The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Search Engine Backed by Internet-Wide Scanning
Open accessAbstract
Fast Internet-wide scanning has opened new avenues for security research, ranging from uncovering widespread vulnerabilities in random number generators to tracking the evolving impact of Heartbleed. However, this technique still requires significant effort: even simple questions, such as, "What models of embedded devices prefer CBC ciphers?", require developing an application scanner, manually identifying and tagging devices, negotiating with network administrators, and responding to abuse complaints. In this paper, we introduce Censys, a public search engine and data processing facility backed by data collected from ongoing Internet-wide scans. Designed to help researchers answer security-related questions, Censys supports full-text searches on protocol banners and querying a wide range of derived fields (e.g., 443.https.cipher). It can identify specific vulnerable devices and networks and generate statistical reports on broad usage patterns and trends. Censys returns these results in sub-second time, dramatically reducing the effort of understanding the hosts that comprise the Internet. We present the search engine architecture and experimentally evaluate its performance. We also explore Censys's applications and show how questions asked in recent studies become simple to answer.
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Citations
Cites
The 26th USENIX Security Symposium 2017
Αλεξόπουλος, Ν., Kiayias, A., Zacharias, T., & Talviste, R. (2017) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 1,168
Durumeric, Z., Li, F., Kasten, J., Amann, J., Beekman, J., Payer, M., Weaver, N., Adrian, D., Paxson, V., Bailey, M., et al. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference · doi:10.1145/2663716.2663755 · Cited by 668
Self-citationZMap: fast internet-wide scanning and its security applications
Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., & Halderman, J. A. (2013) · Cited by 652
Self-citationA Large-Scale Analysis of the Security of Embedded Firmwares
Costin, A., Zaddach, J., Francillon, A., & Balzarotti, D. (2014) · HAL · Cited by 548
Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., Green, M., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Thomé, E., Valenta, L., et al. (2015) · Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813707 · Cited by 348
Self-citationMining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., & Halderman, J. A. (2013) · Cited by 346
Self-citationElliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice
Bos, J. W., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Moore, J., Naehrig, M., & Wustrow, E. (2014) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_11 · Cited by 321
Self-citationAnalysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem
Durumeric, Z., Kasten, J., Bailey, M., & Halderman, J. A. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measurement conference · doi:10.1145/2504730.2504755 · Cited by 286
Self-citationA Messy State of the Union: Taming the Composite State Machines of TLS
Beurdouche, B., Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., Strub, P.-Y., & Zinzindohoue, J. K. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.39 · Cited by 218
Brubaker, C., Jana, S., Ray, B., Khurshid, S., & Shmatikov, V. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.15 · Cited by 218
Bailey, M., Dittrich, D., Kenneally, E., & Maughan, D. (2012) · IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2012.52 · Cited by 190 · cited 1×
“Although the community has yet to derive robust ethical standards for active measurement, our reasoning was guided by broad ethical principles, such as those embodied in the Menlo Report [5], as well as by the guidelines for ethical scanning set forth in the original ZMap work [20].”
MethodSelf-citationAn internet-wide view of internet-wide scanning
Durumeric, Z., Bailey, M., & Halderman, J. A. (2014) · Cited by 149
Self-citationCzyz, J., Kallitsis, M., Gharaibeh, M., Papadopoulos, C., Bailey, M., & Karir, M. (2014) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) · doi:10.1145/2663716.2663717 · Cited by 142
Self-citation23rd USENIX Security Symposium
Lapsley, P., Bernstein, D. J., Blaze, M., Lange, T., Lopez, R. R., Secure, O., & Menn, J. (2014) · Cited by 129
Upgrading HTTPS in mid-air: An Empirical Study of Strict Transport Security and Key Pinning
Kranch, M. J., & Bonneau, J. (2015) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2015.23162 · Cited by 123
On the practical exploitability of Dual EC in TLS implementations
Checkoway, S., Fredrikson, M., Niederhagen, R., Everspaugh, A., Green, M., Lange, T., Ristenpart, T., Bernstein, D. J., Maskiewicz, J., & Shacham, H. (2014) · TU/e Research Portal · Cited by 105
When governments hack opponents: a look at actors and technology
Marczak, W. R., Scott-Railton, J., Marquis-Boire, M., & Paxson, V. (2014) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 96
TapDance: end-to-middle anticensorship without flow blocking
Wustrow, E., Swanson, C. M., & Halderman, J. A. (2014) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 75
Self-citationOn the Detection of Fake Certificates via Attribute Correlation
Gu, X., & Gu, X. (2015) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e17063806 · Cited by 14
Cited by
Neshenko, N., Bou-Harb, E., Crichigno, J., Kaddoum, G., & Ghani, N. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2910750 · Cited by 827
IoT Privacy and Security Challenges for Smart Home Environments
Lin, H., & Bergmann, N. (2016) · Information · doi:10.3390/info7030044 · Cited by 398
“As who have 19], sensors, many devices are suddenly known and visible.”
BackgroundSoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT Deployments
Alrawi, O., Lever, C., Antonakakis, M., & Monrose, F. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00013 · Cited by 391
Keeping the Smart Home Private with Smart(er) IoT Traffic Shaping
Apthorpe, N., Huang, D. Y., Reisman, D., Narayanan, A., & Feamster, N. (2019) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.2478/popets-2019-0040 · Cited by 192
Towards a Complete View of the Certificate Ecosystem
VanderSloot, B., Amann, J., Bernhard, M., Durumeric, Z., Bailey, M., & Halderman, J. A. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference · doi:10.1145/2987443.2987462 · Cited by 82
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Durumeric, Z., Adrian, D., Mirian, A., Bailey, M., & Halderman, J. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-10-12
- Pages
- 542-553
- OpenAlex
- W2001637908
- Cited by
- 439
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 31.87
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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