The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms
Abstract
Recent work shows that the Rowhammer hardware bug can be used to craft powerful attacks and completely subvert a system. However, existing efforts either describe probabilistic (and thus unreliable) attacks or rely on special (and often unavailable) memory management features to place victim objects in vulnerable physical memory locations. Moreover, prior work only targets x86 and researchers have openly wondered whether Rowhammer attacks on other architectures, such as ARM, are even possible. We show that deterministic Rowhammer attacks are feasible on commodity mobile platforms and that they cannot be mitigated by current defenses. Rather than assuming special memory management features, our attack, DRAMMER, solely relies on the predictable memory reuse patterns of standard physical memory allocators. We implement DRAMMER on Android/ARM, demonstrating the practicability of our attack, but also discuss a generalization of our approach to other Linux-based platforms. Furthermore, we show that traditional x86-based Rowhammer exploitation techniques no longer work on mobile platforms and address the resulting challenges towards practical mobile Rowhammer attacks.
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Cites
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Boneh, D. (2002) · Cited by 2,530
Flipping bits in memory without accessing them: an experimental study of DRAM disturbance errors
Kim, Y., Daly, R., Kim, J., Fallin, C., Lee, J. H., Lee, D., Wilkerson, C., Lai, K., & Mutlu, O. (2014) · ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News · doi:10.1145/2678373.2665726 · Cited by 921
Flikker: saving DRAM refresh-power through critical data partitioning
Liu, S., Pattabiraman, K., Moscibroda, T., & Zorn, B. G. (2011) · Proceedings of the sixteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1950365.1950391 · Cited by 412
Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript
Gruss, D., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40667-1_15 · Cited by 373
Self-citationFlip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software Stack
Razavi, K., Gras, B., Bosman, E., Preneel, B., Giuffrida, C., & Bos, H. (2016) · VU Research Portal · Cited by 324
Self-citationDedup Est Machina: Memory Deduplication as an Advanced Exploitation Vector
Bosman, E., Razavi, K., Bos, H., & Giuffrida, C. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.63 · Cited by 216
Self-citationRetention-Aware Placement in DRAM (RAPID): Software Methods for Quasi-Non-Volatile DRAM
Venkatesan, R. K., Herr, S., & Rotenberg, E. (2006) · The Twelfth International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture, 2006. · doi:10.1109/hpca.2006.1598122 · Cited by 215
Armageddon: Cache Attacks On Mobile Devices
Lipp, M., Gruss, D., Spreitzer, R., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2016) · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · doi:10.5281/zenodo.59889 · Cited by 198
Self-citationDRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU AttacksPreprint
Pessl, P., Gruss, D., Maurice, C., Schwarz, M., & Mangard, S. (2015) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1511.08756 · Cited by 175
Self-citationOne Bit Flips, One Cloud Flops: Cross-VM Row Hammer Attacks and Privilege Escalation
Xiao, Y. M., Zhang, X., Zhang, Y., & Teodorescu, R. (2016) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 140
Cited by
Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash-Memory-Based Solid-State Drives
Cai, Y., Ghose, S., Haratsch, E. F., Luo, Y., & Mutlu, O. (2017) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2017.2713127 · Cited by 343
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX
Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00057 · Cited by 314
Self-citationRIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load
van Schaik, S., Milburn, A., Osterlund, S., Frigo, P., Maisuradze, G., Razavi, K., Bos, H., & Giuffrida, C. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00087 · Cited by 310
Self-citationProcessing data where it makes sense: Enabling in-memory computation
Mutlu, O., Ghose, S., Gómez-Luna, J., & Ausavarungnirun, R. (2019) · Microprocessors and Microsystems · doi:10.1016/j.micpro.2019.01.009 · Cited by 300
SoK: Understanding the Prevailing Security Vulnerabilities in TrustZone-assisted TEE Systems
Cerdeira, D., Santos, N., Fonseca, P., & Pinto, S. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00061 · Cited by 208
Metadata
- Authors
- van der Veen, V., Fratantonio, Y., Lindorfer, M., Gruss, D., Maurice, C., Vigna, G., Bos, H., Razavi, K., & Giuffrida, C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-10-24
- Pages
- 1675-1689
- OpenAlex
- W2537014044
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 18.15
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- van der Veen, V., Fratantonio, Y., Lindorfer, M., Gruss, D., Maurice, C., Vigna, G., Bos, H., Razavi, K., & Giuffrida, C. (2016). Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978406
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