SoK: A Study of Using Hardware-assisted Isolated Execution Environments for Security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Hardware-assisted Isolated Execution Environments (HIEEs) have been widely adopted to build effective and efficient defensive tools for securing systems. Hardware vendors have introduced a variety of HIEEs including system management mode, Intel management engine, ARM TrustZone, and Intel software guard extensions. This SoK paper presents a comprehensive study of existing HIEEs and compares their features from the security perspective. Additionally, we explore both defensive and offensive use scenarios of HIEEs and discuss the attacks against HIEE-based systems. Overall, this paper aims to give an essential checkpoint of the state-of-the-art systems that use HIEEs for trustworthy computing.
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Citations
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Cited by
Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted Hardware
Bentov, I., Ji, Y., Zhang, F., Breidenbach, L., Daian, P., & Juels, A. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363221 · Cited by 175
Self-citationSoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance
Heimbach, L., & Wattenhofer, R. P. (2022) · ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT) · doi:10.1145/3558535.3559784 · Cited by 147
No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware
Koning, K., Chen, X., Bos, H., Giuffrida, C., & Athanasopoulos, E. (2017) · Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3064176.3064217 · Cited by 116
A comparison study of intel SGX and AMD memory encryption technology
Mofrad, S., Zhang, F., Lu, S., & Shi, W. (2018) · Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/3214292.3214301 · Cited by 102
“During past years, hardware vendors have introduced several hardware-assisted TEEs such as ARMTrustZone, Intel Management Engine, AMD Platform Security Processor, and SystemManagement Mode [64].”
BackgroundSelf-citationObscuro: A Bitcoin Mixer using Trusted Execution Environments
Tran, M., Luu, L., Kang, M. S., Bentov, I., & Saxena, P. (2018) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1145/3274694.3274750 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, F., & Zhang, H.
- Affiliations
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy 2016
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-06-18
- Pages
- 1-8
- OpenAlex
- W2491334266
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 3.05
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Funders
- Hort Innovation
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Keywords
- trusted execution environments, System Management Mode, ARM TrustZone, Intel SGX, trusted computing
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- Zhang, F., & Zhang, H. (2016). SoK: A Study of Using Hardware-assisted Isolated Execution Environments for Security. Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2948618.2948621
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