The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation of cache side channel attacks
Open accessAbstract
We propose a flexibly-partitioned cache design that either drastically weakens or completely eliminates cache-based side channel attacks. The proposed Non-Monopolizable (NoMo) cache dynamically reserves cache lines for active threads and prevents other co-executing threads from evicting reserved lines. Unreserved lines remain available for dynamic sharing among threads. NoMo requires only simple modifications to the cache replacement logic, making it straightforward to adopt. It requires no software support enabling it to automatically protect pre-existing binaries. NoMo results in performance degradation of about 1% on average. We demonstrate that NoMo can provide strong security guarantees for the AES and Blowfish encryption algorithms.
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Cites
Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems
Biham, E., & Shamir, A. (1991) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/bf00630563 · Cited by 2,914
Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher
Matsui, M. (1994) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48285-7_33 · Cited by 2,748
Cited by
CATalyst: Defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing
Liu, F., Ge, Q., Yarom, Y., Mckeen, F., Rozas, C., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2016) · 2016 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA) · doi:10.1109/hpca.2016.7446082 · Cited by 370
A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware
Ge, Q., Yarom, Y., Cock, D., & Heiser, G. (2018) · Journal of Cryptographic Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 · Cited by 368
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
A survey on the (in)security of trusted execution environments
Muñoz, A., Ríos, R., Román, R., & López, J. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103180 · Cited by 131
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
Subramanyan, P., Sinha, R., Lebedev, I., Devadas, S., & Seshia, S. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134098 · Cited by 119
Metadata
- Authors
- Domnitser, L., Jaleel, A., Loew, J., Abu-Ghazaleh, N., & Ponomarev, D.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Published
- 2012-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 1544-3566 (ISSN-L)
- 1544-3973
- OpenAlex
- W2025539306
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 6.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation of cache side channel attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2086696.2086714
- The paper
- Domnitser, L., Jaleel, A., Loew, J., Abu-Ghazaleh, N., & Ponomarev, D. (2012). Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation of cache side channel attacks. ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization. https://doi.org/10.1145/2086696.2086714
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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