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To Trust or to Think: Cognitive Forcing Functions Can Reduce Overreliance on AI in AI-assisted Decision-making
Open accessAbstract
People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.
Verified 2026-10-11 · 4 references not checked yet
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
In an MTurk experiment with 199 participants on a nutrition replacement task, cognitive forcing functions reduced overreliance on incorrect AI suggestions compared with simple explainable AI, but they did not improve performance overall enough to match the AI alone. The gains came with a subjective cost: the more effective interfaces were also rated as less preferred, more mentally demanding, and more complex.
Key findings
- Across all task instances, both simple explainable AI (SXAI) and cognitive forcing functions (CFF) improved performance over no AI on overall performance, carb source detection, carb reduction, and flavor similarity, but there were no significant differences between CFF and SXAI on these aggregate metrics.
- When the AI’s top prediction was incorrect, CFF reduced overreliance and improved correctness relative to SXAI: the paper reports overall performance of 0.27 (0.03) for CFF vs 0.08 (0.03) for SXAI, and carb source detection of 0.09 (0.01) vs 0.03 (0.02), with significant differences.
- In the main results, CFF led to significantly more correct decisions than SXAI on incorrect AI predictions, and significantly less overreliance for carb source detection; however, CFF still did not eliminate overreliance, and human+AI performance remained below the AI alone (AI accuracy was set to 75%).
- Subjective ratings showed a trade-off: compared with no AI, participants preferred AI-assisted conditions more, but CFF/SXAI were rated as less mentally demanding than no AI; CFF was perceived as more complex than SXAI, and in the NFC analysis high-NFC participants especially benefited from CFF on incorrect predictions.
Methods
- Mixed between- and within-subject online experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk with 199 retained participants from an initial 260 recruited adults in the United States; each participant interacted with two of nine conditions across 26 questions in two blocks.
- Participants completed a nutrition task: for meal images, they selected the ingredient highest in carbohydrates to replace and then chose a low-carb, flavor-similar replacement from a list of about 10 options.
- Conditions included no AI, two SXAI baselines (explanation, uncertainty), and three CFF designs (on demand, update, wait). Analysis used mixed-effects models/ANOVA, with category as a fixed effect and participant as a random effect; post-hoc comparisons used t-tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction, and correlations used Pearson’s r.
Limitations
- The paper states that the study was conducted on a single non-critical decision-making task, so generalization to other domains and settings is uncertain.
- The paper notes that CFF improved performance at the cost of reduced perceived usability, which may limit adoption; this is a limitation stated by the authors.
- Evident from the design: the AI was simulated rather than a trained machine-learning model, and the task used a nutrition domain with lay participants on MTurk, so ecological validity for high-stakes expert settings is limited (evident from the text).
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“Yet, performance of participants that completed the task with no AI assistanceno AI category-was significantly higher than that of participants' in either cognitive forcing functions or simple explainable AI categories when they saw incorrect model predictions.”
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In the paper
“When analyzing performance on all task instances (both those where the top AI predictions were correct and those where they were incorrect), both simple explainable AI conditions and cognitive forcing functions improved participants' performance on all measures (overall performance, carb source detection, carb reduction, and flavor similarity) compared to the no AI baseline.”
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In the paper
“For all the metrics, there were no significant differences among conditions within either category (i.e., simple explainable AI and cognitive forcing functions ).”
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In the paper
“When the top AI predictions were incorrect, however, cognitive forcing functions improved the objective metrics (i.e., overall performance, carb source detection performance, carb reduction and flavor similarity) significantly more compared to simple explainable AI .”
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In the paper
“When the top AI predictions were incorrect, however, cognitive forcing functions improved the objective metrics (i.e., overall performance, carb source detection performance, carb reduction and flavor similarity) significantly more compared to simple explainable AI .”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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“The sequential task setup could induce an anchoring effect which prevents the human to more actively take the AI into account [9].”
From Appropriate Reliance on AI Advice: Conceptualization and the Effect of Explanations (2023) · cites this paper as [9]
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source doesn’t support the claim as written.
In the citing paper
“However, they also reduce reliance on correct model predictions, yielding no significant differences when humans are not aided by an AI.”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [9]
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In the citing paper
“However, unlike in [16], where cognitive effort significantly increased under-reliance (i.e., humans under high cognitive effort may blindly ignore AI's suggestions), our findings reveal no such adverse effect.”
From Towards Human-AI Deliberation: Design and Evaluation of LLM-Empowered Deliberative AI for AI-Assisted Decision-Making (2025) · cites this paper as [16]
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“A recent work by Buçinca et al. [10] called out that when interacting with AI decision support, there is tension between cognitive engagement, which can lead to better decision outcomes, and subjective user experience, which may be influenced by ease of use and efficiency.”
