Cited by 121Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningTopic ModelingHate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection

Exploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attacks

Open access
Kang, Daniel, Li, Xuechen, Stoica, Ion, Guestrin, Carlos, Zaharia, Matei, Hashimoto, Tatsunori·2024·2024 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)

Abstract

Recent advances in instruction-following large language models (LLMs) have led to dramatic improvements in a range of NLP tasks. Unfortunately, we find that the same improved capabilities amplify the dual-use risks for malicious purposes of these models. Dual-use is difficult to prevent as instruction-following capabilities now enable standard attacks from computer security. The capabilities of these instruction-following LLMs provide strong economic incentives for dual-use by malicious actors. In particular, we show that instruction-following LLMs can produce targeted malicious content, including hate speech and scams, bypassing in-the-wild defenses implemented by LLM API vendors. Our analysis shows that this content can be generated economically and at cost of $125-500 \times$ cheaper than human effort alone. Together, our findings suggest that LLMs will increasingly attract more sophisticated adversaries and attacks, and addressing these attacks may require new approaches to mitigations.

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  • Potential consequences of a successful prompt injection attack include exfiltrating user data, executing arbitrary code, and more.

    “Potential consequences include exfiltrating user data, executing arbitrary code, and more [18, 23, 33, 42].”

    From AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents (2024) · cites this paper as [23]

    Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4 show attack prompts soliciting credit-card or Social Security information, supporting a potential risk of obtaining sensitive data. They do not show a prompt injection exfiltrating user data. Section 3.3.3 discusses arbitrary execution in a separate iPhone hack, not as a demonstrated consequence of the paper’s LLM attacks. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Even without actively specifying any social engineering techniques, the model's output could mirror some standard scam persuasion techniques.

    “Even without actively specifying any social engineering techniques, the model's output could mirror some standard scam persuasion techniques [20].”

    From Not What You've Signed Up For: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection (2023) · cites this paper as [20]

    Section 5.1 reports that LLMs generated convincing scam emails, and Appendix C gives an example using limited availability and reassurance—recognizable scam persuasion techniques. The copy does not establish that these techniques appeared without being requested; a prompt shown in Section 3.4 explicitly asks for urgency. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • LLMs also excel at phishing attacks.

    “However, LLMs also excel at phishing attacks 29 .”
  • When prompted, the model may produce convincing personalized scams given appropriate knowledge about the target.

    “When prompted, the model may produce convincing personalized scams given appropriate knowledge about the target [21,43] (that was either given in the prompt or, importantly, the model acquired during the chat session).”
  • Previous work has shown that LLMs can produce convincing scams such as phishing emails.

    “Previous work has shown that LLMs can produce convincing scams such as phishing emails [21].”

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Authors
Kang, D., Li, X., Stoica, I., Guestrin, C., Zaharia, M., & Hashimoto, T.
Affiliations
  • University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
  • Stanford University (US)
  • Berkeley
Venue
2024 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2024-05-23
Pages
132-143
OpenAlex
W4400315206
Cited by
114
References
45
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 14
FWCI
29.51
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
Open Philanthropy Project
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
Keywords
large language models, dual-use risks, hate speech, scams, instruction following, security attacks

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