Uncovering Practical Security and Privacy Threats for Connected Glasses with Embedded Video Cameras
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Abstract
We address in this work security and privacy threats for connected camera glasses, for which very few investigations have been conducted so far, despite the considerable attention to understanding security concerns for other wearables, such as smartwatches and fitness trackers. To raise awareness about such threats, we present the results of a case study involving a low-cost spy camera glasses device, readily available on the market, that can be used to record and stream live video, for which we demonstrate infringement of several privacy requirements (regarding the camera glasses device itself, the data collected by the embedded video camera, the wearer of the device, and for bystanders as well) that lead to corresponding security threats (e.g., data confidentiality, integrity, availability, and access control). To foster replicability and reproducibility of our empirical results, investigation method, and implementation of attacks, we describe our case study in the form of a detailed activity log and release full C++ code implementing our approach. Furthermore, we present our findings to three IT security experts and summarize their recommendations for designing more secure connected camera glasses.
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“Egocentric video-based models capture rich semantic information and have demonstrated strong performance in human activity recognition (HAR), but their high power consumption, privacy concerns, and dependence on lighting limit their feasibility for continuous on-device recognition.”
From COMODO: Cross-Modal Video-to-IMU Distillation for Efficient Egocentric Human Activity Recognition (2026) · cites this paper as [43]
In the citing paper
“Continuous wearable video is often untenable due to power consumption and privacy concerns [4, 36, 41, 43].”
From COMODO: Cross-Modal Video-to-IMU Distillation for Efficient Egocentric Human Activity Recognition (2026) · cites this paper as [43]
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BackgroundInfluentialBeyond LED Status Lights - Design Requirements of Privacy Notices for Body-worn Cameras
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BackgroundInfluentialSensitive Lifelogs: A Privacy Analysis of Photos from Wearable Cameras
Hoyle, R., Templeman, R., Anthony, D., Crandall, D., & Kapadia, A. (2015) · Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/2702123.2702183 · Cited by 66 · cited 5×
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BackgroundInfluentialRelease the Kraken: New KRACKs in the 802.11 Standard
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Fitness Trackers: Fit for Health but Unfit for Security and Privacy
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“, for users with motor impairments [58,59], visual impairments [2,86,104], or users that are deaf or hard of hearing [42].”
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“Requirements S 4 (authentication) and S 5 (access control) have been addressed in other work interested in unlocking smartglasses [21,41,56], while S 6 (nonrepudiation) and S 7 (notarization) concern data integrity and fall outside our scope.”
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BackgroundSelf-citationDesign Space and Users’ Preferences for Smartglasses Graphical Menus: A Vignette Study
Vatavu, R.-D., & Vanderdonckt, J. M. (2020) · International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia (MUM) · doi:10.1145/3428361.3428467 · Cited by 7 · cited 1×
“However, as we uncover more security and privacy aspects for wearables [80], including for connected camera glasses as in this work, designing accessible glasses that are equally secure and privacy-oriented should represent a top priority for practitioners, among other aspects of design [10,48,49,92].”
BackgroundSelf-citationAggregating Life Tags for Opportunistic Crowdsensing with Mobile and Smartglasses Users
Aiordăchioae, A., Furtuna, D., & Vatavu, R.-D. (2020) · EAI International Conference on Smart Objects and Technologies for Social Good (GOODTECHS) · doi:10.1145/3411170.3411237 · Cited by 5
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“More complex methods for tracking with Wi-Fi exist [60,67,74] and could be further implemented, but the above procedure is sufficient to demonstrate this type of attack.”
BackgroundMethodBinary Program Statistical Features Hiding through Huffman Obfuscated Coding
Niu, X., Li, Q., Wang, W., & Weng, X. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39479-9_33 · Cited by 1 · cited 1×
“) We did not follow this thread of investigation further since we were more interested in the Wi-Fi communications leaks (described next), but examinations could continue at this point to find out more [68] about the software running on the camera glasses and the contents of the memory.”
BackgroundTreadwell, L. (2013) · Journal of multidisciplinary research · Cited by 1
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- 2019, d.]. FHD 1080P Wearable Camera with Video Recording Mini Spy Camera Sunglasses. Retrieved
- 2019, Super Small Surveillance Spy Camera Glasses. Retrieved
Cited by
Otus: A Gaze Model-based Privacy Control Framework for Eye Tracking Applications
Hu, M., Luo, Z., Zhou, Y., Liu, X., & Wu, D. (2022) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infocom48880.2022.9796665 · Cited by 15
“Eye tracking [1] is a kind of sensing technique that enables a broad range of devices (e.g., AR/VR headsets [2], smartphones [3], webcams [4], wearable glasses [5]) to know where an individual is looking (including the point of gaze, the motion of eyes).”
BackgroundToward Privacy-Preserving Localization and Mapping in eXtended Reality: A Privacy Threat Model
Brachmann, M., Phillips, G., Gülen, U., & Tudor, V. (2023) · Joint European Conference on Networks and Communications & 6G Summit (EuCNC/6G Summit) · doi:10.1109/eucnc/6gsummit58263.2023.10188227 · Cited by 7
Wang, L., Allman-Farinelli, M. A., Hekler, E. B., & Rangan, A. (2025) · Advances in Nutrition · doi:10.1016/j.advnut.2025.100575 · Cited by 7
“Furthermore, connected smart glasses also pose potential security threats to both users and bystanders, including risks of video hijacking, surveillance, and identity theft [106].”
Silent Impact: Tracking Tennis Shots from the Passive Arm
Park, J., Yang, S., & Jo, S. (2024) · ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST) · doi:10.1145/3654777.3676403 · Cited by 7
“This trend has also sparked innovation in other wearables, like glasses and earphones, to explore new functionalities that enhance our daily experiences [54, 69].”
Terenti, M., & Vatavu, R.-D. (2021) · Companion Publication of the International Conference on Multimodal Interaction (ICMI Companion) · doi:10.1145/3461615.3485431 · Cited by 3
“Documenting software tools with screenshots, diagrams, code, and photographs: (a) screenshot of SAPIENS [28], a software architecture for peripheral interaction, from EICS ’19; (b) UML class diagram of Flecto [14], a rapid prototyping tool for foldable UIs, from ISS ’20; (c) API response of KeyTime [16], a web-based t…”
MethodSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Opaschi, O., & Vatavu, R.-D.
- Affiliations
- Ştefan cel Mare University of Suceava (RO)
- ORCID
- Vatavu, Radu-Daniel
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
- Published
- 2020-12-17
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 2474-9567 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3114409854
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 1.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive Mobile Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Unitatea Executiva pentru Finantarea Invatamantului Superior, a Cercetarii, Dezvoltarii si Inovarii (PN-III-P2-2.1-PED-2019-0352 (276PED/2020))
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Keywords
- privacy risks, security threats, data confidentiality, data integrity, data availability, access control, live streaming, privacy requirements
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.