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Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice

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Milano, Silvia, Prunkl, Carina · 2025 · Philosophical Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 25 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

It is well-established that algorithms can be instruments of injustice. It is less frequently discussed, however, how current modes of AI deployment often make the very discovery of injustice difficult, if not impossible. In this article, we focus on the effects of algorithmic profiling on epistemic agency. We show how algorithmic profiling can give rise to epistemic injustice through the depletion of epistemic resources that are needed to interpret and evaluate certain experiences. By doing so, we not only demonstrate how the philosophical conceptual framework of epistemic injustice can help pinpoint potential, systematic harms from algorithmic profiling, but we also identify a novel source of hermeneutical injustice that to date has received little attention in the relevant literature, what we call epistemic fragmentation. As we detail in this paper, epistemic fragmentation is a structural characteristic of algorithmically-mediated environments that isolate individuals, making it more difficult to develop, uptake and apply new epistemic resources, thus making it more difficult to identify and conceptualise emerging harms in these environments. We thus trace the occurrence of hermeneutical injustice back to the fragmentation of the epistemic experiences of individuals, who are left more vulnerable by the inability to share, compare and learn from shared experiences.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that algorithmic profiling can produce hermeneutical injustice by depleting the epistemic resources people need to interpret their experiences. It introduces epistemic fragmentation—a structural feature of algorithmically mediated environments that isolates individuals—as a novel source of such injustice, impairing the formation, uptake, and application of epistemic resources.

Key findings

  • Algorithmic profiling can undermine epistemic agency through inference-level problems (biased, incomplete, or inadequate data and bad proxies) and enquiry-level problems (opacity, inaccessible profiles, and individualised experiences).
  • The paper identifies epistemic fragmentation as a novel source of hermeneutical injustice: individuals lack access to others’ personal contexts, making it harder to share and compare experiences and to develop, uptake, and apply epistemic resources.
  • Fragmentation can sustain hermeneutical injustice through three dysfunctions: blocking formation of new concepts/lacunas, preventing uptake by relevant decision-makers, and impairing application of existing concepts to one’s own experience.
  • These harms disproportionately affect marginalised and disadvantaged groups; cited examples include Google Ads showing fewer high-paying jobs to women (Datta et al., 2015) and a US healthcare algorithm assigning lower health risk to Black patients (Ledford, 2019). No original quantitative results are reported.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis; no empirical sample or data collection.
  • Draws on Fricker’s epistemic injustice framework, Medina’s semantic and performative varieties, and related literature, using illustrative cases such as Carmita Wood/sexual harassment, Netflix’s *Sex Education*, Google Ads, healthcare algorithms, and social media moderation.
  • Proposes a heuristic model (Fig. 1) of epistemic resource formation, uptake, application, and epistemic infrastructure, arguing that dysfunctions in infrastructure underpin hermeneutical injustice.

Limitations

  • Stated: the depiction of epistemic resource creation is “highly idealised”; treatment of possible solutions lies outside the paper’s scope; the authors hope to invite more research on failures of application.
  • Stated/evident: no empirical validation or measurement of epistemic fragmentation or injustice; the argument relies on conceptual analysis and illustrative/secondary examples.
  • Evident: examples are drawn from other studies, fiction, and reported cases rather than original data, so prevalence and causal claims are not tested here.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11098-023-02095-2

Cites

42 of 42 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Figures

Fig. 1 The diagram illustrates the different steps involved in the formation, collective uptaking, and application of epistemic resources. Sources of epistemic injustice are linked to dysfunctions within the various steps. Underlying the entire process is the epistemic infrastructure that creates opportunity for the sharing and comparing of experiences, thereby enabling epistemic resources to be created, taken up, and applied
Fig. 1 The diagram illustrates the different steps involved in the formation, collective uptaking, and application of epistemic resources. Sources of epistemic injustice are linked to dysfunctions within the various steps. Underlying the entire process is the epistemic infrastructure that creates opportunity for the sharing and comparing of experiences, thereby enabling epistemic resources to be created, taken up, and appliedCC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

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Citations

Cites

Show all 42 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Alcoff, L. M. (1996). The problem of speaking for others who can speak? Authority and critical identity. In R. Wiegman (Ed.), J Roofand. University of Illinois Press.
  2. Véliz, C. (2021). Privacy is power. Melville House.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Milano, S., & Prunkl, C.
Affiliations
  • University of Exeter (GB)
  • Utrecht University (NL)
Corresponding author
Milano, Silvia
Venue
Philosophical Studies
Published
2024-02-05
Volume
182
Issue
1
Pages
185-203
ISSN
  • 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0883
OpenAlex
W4391535930
Cited by
38
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 4
FWCI
17.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Wellcome Trust (223765/Z/21/Z)
  • Sloan Foundation (G-2021-16779)
  • Department of Health and Social Care
  • Luminate Group
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
algorithmic profiling, hermeneutical injustice, epistemic injustice, epistemic fragmentation, epistemic agency, epistemic resources, algorithmic harms, algorithmic mediation, social isolation, AI deployment

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11098-023-02095-2
The paper
Milano, S., & Prunkl, C. (2025). Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02095-2

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