The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
Abstract
Contrary to widespread assumption, dynamic RAM (DRAM), the main memory in most modern computers, retains its contents for several seconds after power is lost, even at room temperature and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAM becomes less reliable when it is not refreshed, it is not immediately erased, and its contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access to a machine. It poses a particular threat to laptop users who rely on disk encryption: we demonstrate that it could be used to compromise several popular disk encryption products without the need for any special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory retention and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple cooling techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
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Citations
Cites
Small Solutions to Polynomial Equations, and Low Exponent RSA Vulnerabilities
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A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture
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Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
Thekkath, D. L. C., Mitchell, M., Lincoln, P., Boneh, D., Mitchell, J., & Horowitz, M. (2000) · Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/378993.379237 · Cited by 176
Architecture for Protecting Critical Secrets in Microprocessors
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Shredding your garbage: reducing data lifetime through secure deallocation
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BootJacker: compromising computers using forced restarts
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Cited by
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_28 · Cited by 490
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Naor, M., & Segev, G. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_2 · Cited by 403
Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software solutions
Hoekstra, M., Lal, R., Pappachan, P., Phegade, V., & Del Cuvillo, J. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/2487726.2488370 · Cited by 347
Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Noura, H. N., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2022) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00545-8 · Cited by 320
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices
Francillon, A., & Castelluccia, C. (2008) · Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455775 · Cited by 261
Metadata
- Authors
- Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. J., Appelbaum, J., & Felten, E. W.
- Venue
- Communications of the ACM
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 91-98
- ISSN
- 0001-0782 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7317
- OpenAlex
- W2175377689
- Cited by
- 980
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 68.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.