A GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationCoalition formation games with separable preferences
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Cited by
Coalitional game theory for communication networks
Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjorungnes, A., & Basar, T. (2009) · IEEE Signal Processing Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2009.000000 · Cited by 1,051
Game theory meets network security and privacy
Manshaei, M. H., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Bacşar, T., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2013) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 · Cited by 808
Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Micro-Grid Distribution Networks
Saad, W., Han, Z., & Poor, H. V. (2011) · 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC) · doi:10.1109/iccw.2011.5963577 · Cited by 298
Metadata
- Authors
- APT, K. R., & WITZEL, A.
- Venue
- International Game Theory Review
- Publisher
- World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
- Published
- 2009-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 03
- Pages
- 347-367
- ISSN
- 0219-1989 (ISSN-L)
- 1793-6675
- OpenAlex
- W2090939903
- Cited by
- 325
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 46.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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