Equilibrium points in n -person games
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The state described by Wardrop's First Principle, or User Equilibrium, is a Nash Equilibrium from non-cooperative game theory because no individual driver can reduce travel cost by unilaterally changing route.
“The state described by Wardrop's First Principle is a direct application of the concept of a Nash Equilibrium from non-cooperative game theory [22, 23].”
From Classical Paradigm of Transportation Modeling (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
The passage labeled Abstract defines an equilibrium point as a strategy profile in which each player obtains the highest available payoff given the other players’ strategies. That supports the no-beneficial-unilateral-change concept, but Nash’s paper does not discuss Wardrop’s First Principle, drivers, or route costs, so it does not itself establish the stated application. (LLM, conf=0.86)
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“…inequalities: R > P, R > S, 2 R > T + S, and either: T > R, or, P > S. (1) Nash Equilibria, a fundamental concept in game theory introduced by Nash [18], refers to a situation in which each player in a game makes an optimal choice considering the choices of the other players, and no player has…”
BackgroundClassical Paradigm of Transportation Modeling
Teknomo, K. (2026) · Lecture Notes in Intelligent Transportation and Infrastructure · doi:10.1007/978-981-95-4727-2_2
- Authors
- Nash, J. F.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nash, John F.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 1950-01
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 48-49
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC1063129
- OpenAlex
- W2067050450
- Cited by
- 7,560
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 310 · 2025: 383 · 2024: 347 · 2023: 336 · 2022: 355 · 2021: 374 · 2020: 407 · 2019: 346 · 2018: 345 · 2017: 325 · 2016: 286 · 2015: 334 · 2014: 315 · 2013: 306 · 2012: 320
- FWCI
- 3.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- equilibrium points, multiplayer games, game theory, Nash equilibrium
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