From Understanding the Role of Human Intuition on Reliance in Human-AI Decision-Making with Explanations (2023) · cites this paper as Buçinca et al. [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“However, recent research has shown that the recommendation-driven explainable/interpretable AI has little effect on decision making [1, 6-8, 28, 32], although this is not always the case [22,23,41].”
From Explainable AI is Dead, Long Live Explainable AI!: Hypothesis-driven Decision Support using Evaluative AI (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
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In the paper
§ 5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE MOTIVATION
“| performance | incorrect AI predictions | {SXAI} < {CFF} | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.11 (0.02) | 𝐹 1 , 100 . 6 = 10 . 55, 𝑝 = . 002, 𝑑 = . 57 | {SXAI, CFF} | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.06 (0.02) | 𝐹 1 , 99 . 37 = 0 . 94, 𝑛.𝑠. , 𝑑 = . 15 |”
§ 5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE MOTIVATION
“| correct | {SXAI} <{CFF} | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.11 (0.02) | 𝐹 1 , 100 . 6 = 10 . 55, 𝑝 = . 002, 𝑑 = . 57 | {SXAI, CFF} | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.07 (0.02) | 𝑛.𝑠. , 𝑑 = . 15 |”
Citations
Cites
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“These heuristics are highly useful and mostly effective, however they can lead to systemic and predictable errors [34].”
A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model Predictions
Lundberg, S., & Lee, S.-I. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1705.07874 · Cited by 23,707
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
A Simple Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure
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Random effects structure for confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal
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“, all the measurements were not statistically independent) [3].”
BackgroundThe Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60214-2 · Cited by 8,822
Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance
Lee, J. D., & See, K. A. (2004) · Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society · doi:10.1518/hfes.46.1.50_30392 · Cited by 6,605 · cited 1×
“Thus, numerous studies have highlighted the importance of calibrated trust in improving AI-assisted decision-making [7, 9, 31, 44, 51, 53, 67].”
BackgroundCacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 · Cited by 5,359 · cited 1×
“In psychology, it is captured through the concept of Need for Cognition (NFC), a stable personality trait that reflects how much a person enjoys engaging in cognitively demanding activities [10, 52].”
BackgroundPetty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4964-1 · Cited by 5,219
Cited by
Zhai, C., Wibowo, S., & Li, L. D. (2024) · Smart Learning Environments · doi:10.1186/s40561-024-00316-7 · Cited by 1,567
“Students can inadvertently become overly dependent on AI-generated assistance, potentially detracting from their ability to make independent, well-informed decisions (Buçinca et al., 2021).”
BackgroundWhen combinations of humans and AI are useful: A systematic review and meta-analysis
Vaccaro, M., Almaatouq, A., & Malone, T. (2024) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-024-02024-1 · Cited by 570
Abulibdeh, A., Zaidan, E., & Abulibdeh, R. (2024) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.140527 · Cited by 641
Trust in AI: progress, challenges, and future directions
Afroogh, S., Akbari, A., Malone, E., Kargar, M., & Alambeigi, H. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-04044-8 · Cited by 507
“People often over-rely on arti fi cial intelligence systems, trusting them too much (Buçinca et al., 2021).”
InfluentialLee, H.-P. (., Sarkar, A., Tankelevitch, L., Drosos, I., Rintel, S., Banks, R., & Wilson, N. (2025) · Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3706598.3713778 · Cited by 490
Metadata
- Authors
- Buçinca, Z., Malaya, M. B., & Gajos, K. Z.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Lodz University of Technology (PL)
- Venue
- arXiv
- Publisher
- arXiv
- Published
- 2021
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- CSCW1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 2573-0142 (ISSN-L)
- arXiv
- 2102.09692
- OpenAlex
- W3159250634
- Semantic Scholar
- 65772de56676a6a437c8abaeccef34224f62ee13
- Cited by
- 1,124
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 475 · 2025: 285 · 2024: 164 · 2023: 151 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 5
- FWCI
- 32.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Social Sciences › Human Factors and Ergonomics › Human-Automation Interaction and Safety
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- overreliance on AI, explainable AI, dual-process theory, heuristics, clinical decision support, decision support system, need for cognition, subjective ratings, trust in AI
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- Buçinca, Z., Malaya, M. B., & Gajos, K. Z. (2021). To Trust or to Think: Cognitive Forcing Functions Can Reduce Overreliance on AI in AI-assisted Decision-making. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.09692
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