Cited by 27Global Public Health Policies and EpidemiologySmoking Behavior and CessationPolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

Mobilising public opinion for the tobacco industry: the consumer tax alliance and excise taxes

Open access
Campbell, R, Balbach, E D·2008·Tobacco Control

Abstract

Background: Tobacco industry funding was instrumental in creating and financing the Consumer Tax Alliance in 1989 as an organisation that relied upon extensive media outreach to build opposition to excise taxes as a regressive form of taxation. By obscuring its own role in this effort, the tobacco industry undermined the public’s reasonable expectations for transparency in the policy-making process. Aim: To examine the formation and activities of the Consumer Tax Alliance as a “hybrid” form of interest group in order to provide tobacco control and public health advocates with a better understanding of unanticipated tobacco industry coalitions and facilitate appropriate countermeasures. Methods: Document searches through the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library and through Tobacco Documents Online and review of background literature. Results: The Tobacco Institute actively sought liberal allies beginning in the mid-1980s in seeking to build public opposition to cigarette excise tax increases by promoting them as a regressive form of taxation. The creation of the Consumer Tax Alliance in 1989 was expressly intended to turn labour and middle-class opinion against prospective excise tax increases in federal budget deficit negotiations, without divulging the tobacco industry’s role in its formation. Conclusion: It is important to understand the dynamic by which trusted organisations can be induced to alter their agendas in response to funding sources. Advocates need to understand this form of interest group behaviour so that they are better able to negotiate the policy arena by diagnosing and exposing this influence where it occurs and, by doing so, be better prepared to take appropriate countermeasures.

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  • Existing studies on how tobacco control policy is passed at the national level focus more on tactics used by opponents rather than proponents.

    “Moreover, existing studies on how tobacco control policy is passed at the national level are focused more on tactics used by opponents (eg, lobbying, litigation, protests and other tactics to delay or subvert policy passage) rather than proponents,25–32 with few exceptions.33–36”

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Research works printed but not linked: 14

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Authors
Campbell, R., & Balbach, E. D.
Affiliations
Tufts University (US)
Corresponding author
Campbell, R
Venue
Tobacco Control
Publisher
BMJ
Published
2008-08-07
Volume
17
Issue
5
Pages
351-356
ISSN
  • 0964-4563 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-3318
OpenAlex
W2140918735
Cited by
27
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
FWCI
0.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Tobacco Control (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
National Cancer Institute (R01CA095964)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Physiology › Smoking Behavior and Cessation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
tobacco industry, excise tax, cigarette taxes, regressive taxation, interest groups, public opinion, media outreach, tobacco control advocacy, agenda setting
MeSH terms
Consumer Advocacy, Humans, Politics, Public Opinion, Smoking, Taxes, Tobacco Industry

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