The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications
Abstract
We introduce return-oriented programming , a technique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior in a program whose control flow he has diverted, without injecting any code. A return-oriented program chains together short instruction sequences already present in a program’s address space, each of which ends in a “return” instruction. Return-oriented programming defeats the W⊕X protections recently deployed by Microsoft, Intel, and AMD; in this context, it can be seen as a generalization of traditional return-into-libc attacks. But the threat is more general. Return-oriented programming is readily exploitable on multiple architectures and systems. It also bypasses an entire category of security measures---those that seek to prevent malicious computation by preventing the execution of malicious code. To demonstrate the wide applicability of return-oriented programming, we construct a Turing-complete set of building blocks called gadgets using the standard C libraries of two very different architectures: Linux/x86 and Solaris/SPARC. To demonstrate the power of return-oriented programming, we present a high-level, general-purpose language for describing return-oriented exploits and a compiler that translates it to gadgets.
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Citations
Cites
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
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Self-citationStackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of Buffer-Overflow Attacks
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On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
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Self-citationControl-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications
Abadi, M., Budiu, M., Erlingsson, Ú., & Ligatti, J. (2009) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1609956.1609960 · Cited by 795
Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit
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Return-oriented programming without returns
Checkoway, S., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., Shacham, H., & Winandy, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866370 · Cited by 530
Self-citationWhen good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC
Buchanan, E., Roemer, R., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2008) · Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455776 · Cited by 362
Self-citationXFI: software guards for system address spaces
Erlingsson, Ú., Abadi, M., Vrable, M., Budiu, M., & Necula, G. C. (2006) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/1298455.1298463 · Cited by 332
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Cited by
Szekeres, L., Payer, M., Wei, T., & Song, D. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.13 · Cited by 664
Return-oriented programming without returns
Checkoway, S., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., Shacham, H., & Winandy, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866370 · Cited by 530
Self-citationCyber-physical systems security: Limitations, issues and future trends
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Salman, O., Noura, H. N., Kaaniche, N., Chehab, A., & Malli, M. (2020) · Microprocessors and Microsystems · doi:10.1016/j.micpro.2020.103201 · Cited by 491
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems
McLaughlin, S., Konstantinou, C., Wang, X., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., Maniatakos, M., & Karri, R. (2016) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2015.2512235 · Cited by 391
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C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
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Control-Flow Integrity: Precision, Security, and Performance
Burow, N., Carr, S. A., Nash, J., Larsen, P., Franz, M., Brunthaler, S., & Payer, M. (2018) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3054924 · Cited by 254
Exploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attacks
Kang, D., Li, X., Stoica, I., Guestrin, C., Zaharia, M., & Hashimoto, T. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw63631.2024.00018 · Cited by 114
“This observation is also key in a class of traditional program attacks called return-oriented programming (ROP) (Roemer et al., 2012).”
BackgroundExploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attacks
Kang, D., Li, X., Stoica, I., Guestrin, C., Zaharia, M., & Hashimoto, T. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2302.05733 · Cited by 114
“This observation is also key in a class of traditional program attacks called return-oriented programming (ROP) (Roemer et al., 2012).”
BackgroundTrackOS: A Security-Aware Real-Time Operating System
Pike, L., Hickey, P., Elliott, T., Mertens, E., & Tomb, A. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46982-9_19 · Cited by 20
“While this code cannot be eliminated from the program, it represents a security risk similar to libc insofar as it contains additional instructions for use in return-oriented attacks [18].”
BackgroundExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?
Wang, Z., Schiller, N., Li, H., Narayana, S. S., Nasr, M., Carlini, N., Qi, X., Wallace, E., Bursztein, E., Invernizzi, L., et al. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.11086 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Roemer, R., Buchanan, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
- Published
- 2012-03
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-34
- ISSN
- 1094-9224 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7406
- OpenAlex
- W2089448621
- Cited by
- 497
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 31.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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