The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Improved website fingerprinting on Tor
Abstract
In this paper, we propose new website fingerprinting techniques that achieve a higher classification accuracy on Tor than previous works. We describe our novel methodology for gathering data on Tor; this methodology is essential for accurate classifier comparison and analysis. We offer new ways to interpret the data by using the more fundamental Tor cells as a unit of data rather than TCP/IP packets. We demonstrate an experimental method to remove Tor SENDMEs, which are control cells that provide no useful data, in order to improve accuracy. We also propose a new set of metrics to describe the similarity between two traffic instances; they are derived from observations on how a site is loaded. Using our new metrics we achieve a higher success rate than previous authors. We conduct a thorough analysis and comparison between our new algorithms and the previous best algorithm. To identify the potential power of website fingerprinting on Tor, we perform open-world experiments; we achieve a recall rate over 95% and a false positive rate under 0.2% for several potentially monitored sites, which far exceeds previous reported recall rates. In the closed-world experiments, our accuracy is 91%, as compared to 86-87% from the best previous classifier on the same data.
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Citations
Cites
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004) · doi:10.21236/ada465464 · Cited by 4,104
Support vector machines for multi-class pattern recognition.
Weston, J., & Watkins, C. (1999) · Cited by 796
How Unique Is Your Web Browser?
Eckersley, P. (2010) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_1 · Cited by 756
Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Panchenko, A., Niessen, L., Zinnen, A., & Engel, T. (2011) · Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society · doi:10.1145/2046556.2046570 · Cited by 501
Peek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail
Dyer, K. P., Coull, S. E., Ristenpart, T., & Shrimpton, T. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.28 · Cited by 456
Herrmann, D., Wendolsky, R., & Federrath, H. (2009) · Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security · doi:10.1145/1655008.1655013 · Cited by 424
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Liberatore, M., & Levine, B. N. (2006) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1180405.1180437 · Cited by 413
Traffic Morphing: An Efficient Defense Against Statistical Traffic Analysis
Wright, C. V., Coull, S. E., & Monrose, F. (2009) · Cited by 397
Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Cai, X., Zhang, X. C., Joshi, B., & Johnson, R. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382260 · Cited by 394
An Extension of the String-to-String Correction Problem
Wagner, R. A., & Lowrance, R. (1975) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/321879.321880 · Cited by 313
ConceptDoppler: a weather tracker for internet censorship
Crandall, Jr., Zinn, D., Byrd, M., Barr, E. T., & East, R. (2007) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315290 · Cited by 104
DefenestraTor: Throwing Out Windows in Tor
AlSabah, M., Bauer, K. S., Goldberg, I., Grunwald, D. C., McCoy, D., Savage, S., & Voelker, G. M. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22263-4_8 · Cited by 71
Self-citationOn performance bottleneck of anonymous communication networks
Pries, R., Yu, W., Graham, S., & Fu, X. (2008) · IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS) · doi:10.1109/ipdps.2008.4536239 · Cited by 32
Cited by
Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Panchenko, A., Lanze, F., Zinnen, A., Henze, M., Pennekamp, J., Wehrle, K., & Engel, T. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23477 · Cited by 645
“[5] and Wang et Goldberg [26] showed that these defenses are not as effective as assumed and, in the case of randomized pipelining, might even lead to increased recognition rates on small datasets.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialDeep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243768 · Cited by 592
“Since then, the success rate of WF attacks against Tor has been incrementally improved, reaching 90% accuracy by two classifiers using edit-distances [8, 39].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Juarez, M., Afroz, S., Acar, G., Diaz, C., & Greenstadt, R. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660368 · Cited by 327
Automated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning
Rimmer, V., Preuveneers, D., Juarez, M., Goethem, T. V., & Joosen, W. (2018) · Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2018.23105 · Cited by 319
A Systematic Approach to Developing and Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Defenses
Cai, X., Nithyanand, R., Wang, T., Johnson, R., & Goldberg, I. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660362 · Cited by 284
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, T., & Goldberg, I.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2013-11-04
- Pages
- 201-212
- OpenAlex
- W1993568446
- Cited by
- 295
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 10.84
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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