The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Abstract
Low-latency anonymization networks such as Tor and JAP claim to hide the recipient and the content of communications from a local observer, i.e., an entity that can eavesdrop the traffic between the user and the first anonymization node. Especially users in totalitarian regimes strongly depend on such networks to freely communicate. For these people, anonymity is particularly important and an analysis of the anonymization methods against various attacks is necessary to ensure adequate protection. In this paper we show that anonymity in Tor and JAP is not as strong as expected so far and cannot resist website fingerprinting attacks under certain circumstances. We first define features for website fingerprinting solely based on volume, time, and direction of the traffic. As a result, the subsequent classification becomes much easier. We apply support vector machines with the introduced features. We are able to improve recognition results of existing works on a given state-of-the-art dataset in Tor from 3% to 55% and in JAP from 20% to 80%. The datasets assume a closed-world with 775 websites only. In a next step, we transfer our findings to a more complex and realistic open-world scenario, i.e., recognition of several websites in a set of thousands of random unknown websites. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first successful attack in the open-world scenario. We achieve a surprisingly high true positive rate of up to 73% for a false positive rate of 0.05%. Finally, we show preliminary results of a proof-of-concept implementation that applies camouflage as a countermeasure to hamper the fingerprinting attack. For JAP, the detection rate decreases from 80% to 4% and for Tor it drops from 55% to about 3%.
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Citations
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Cited by
Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Panchenko, A., Lanze, F., Zinnen, A., Henze, M., Pennekamp, J., Wehrle, K., & Engel, T. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23477 · Cited by 645
“[21] increased the recognition rate for Tor to an alarming degree using an approach based on Support Vector Machines (SVM) in 2011: in the dataset provided by Herrman et al.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationLin, X., Xiong, G., Gou, G., Li, Z., Shi, J., & Yu, J. (2022) · Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022 · doi:10.1145/3485447.3512217 · Cited by 599
Deep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243768 · Cited by 592
“Prior work has shown that, under certain conditions, a local and passive adversary can identify the pages visited by a Tor user by exploiting patterns in network traffic [8, 14, 16, 27, 28, 39, 40].”
BackgroundPeek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail
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Robust Smartphone App Identification via Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis
Taylor, V. F., Spolaor, R., Conti, M., & Martinovic, I. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2017.2737970 · Cited by 439
“Similar work was proposed by Panchenko et al. [18].”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Panchenko, A., Niessen, L., Zinnen, A., & Engel, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2011-10-17
- Pages
- 103-114
- OpenAlex
- W2135579486
- Cited by
- 501
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 14.82
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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