Cited by 102Security and Verification in ComputingDistributed systems and fault toleranceDigital Rights Management and Security

A comparison study of intel SGX and AMD memory encryption technology

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Mofrad, Saeid, Zhang, Fengwei, Lu, Shiyong, Shi, Weidong·2018·Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy

Abstract

Hardware-assisted trusted execution environments are secure isolation technologies that have been engineered to serve as efficient defense mechanisms to provide a security boundary at the system level. Hardware vendors have introduced a variety of hardware-assisted trusted execution environments including ARM TrustZone, Intel Management Engine, and AMD Platform Security Processor. Recently, Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) and AMD Memory Encryption Technology have been introduced. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first comparison study between Intel SGX and AMD Memory Encryption Technology in terms of functionality, use scenarios, security, and performance implications. We summarize the pros and cons of these two approaches in comparison to each other.

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  • Intel SGX provides a remote attestation policy that evaluates the enclave identity, the integrity of the code inside it, and guarantees the authenticity of the Intel processor.

    “Intel SGX provides remote attestation policy that evaluates the enclave identity, integrity of the code inside of it, and guarantees the authenticity of the Intel processor.”
  • Remote attestation serves as a verification protocol for the service provider to evaluate the health of enclave(s) created at a remote location.

    “Remote attestation serves as a verification protocol for the service provider to evaluate the health of enclave(s) created at a remote location [27,53,54].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Sven Bugiel, Stefan Nürnberger, Thomas Pöppelmann, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Thomas Schneider. 2011. AmazonIA: when elasticity snaps back. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, 389-400.
  2. Chia che Tsai, Donald E. Porter, and Mona Vij. 2017. Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX. In 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 17). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 645-658. https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc17/technical-sessions/presentation/tsai
  3. Matthew Hoekstra, Reshma Lal, Pradeep Pappachan, Vinay Phegade, and Juan Del Cuvillo. 2013. Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software solutions.. In HASP@ ISCA. 11.
  4. Yeongjin Jang, Jaehyuk Lee, Sangho Lee, and Taesoo Kim. 2017. SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack. In Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. ACM, 5.
  5. Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael Schwarz, and Yuval Yarom. 2018. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution. ArXiv e-prints (Jan. 2018). arXiv:1801.01203 · arXiv

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Authors
Mofrad, S., Zhang, F., Lu, S., & Shi, W.
Affiliations
  • Wayne State University (US)
  • University of Houston (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Publisher
ACM
Published
2018-06-02
Pages
1-8
OpenAlex
W2803185452
Cited by
102
References
36
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 10
FWCI
4.69
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (publishedVersion, public-domain)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (CICI-1738929, IIS-1724227, DGE 1433817)
  • North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (G4919))
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
Keywords
Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, hardware security, ARM TrustZone, system security, performance comparison, security comparison

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