The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Düppel: retrofitting commodity operating systems to mitigate cache side channels in the cloud
Abstract
This paper presents the design, implementation and evaluation of a system called Düppel that enables a tenant virtual machine to defend itself from cache-based side-channel attacks in public clouds. Düppel includes defenses for time-shared caches such as per-core L1 and L2 caches. Experiments in the lab and on public clouds show that Düppel effectively obfuscates timing signals available to an attacker VM via these caches and incurs modest performance overheads (at most 7% and usually much less) in the common case of no side-channel attacks. Moreover, Düppel requires no changes to hypervisors or support from cloud operators.
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Citations
Cites
The PARSEC benchmark suite: characterization and architectural implications
Bienia, C., Kumar, S., Singh, J. P., & Li, K. (2008) · Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Parallel architectures and compilation techniques · doi:10.1145/1454115.1454128 · Cited by 3,444
Yet another MicroArchitectural Attack: exploiting I-Cache
Aciiçmez, O. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture · doi:10.1145/1314466.1314469 · Cited by 232
Cited by
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.45 · Cited by 713
CATalyst: Defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing
Liu, F., Ge, Q., Yarom, Y., Mckeen, F., Rozas, C., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2016) · 2016 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA) · doi:10.1109/hpca.2016.7446082 · Cited by 370
A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware
Ge, Q., Yarom, Y., Cock, D., & Heiser, G. (2018) · Journal of Cryptographic Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 · Cited by 368
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds
Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660356 · Cited by 327
Self-citationCache Template Attacks: Automating Attacks On Inclusive Last-Level Caches
Gruss, D., Spreitzer, R., & Mangard, S. (2015) · INFM-OAR (INFN Catania) · doi:10.5281/zenodo.55454 · Cited by 317
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Y., & Reiter, M. K.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13
- Publisher
- ACM Press
- Published
- 2013
- Pages
- 827-838
- OpenAlex
- W2034195502
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 9.97
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Zhang, Y., & Reiter, M. K. (2013). Düppel: retrofitting commodity operating systems to mitigate cache side channels in the cloud. Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13. https://doi.org/10.1145/2508859.2516741
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