Anatomy of a Vulnerable Fitness Tracking System: Dissecting the Fitbit Cloud, App, and Firmware
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Fitbit fitness trackers record sensitive personal information, including daily step counts, heart rate profiles, and locations visited. By design, these devices gather and upload activity data to a cloud service, which provides aggregate statistics to mobile app users. The same principles govern numerous other Internet-of-Things (IoT) services that target different applications. As a market leader, Fitbit has developed perhaps the most secure wearables architecture that guards communication with end-to-end encryption. In this article, we analyze the complete Fitbit ecosystem and, despite the brand's continuous efforts to harden its products, we demonstrate a series of vulnerabilities with potentially severe implications to user privacy and device security. We employ a range of techniques, such as protocol analysis, software decompiling, and both static and dynamic embedded code analysis, to reverse engineer previously undocumented communication semantics, the official smartphone app, and the tracker firmware. Through this interplay and in-depth analysis, we reveal how attackers can exploit the Fitbit protocol to extract private information from victims without leaving a trace, and wirelessly flash malware without user consent. We demonstrate that users can tamper with both the app and firmware to selfishly manipulate records or circumvent Fitbit's walled garden business model, making the case for an independent, user-controlled, and more secure ecosystem. Finally, based on the insights gained, we make specific design recommendations that can not only mitigate the identified vulnerabilities, but are also broadly applicable to securing future wearable system architectures.
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Cites
A Survey of Man in the Middle Attacks
Conti, M., Dragoni, N., & Lesyk, V. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2548426 · Cited by 724 · cited 1×
“This is both critical, given the potentially delicate nature of user records, and challenging to implement, given the ever-expanding attack surface—the wireless communication between trackers and smartphones is prone to eavesdropping, risks of compromising mobile apps exist [7], and a range of man-in-the-middle (MITM)…”
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Cited by
Yaqoob, T., Abbas, H., & Atiquzzaman, M. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2914094 · Cited by 236
“In addition, [70] also intercepted credentials in plain”
BackgroundResultInfluentialA Survey on Security and Privacy Issues in Modern Healthcare Systems: Attacks and Defenses
Newaz, A. I., Sikder, A. K., Rahman, M. A., & Uluagac, A. S. (2021) · ACM Transactions on Computing for Healthcare · doi:10.1145/3453176 · Cited by 225
“In other studies [47, 48, 72–75], fitness tracker devices’ application codes and firmware were reverse”
BackgroundResultWatching and Safeguarding Your 3D Printer: Online Process Monitoring Against Cyber-Physical Attacks
Gao, Y., Li, B., Wang, W., Xu, W., Zhou, C., & Jin, Z. (2018) · Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies · doi:10.1145/3264918 · Cited by 61
Uncovering Practical Security and Privacy Threats for Connected Glasses with Embedded Video Cameras
Opaschi, O., & Vatavu, R.-D. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies · doi:10.1145/3432700 · Cited by 10
“Just like history has demonstrated for smartwatches [81,93,94] and fitness trackers [6,15,20,30], we suspect that many camera glasses currently available on the market do not have hardware and software architectures suited to prevent security attacks, most likely due to manufacturers being more interested in utility r…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Classen, J., Wegemer, D., Patras, P., Spink, T., & Hollick, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
- Published
- 2018-03-26
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 2474-9567 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2788819230
- Cited by
- 67
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Classen, J., Wegemer, D., Patras, P., Spink, T., & Hollick, M. (2018). Anatomy of a Vulnerable Fitness Tracking System: Dissecting the Fitbit Cloud, App, and Firmware. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies. https://doi.org/10.1145/3191737
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