Eleos: ExitLess OS Services for SGX Enclaves
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Intel Software Guard extensions (SGX) enable secure and trusted execution of user code in an isolated enclave to protect against a powerful adversary. Unfortunately, running I/O-intensive, memory-demanding server applications in enclaves leads to significant performance degradation. Such applications put a substantial load on the in-enclave system call and secure paging mechanisms, which turn out to be the main reason for the application slowdown. In addition to the high direct cost of thousands-of-cycles long SGX management instructions, these mechanisms incur the high indirect cost of enclave exits due to associated TLB flushes and processor state pollution.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Orenbach, M., Lifshits, P., Minkin, M., & Silberstein, M.
- Affiliations
- Technion – Israel Institute of Technology (IL)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-04-23
- Pages
- 238-253
- OpenAlex
- W2605470470
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 26
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 5
- FWCI
- 10.73
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Conference on Computer Systems (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Israel Science Foundation (1138/14)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Parallel Computing and Optimization Techniques
- Keywords
- Intel SGX, system calls, server applications, memory-intensive applications
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