The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution
Open accessAbstract
In this work, we aim to design a data marketplace; a robust real-time matching mechanism to efficiently buy and sell training data for Machine Learning tasks. While the monetization of data and pre-trained models is an essential focus of industry today, there does not exist a market mechanism to price training data and match buyers to sellers while still addressing the associated (computational and other) complexity. The challenge in creating such a market stems from the very nature of data as an asset: (i) it is freely replicable; (ii) its value is inherently combinatorial due to correlation with signal in other data; (iii) prediction tasks and the value of accuracy vary widely; (iv) usefulness of training data is difficult to verify a priori without first applying it to a prediction task. As our main contributions we: (i) propose a mathematical model for a two-sided data market and formally define the key associated challenges; (ii) construct algorithms for such a market to function and analyze how they meet the challenges defined. We highlight two technical contributions: (i) a new notion of "fairness" required for cooperative games with freely replicable goods; (ii) a truthful, zero regret mechanism to auction a class of combinatorial goods based on utilizing Myerson's payment function and the Multiplicative Weights algorithm. These might be of independent interest.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642 · cited 2×
“In [32] and [10], platform design and the function of general intermediary service providers for such markets is studied; in [17], advertising auctions are studied; in the context of ride–sharing such as those in Uber and Ly, the eciency of matching in [12] and optimal pricing in [8] are studied.”
BackgroundChicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799 · cited 2×
“In [32] and [10], platform design and the function of general intermediary service providers for such markets is studied; in [17], advertising auctions are studied; in the context of ride–sharing such as those in Uber and Ly, the eciency of matching in [12] and optimal pricing in [8] are studied.”
BackgroundWolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330041371321 · Cited by 889
Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling
Castro, J., Gómez, D., & Tejada, J. (2009) · Computers & Operations Research · doi:10.1016/j.cor.2008.04.004 · Cited by 601
Cited by
Forecasting: theory and practice
Petropoulos, F., Apiletti, D., Assimakopoulos, V., Babai, M. Z., Barrow, D. K., Ben Taieb, S., Bergmeir, C., Bessa, R. J., Bijak, J., Boylan, J. E., et al. (2022) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2021.11.001 · Cited by 921
Data-centric Artificial Intelligence: A Survey
Zha, D., Bhat, Z. P., Lai, K.-H., Yang, F., Jiang, Z., Zhong, S., & Hu, X. (2025) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3711118 · Cited by 334
The future of forecasting for renewable energy
Sweeney, C., Bessa, R. J., Browell, J., & Pinson, P. (2020) · WIREs Energy and Environment · doi:10.1002/wene.365 · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Authors
- Agarwal, A., Dahleh, M., & Sarkar, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2019-06-17
- Pages
- 701-726
- OpenAlex
- W2964210282
- Cited by
- 211
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 31.58
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3328526.3329589
- The paper
- Agarwal, A., Dahleh, M., & Sarkar, T. (2019). A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329589
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.