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Trusted paths for browsers
Abstract
Computer security protocols usually terminate in a computer; however, the human-based services which they support usually terminate in a human. The gap between the human and the computer creates potential for security problems. We examine this gap, as it is manifested in secure Web servers. Felten et al. demonstrated the potential, in 1996, for malicious servers to impersonate honest servers. In this paper, we show how malicious servers can still do this---and can also forge the existence of an SSL session and the contents of the alleged server certificate. We then consider how to systematically defend against Web spoofing, by creating a trusted path from the browser to the human user. We present potential designs, propose a new one, prototype it in open-source Mozilla, and demonstrate its effectiveness via user studies.
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Cited by
Cantina: a content-based approach to detecting phishing web sites
Zhang, Y., Hong, J. I., & Cranor, L. F. (2007) · Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/1242572.1242659 · Cited by 757
You've been warned: an empirical study of the effectiveness of web browser phishing warnings
Egelman, S., Cranor, L. F., & Hong, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/1357054.1357219 · Cited by 607
Anti-Phishing Phil: the design and evaluation of a game that teaches people not to fall for phish
Sheng, S., Magnien, B., Kumaraguru, P., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., Hong, J., & Nunge, E. (2007) · Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security · doi:10.1145/1280680.1280692 · Cited by 509
The battle against phishing: Dynamic Security Skins
Dhamija, R., & Tygar, J. D. (2005) · Proceedings of the 2005 symposium on Usable privacy and security - SOUPS '05 · doi:10.1145/1073001.1073009 · Cited by 442
Teaching Johnny not to fall for phish
Kumaraguru, P., Sheng, S., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., & Hong, J. (2010) · ACM Transactions on Internet Technology · doi:10.1145/1754393.1754396 · Cited by 396
Metadata
- Authors
- Ye, Z. (., Smith, S., & Anthony, D.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 153-186
- ISSN
- 1094-9224 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7406
- OpenAlex
- W1568223756
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 60.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.