The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Abstract
We suggest an architecture for executing protocols for auctions and, more generally, mechanism design. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants (so that no nonessential information about them is divulged, even a posteriori) while maintaining communication and computational efficiency. We achieve this goal by adding another party - the auction issuer - that generates the programs for computing the auctions but does not take an active part in the protocol. The auction issuer is not a trusted party, but is assumed not to collude with the auctioneer. In the case of auctions, barring collusion between the auctioneer and the auction issuer, neither party gains any information about the bids, even after the auction is over. Moreover, bidders can verify that the auction was performed correctly. The protocols do not require any communication between the bidders and the auction issuer and the computational efficiency is very reasonable. This architecture can be used to implement any mechanism design where the important factor is the complexity of the decision procedure.
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Extending Oblivious Transfers Efficiently
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Improved Garbled Circuit: Free XOR Gates and Applications
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Metadata
- Authors
- Naor, M., Pinkas, B., & Sumner, R.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 1999-11
- Pages
- 129-139
- OpenAlex
- W2040168265
- Cited by
- 753
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 10.47
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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