The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Open accessAbstract
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) see rising use in devices from embedded sensors to cloud servers and encompass a range of cost, power constraints, and security threat model choices. On the other hand, each of the current vendor-specific TEEs makes a fixed set of trade-offs with little room for customization. We present Keystone---the first open-source framework for building customized TEEs. Keystone uses simple abstractions provided by the hardware such as memory isolation and a programmable layer underneath untrusted components (e.g., OS). We build reusable TEE core primitives from these abstractions while allowing platform-specific modifications and flexible feature choices. We showcase how Keystone-based TEEs run on unmodified RISC-V hardware and demonstrate the strengths of our design in terms of security, TCB size, execution of a range of benchmarks, applications, kernels, and deployment models.
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Trustworthy ai: A computational perspective
Liu, H., Wang, Y., Fan, W., Liu, X., Li, Y., Jain, S., Liu, Y., Jain, A., & Tang, J. (2023) · ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology · doi:10.1145/3546872 · Cited by 261
Serverless Edge Computing: Vision and Challenges
Aslanpour, M. S., Toosi, A. N., Cicconetti, C., Javadi, B., Sbarski, P., Taibi, D., Assuncao, M., Gill, S. S., Gaire, R., & Dustdar, S. (2021) · 2021 Australasian Computer Science Week Multiconference · doi:10.1145/3437378.3444367 · Cited by 236
Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments Demystified
Ménétrey, J., Göttel, C., Khurshid, A., Pasin, M., Felber, P., Schiavoni, V., & Raza, S. (2022) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-16092-9_7 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-04-15
- Pages
- 1-16
- OpenAlex
- W3021475380
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 20.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D. (2020). Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments. Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems. https://doi.org/10.1145/3342195.3387532
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