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The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Abstract
We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence between polynomial time solvability of normal form games and graphical games, establishing that these kinds of games can simulate a PPAD-complete class of Brouwer functions.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P. W., & Papadimitriou, C. H.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2006-05-21
- Pages
- 71-78
- OpenAlex
- W2140790422
- Cited by
- 470
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 80.24
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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