The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Open accessAbstract
A promising technique for protecting privacy and integrity of sensitive data is to statically check information flow within programs that manipulate the data. While previous work has proposed programming language extensions to allow this static checking, the resulting languages are too restrictive for practical use and have not been implemented. In this paper, we describe the new language JFlow, an extension to the Java language that adds statically-checked information flow annotations. JFlow provides several new features that make information flow checking more flexible and convenient than in previous models: a decentralized label model, label polymorphism, run-time label checking, and automatic label inference. JFlow also supports many language features that have never been integrated successfully with static information flow control, including objects, subclassing, dynamic type tests, access control, and exceptions. This paper defines the JFlow language and presents formal rules that are used to check JFlow programs for correctness. Because most checking is static, there is little code space, data space, or run-time overhead in the JFlow implementation.
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Cites
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TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung, J., McDaniel, P. D., & Sheth, A. N. (2010) · doi:10.5555/1924943.1924971 · Cited by 2,238
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Self-citationEnck (2014) · doi:10.1145/2619091 · Cited by 1,203
EnerJ: approximate data types for safe and general low-power computation
Sampson, A., Dietl, W., Fortuna, E., Gnanapragasam, D., Ceze, L., & Grossman, D. (2011) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/1993316.1993518 · Cited by 589
Securing web application code by static analysis and runtime protection
Huang, Y.-W., Yu, F., Hang, C., Tsai, C.-H., Lee, D.-T., & Kuo, S.-Y. (2004) · Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/988672.988679 · Cited by 567
Metadata
- Authors
- Myers, A. C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 1999-01
- Pages
- 228-241
- OpenAlex
- W2158126684
- Cited by
- 1,034
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 19.81
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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