The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
Abstract
Despite general awareness of the importance of keeping one's system secure, and widespread availability of consumer security technologies, actual investment in security remains highly variable across the Internet population, allowing attacks such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and spam distribution to continue unabated. By modeling security investment decision-making in established (e.g., weakest-link, best-shot) and novel games (e.g., weakest-target), and allowing expenditures in self-protection versus self-insurance technologies, we can examine how incentives may shift between investment in a public good (protection) and a private good (insurance), subject to factors such as network size, type of attack, loss probability, loss magnitude, and cost of technology. We can also characterize Nash equilibria and social optima for different classes of attacks and defenses. In the weakest-target game, an interesting result is that, for almost all parameter settings, more effort is exerted at Nash equilibrium than at the social optimum. We may attribute this to the "strategic uncertainty" of players seeking to self-protect at just slightly above the lowest protection level.
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Citations
Cites
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Privacy and rationality in individual decision making
Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2005) · IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2005.22 · Cited by 1,123 · cited 1×
“When asked in surveys, network users say they are interested in preventing attacks and mitigating the damages from computer and information security breaches [1] [40].”
Background
Cited by
Game theory meets network security and privacy
Manshaei, M. H., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Bacşar, T., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2013) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 · Cited by 808
Hardware Trojan attacks: Threat analysis and countermeasures
Bhunia, S., Hsiao, M. S., Banga, M., & Narasimhan, S. (2014) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2014.2334493 · Cited by 766
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
Game Theory for Network Security
Liang, X., & Xiao, Y. (2013) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2012.062612.00056 · Cited by 293
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossklags, J., Christin, N., & Chuang, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2008-04-21
- Pages
- 209-218
- OpenAlex
- W2110522107
- Cited by
- 247
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 15.74
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Grossklags, J., Christin, N., & Chuang, J. (2008). Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games. Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web. https://doi.org/10.1145/1367497.1367526
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