On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We consider the problem of maximizing welfare when allocating m items to n players with subadditive utility functions. Our main result is a way of rounding any fractional solution to a linear programming relaxation to this problem so as to give a feasible solution of welfare at least half that of the value of the fractional solution. This approximation ratio of 1/2 improves over an Ω(1/log m) ratio of Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [STOC 2005]. We also show an approximation ratio of 1 - 1/e when utility functions are fractionally subadditive. A result similar to this last result was previously obtained by Dobzinski and Schapira [Soda 2006], but via a different rounding technique that requires the use of a so called "XOS oracle".The randomized rounding techniques that we use are oblivious in the sense that they only use the primal solution to the linear program relaxation, but have no access to the actual utility functions of the players. This allows us to suggest new incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, extending previous work of Lavi and Swamy [FOCS 2005].
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722 · cited 1×
“Now we can use standard methodology, namely, the VCG mechanism [12, 3, 8], to construct an incentive compatible”
MethodGroves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284 · cited 1×
“Now we can use standard methodology, namely, the VCG mechanism [12, 3, 8], to construct an incentive compatible”
Multipart pricing of public goods
Clarke, E. H. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726210 · Cited by 3,246 · cited 1×
“Now we can use standard methodology, namely, the VCG mechanism [12, 3, 8], to construct an incentive compatible”
MethodProbabilistic checking of proofs: a new characterization of NP
Arora, S., & Safra, S. (1998) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/273865.273901 · Cited by 1,153 · cited 1×
“It is known [1] that for every > 0 there is an α > 0 such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between ”yes instances” in which a graph has an independent set of size αn and ”no instances” in which every independent set is of size at most αn.”
BackgroundShapley, L. S. (1967) · Naval Research Logistics Quarterly · doi:10.1002/nav.3800140404 · Cited by 1,045 · cited 2×
“The reader may note the Proposition 1.1 is a straightforward variation of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [2, 11].”
MethodInfluentialTight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
Fleischer, L., Goemans, M. X., Mirrokni, V., & Sviridenko, M. I. (2006) · ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) · doi:10.1145/1109557.1109624 · Cited by 246
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D., & Nisan, N. (2001) · Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce · doi:10.1145/501158.501161 · Cited by 230 · cited 2×
“Another class of utility functions that is considered in [10, 4, 5] is called XOS.”
BackgroundTruthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Lavi, R., & Swamy, C. (2005) · Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.2005.76 · Cited by 220
Tight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
Fleischer, L., Goemans, M. X., Mirrokni, V., & Sviridenko, M. I. (2006) · Cited by 219
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
Feige, U., & Vondrak, J. (2006) · 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06) · doi:10.1109/focs.2006.14 · Cited by 219 · cited 2×
“Recent work [ 6 ] shows that there is some † > 0 such that this ratio is at least 1i1=e+†, and the ratio is also known to be bounded away from 1, but we are still far from flnding matching upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratio (or the integrality gap of the LP) in this case.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
Maximizing a Monotone Submodular Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint
Calinescu, G., Chekuri, C., Pál, M., & Vondrák, J. (2011) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/080733991 · Cited by 795
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
Vondrak, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing · doi:10.1145/1374376.1374389 · Cited by 546
TimeAware test suite prioritization
Walcott, K. R., Soffa, M. L., Kapfhammer, G. M., & Roos, R. S. (2006) · Proceedings of the 2006 international symposium on Software testing and analysis · doi:10.1145/1146238.1146240 · Cited by 340
Learning with Submodular Functions: A Convex Optimization Perspective
Bach, F. (2013) · now publishers, Inc. eBooks · doi:10.1561/9781601987570 · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- Feige, U.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2006-05-21
- Pages
- 41-50
- OpenAlex
- W1995275762
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 22.54
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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