The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
Open accessAbstract
We investigate the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as used in popular Internet protocols and find it to be less secure than widely believed. First, we present Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to "export-grade" Diffie-Hellman. To carry out this attack, we implement the number field sieve discrete log algorithm. After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logs in that group in about a minute. We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use a single 512-bit group, allowing us to compromise connections to 7% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites. In response, major browsers are being changed to reject short groups. We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768- and 1024-bit groups. We estimate that even in the 1024-bit case, the computations are plausible given nation-state resources. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are used by millions of servers; performing precomputation for a single 1024-bit group would allow passive eavesdropping on 18% of popular HTTPS sites, and a second group would allow decryption of traffic to 66% of IPsec VPNs and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break. We conclude that moving to stronger key exchange methods should be a priority for the Internet community.
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Citations
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Self-citationSoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT Deployments
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Metadata
- Authors
- Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., Green, M., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E., Zanella-Béguelin, S., & Zimmermann, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-10-12
- Pages
- 5-17
- OpenAlex
- W2042923641
- Cited by
- 348
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 39.47
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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