What's sex got to do with machine learning?
Open accessAbstract
The debate about fairness in machine learning has largely centered around competing substantive definitions of what fairness or nondiscrimination between groups requires. However, very little attention has been paid to what precisely a group is. Many recent approaches have abandoned observational, or purely statistical, definitions of fairness in favor of definitions that require one to specify a causal model of the data generating process. The implicit ontological assumption of these exercises is that a racial or sex group is a collection of individuals who share a trait or attribute, for example: the group "female" simply consists in grouping individuals who share female-coded sex features. We show this by exploring the formal assumption of modularity in causal models using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), which hold that the dependencies captured by one causal pathway are invariant to interventions on any other causal pathways. Modeling sex, for example, as a node in a causal model aimed at elucidating fairness questions proposes two substantive claims: 1) There exists a feature, sex-on-its-own, that is an inherent trait of an individual that then (causally) brings about social phenomena external to it in the world; and 2) the relations between sex and its downstream effects can be modified in whichever ways and the former node would still retain the meaning that sex has in our world. Together, these claims suggest sex to be a category that could be different in its (causal) relations with other features of our social world via hypothetical interventions yet still mean what it means in our world. This fundamental stability of categories and causes (unless explicitly intervened on) is essential in the methodology of causal inference, because without it, causal operations can alter the meaning of a category, fundamentally change how it is situated within a causal diagram, and undermine the validity of any inferences drawn on the diagram as corresponding to any real phenomena in the world.
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Even causal explanations may be problematic because they rely on flawed ontological assumptions about the social categories used for classification.
“Even causal explanations may be problematic, as recent work has shown (Hu & Kohler-Hausman, 2020), because they rely on flawed ontological assumptions about the social categories used for classification.”
From Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice (2025) · cites this paper as Hu & Kohler-Hausman, 2020
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Andrus, M., Spitzer, E., Brown, J., & Xiang, A. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3442188.3445888 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice
Milano, S., & Prunkl, C. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02095-2 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Gaebler, J. D., Goel, S., Huq, A., & Tambe, P. (2024) · Behavioral Science & Policy · doi:10.1177/23794607251320229 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
System Safety and Artificial Intelligence
Dobbe, R. I. J. (2022) · The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.67 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
- Authors
- Hu, L., & Kohler-Hausmann, I.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Yale University
- ORCID
- Hu, Lily
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-01-27
- Pages
- 513-513
- OpenAlex
- W3013969094
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1
- Type
- conference abstract
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program (DGE1745303)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Keywords
- algorithmic fairness, causal models, directed acyclic graphs, non-discrimination, sex categories
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