The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Property-based attestation for computing platforms: caring about properties, not mechanisms
Abstract
Over the past years, the computing industry has started various initiatives announced to increase computer security by means of new hardware architectures. The most notable effort is the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB). This technology offers useful new functionalities as the possibility to verify the integrity of a platform (attestation) or binding quantities on a specific platform (sealing).In this paper, we point out the deficiencies of the attestation and sealing functionalities proposed by the existing specification of the TCG: we show that these mechanisms can be misused to discriminate certain platforms, i.e., their operating systems and consequently the corresponding vendors. A particular problem in this context is that of managing the multitude of possible configurations. Moreover, we highlight other shortcomings related to the attestation, namely system updates and backup. Clearly, the consequences caused by these problems lead to an unsatisfactory situation both for the private and business branch, and to an unbalanced market when such platforms are in wide use.To overcome these problems generally, we propose a completely new approach: the attestation of a platform should not depend on the specific software or/and hardware (configuration) as it is today's practice but only on the "properties" that the platform offers. Thus, a property-based attestation should only verify whether these properties are sufficient to fulfill certain (security) requirements of the party who asks for attestation. We propose and discuss a variety of solutions based on the existing Trusted Computing (TC) functionality. We also demonstrate, how a property-based attestation protocol can be realized based on the existing TC hardware such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Necula, G. C. (1997) · Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '97 · doi:10.1145/263699.263712 · Cited by 1,843
Chaum, D., & van Heyst, E. (1991) · Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques · Cited by 1,492
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., & Wigderson, A. (1991) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/116825.116852 · Cited by 1,349
Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity measurement architecture
Sailer, R., Zhang, X., Jaeger, T., & van Doorn, L. (2004) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 1,035
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1165389.945464 · Cited by 887
A Practical and Provably Secure Coalition-Resistant Group Signature Scheme
Ateniese, G., Camenisch, J., Joye, M., & Tsudik, G. (2000) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44598-6_16 · Cited by 800
Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Camenisch, J., & Van Herreweghen, E. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586114 · Cited by 555
Safe kernel extensions without run-time checking
Necula, G. C., & Lee, P. (1996) · Proceedings of the second USENIX symposium on Operating systems design and implementation · doi:10.1145/238721.238781 · Cited by 505
The design and implementation of a certifying compiler
Necula, G. C., & Lee, P. (1998) · Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1998 conference on Programming language design and implementation · doi:10.1145/277650.277752 · Cited by 358
Improving IPC by kernel design
Liedtke, J. (1993) · Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles - SOSP '93 · doi:10.1145/168619.168633 · Cited by 283
Cited by
C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978358 · Cited by 258
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Sadeghi, A.-R., & Stüble, C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on New security paradigms - NSPW '04
- Publisher
- ACM Press
- Published
- 2005
- Pages
- 67
- OpenAlex
- W2050529434
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 13
- Type
- conference abstract
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Property-based attestation for computing platforms: caring about properties, not mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1065907.1066038
- The paper
- Sadeghi, A.-R., & Stüble, C. (2005). Property-based attestation for computing platforms: caring about properties, not mechanisms. Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on New security paradigms - NSPW '04. https://doi.org/10.1145/1065907.1066038
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.