A. (2004) · Quality and Safety in Health Care · doi:10.1136/qshc.2002.003822 · Cited by 942
(2018) · CRC Press eBooks · doi:10.1201/9780203751725 · Cited by 573
A data-based method for assessing and reducing human error to improve operational performance
Williams, J. C. (2003) · Conference Record for 1988 IEEE Fourth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants, · doi:10.1109/hfpp.1988.27540 · Cited by 320
Errors, Incidents and Accidents in Anaesthetic Practice
Runciman, W. B., Sellen, A., Webb, R. K., Williamson, J. A., Currie, M., Morgan, C., & Russell, W. J. (1993) · Anaesthesia and Intensive Care · doi:10.1177/0310057x9302100506 · Cited by 320
Operating at the Sharp End: The Complexity of Human Error
Cook, R. I., & Woods, D. D. (2018) · Human Error in Medicine · doi:10.1201/9780203751725-13 · Cited by 313
Human factors of advanced technology (glass cockpit) transport aircraft
Wiener, E. L. (1989) · NASA STI Repository (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) · Cited by 294
Team Performance in the Operating Room
Helmreich, R. L., & Schaefer, H.-G. (2018) · Human Error in Medicine · doi:10.1201/9780203751725-12 · Cited by 234
Accident analysis of large-scale technological disasters applied to an anaesthetic complication
Eagle, C., Davies, J. M., & REASON, J. T. (1992) · Canadian Journal of Anesthesia/Journal canadien d anesthésie · doi:10.1007/bf03008640 · Cited by 101
Self-citation
Cited by
Chang, A. (2005) · International Journal for Quality in Health Care · doi:10.1093/intqhc/mzi021 · Cited by 396
Shift and night work and long working hours – a systematic review of safety implications
Wagstaff, A. S., & Sigstad Lie, J.-A. (2011) · Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health · doi:10.5271/sjweh.3146 · Cited by 367
Lawton, R., McEachan, R. R. C., Giles, S. J., Sirriyeh, R., Watt, I. S., & Wright, J. (2012) · BMJ Quality & Safety · doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000443 · Cited by 311
Adverse events in drug administration: a literature review
Armitage, G., & Knapman, H. (2003) · Journal of Nursing Management · doi:10.1046/j.1365-2834.2003.00359.x · Cited by 256
Learning from Errors: A Model of Individual Processes
Tulis, M., Steuer, G., & Dresel, M. (2016) · Frontline Learning Research · doi:10.14786/flr.v4i2.168 · Cited by 135
Metadata
- Authors
- Reason, J.
- Venue
- Quality and Safety in Health Care
- Publisher
- BMJ
- Published
- 1995-06-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 80-89
- ISSN
- 1475-3898 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-3901
- OpenAlex
- W2087938693
- Cited by
- 938
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 13.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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