The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the interaction between a learner and agents in a world where all agents are equally able to manipulate their features in an attempt to "trick" a published classifier. In cases of real world classification, however, an agent's ability to adapt to an algorithm is not simply a function of her personal interest in receiving a positive classification, but is bound up in a complex web of social factors that affect her ability to pursue certain action responses. In this paper, we adapt models of strategic manipulation to capture dynamics that may arise in a setting of social inequality wherein candidate groups face different costs to manipulation. We find that whenever one group's costs are higher than the other's, the learner's equilibrium strategy exhibits an inequality-reinforcing phenomenon wherein the learner erroneously admits some members of the advantaged group, while erroneously excluding some members of the disadvantaged group. We also consider the effects of interventions in which a learner subsidizes members of the disadvantaged group, lowering their costs in order to improve her own classification performance. Here we encounter a paradoxical result: there exist cases in which providing a subsidy improves only the learner's utility while actually making both candidate groups worse-off---even the group receiving the subsidy. Our results reveal the potentially adverse social ramifications of deploying tools that attempt to evaluate an individual's "quality" when agents' capacities to adaptively respond differ.
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Cites
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Discrimination in online ad delivery
Sweeney, L. (2013) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2447976.2447990 · Cited by 783 · cited 1×
“Theoretically, algorithms have great potential to reform existing systems to become both more ecient and equitable, but as exposed by various highprole investigations [2, 11, 23, 27], prediction-based models that make or assist with consequential decisions are, in practice, highly prone to reproducing past and current…”
BackgroundSweeney, L. (2013) · Queue · doi:10.1145/2460276.2460278 · Cited by 477
Avoiding Discrimination through Causal Reasoning
Kilbertus, N., Rojas-Carulla, M., Parascandolo, G., Hardt, M., Janzing, D., & Schölkopf, B. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.02744 · Cited by 358
Stackelberg games for adversarial prediction problems
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“As in previous work in strategic classication, we cast the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the learner moves rst and publishes her classier before candidates best-respond and manipulate their features [1, 5, 7, 14].”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialRunaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing
Ensign, D., Friedler, S. A., Neville, S., Scheidegger, C., & Venkatasubramanian, S. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.09847 · Cited by 161
Price of Transparency in Strategic Machine Learning
Akyol, E., Langbort, C., & Basar, T. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1610.08210 · Cited by 11
Cited by
Explainable AI: a review of machine learning interpretability methods
Linardatos, P., Papastefanopoulos, V., & Kotsiantis, S. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23010018 · Cited by 2,922
“In [82] strategic manipulation models were studied and adapted in an environment of social inequality, in which different social groups have to pay different costs of manipulation.”
Fairness in machine learning: A survey
Caton, S., & Haas, C. (2024) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3616865 · Cited by 646
Actionable Recourse in Linear Classification
Ustun, B., Spangher, A., & Liu, Y. (2019) · Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3287560.3287566 · Cited by 501
Inherent Tradeoffs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores
(2023) · The Societal Impacts of Algorithmic Decision-Making · doi:10.1145/3603195.3603197 · Cited by 310
A Survey of Algorithmic Recourse: Contrastive Explanations and Consequential Recommendations
Karimi, A.-H., Barthe, G., Schölkopf, B., & Valera, I. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3527848 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- Hu, L., Immorlica, N., & Vaughan, J. W.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2019-01-29
- Pages
- 259-268
- OpenAlex
- W2888421747
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 21.83
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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