Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present a novel web page fingerprinting attack that is able to defeat several recently proposed defenses against traffic analysis attacks, including the application-level defenses HTTPOS and randomized pipelining over Tor. Regardless of the defense scheme, our attack was able to guess which of 100 web pages a victim was visiting at least 50% of the time and, with some defenses, over 90% of the time. Our attack is based on a simple model of network behavior and out-performs previously proposed ad hoc attacks. We then build a web site fingerprinting attack that is able to identify whether a victim is visiting a particular web site with over 90% accuracy in our experiments.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Panchenko, A., Lanze, F., Zinnen, A., Henze, M., Pennekamp, J., Wehrle, K., & Engel, T. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23477 · Cited by 645
“pointed out several disadvantages of this approach [5]: besides a high overhead in bandwidth and time, BuFLO may reveal the total transmission size under certain conditions and further is not able to adapt for congestion.”
BackgroundDeep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243768 · Cited by 592
“There is research that has attempted to fingerprint pages that are linked from the homepage [8], but virtually all studies on website fingerprinting train and test the attacks on home pages.”
BackgroundInfluentialRobust Smartphone App Identification via Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis
Taylor, V. F., Spolaor, R., Conti, M., & Martinovic, I. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2017.2737970 · Cited by 439
“More recently, Cai et al. [19] presented a web page fingerprinting attack and showed its effectiveness despite traffic analysis countermeasures (e.g., HTTPOS).”
BackgroundAppScanner: Automatic Fingerprinting of Smartphone Apps from Encrypted Network Traffic
Taylor, V. F., Spolaor, R., Conti, M., & Martinovic, I. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.40 · Cited by 390
A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Juarez, M., Afroz, S., Acar, G., Diaz, C., & Greenstadt, R. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660368 · Cited by 327
“Some authors have also evaluated their classifiers in an open-world scenario [3, 23, 32], where there is a set of k target pages being monitored but the user is allowed to visit pages that are not in that set.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMemGuard: Defending against Black-Box Membership Inference Attacks via Adversarial Examples
Jia, J., Salem, A., Backes, M., Zhang, Y., & Gong, N. Z. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363201 · Cited by 324
Improved website fingerprinting on Tor
Wang, T., & Goldberg, I. (2013) · Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society · doi:10.1145/2517840.2517851 · Cited by 295
A Systematic Approach to Developing and Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Defenses
Cai, X., Nithyanand, R., Wang, T., Johnson, R., & Goldberg, I. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660362 · Cited by 284
Self-citationA Survey on Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis Applications, Techniques, and Countermeasures
Papadogiannaki, E., & Ioannidis, S. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3457904 · Cited by 281
Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense
Juarez, M., Imani, M., Perry, M., Diaz, C., & Wright, M. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45744-4_2 · Cited by 273
Analyzing Android Encrypted Network Traffic to Identify User Actions
Conti, M., Mancini, L. V., Spolaor, R., & Verde, N. V. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2015.2478741 · Cited by 266
Peek-a-boo: i see your smart home activities, even encrypted!
Acar, A., Fereidooni, H., Abera, T., Sikder, A. K., Miettinen, M., Aksu, H., Conti, M., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Uluagac, S. (2020) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks · doi:10.1145/3395351.3399421 · Cited by 264
Adaptive encrypted traffic fingerprinting with bi-directional dependence
Al-Naami, K., Chandra, S., Mustafa, A., Khan, L., Lin, Z., Hamlen, K., & Thuraisingham, B. (2016) · Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications · doi:10.1145/2991079.2991123 · Cited by 145
“Recent studies [7,36] on traffic analysis have focused on identifying characteristic patterns in network traffic that reveal the behavior of an end-node, thereby de-anonymizing the network.”
BackgroundRiffle: An Efficient Communication System With Strong Anonymity
Kwon, A., Lazar, D., Devadas, S., & Ford, B. (2016) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2016-0008 · Cited by 84
“However, such systems are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [36, 43] by powerful adversaries such as an authoritarian government or a state controlled ISP, and have recently been attacked by even weaker adversaries monitoring only the users’ traffic [14, 32, 39, 51].”
Traffic Analysis Attacks on Tor: A Survey
Basyoni, L., Fetais, N., Erbad, A., Mohamed, A., & Guizani, M. (2020) · 2020 IEEE International Conference on Informatics, IoT, and Enabling Technologies (ICIoT) · doi:10.1109/iciot48696.2020.9089497 · Cited by 54
Wang, K., Zhang, J., Bai, G., Ko, R., & Dong, J. S. (2021) · Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021 · doi:10.1145/3442381.3450008 · Cited by 27
(2016) · Lirias · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Cai, X., Zhang, X. C., Joshi, B., & Johnson, R.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2012-10-16
- Pages
- 605-616
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2170085959
- Cited by
- 394
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 14.77
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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