A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In today’s world, critical infrastructure is often controlled by computing systems. This introduces new risks for cyber attacks, which can compromise the security and disrupt the functionality of these systems. It is therefore necessary to build such systems with strong guarantees of resiliency against cyber attacks. One way to achieve this level of assurance is using formal verification, which provides proofs of system compliance with desired cyber security properties. The use of Formal Methods (FM) in aspects of cyber security and safety-critical systems are reviewed in this article. We split FM into the three main classes: theorem proving, model checking, and lightweight FM. To allow the different uses of FM to be compared, we define a common set of terms. We further develop categories based on the type of computing system FM are applied in. Solutions in each class and category are presented, discussed, compared, and summarised. We describe historical highlights and developments and present a state-of-the-art review in the area of FM in cyber security. This review is presented from the point of view of FM practitioners and researchers, commenting on the trends in each of the classes and categories. This is achieved by considering all types of FM, several types of security and safety-critical systems, and by structuring the taxonomy accordingly. The article hence provides a comprehensive overview of FM and techniques available to system designers of security-critical systems, simplifying the process of choosing the right tool for the task. The article concludes by summarising the discussion of the review, focusing on best practices, challenges, general future trends, and directions of research within this field.
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Citations
Cites
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Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
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A Tool for Checking ANSI-C Programs
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The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes
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“Sometimes, in order to provide strong authentication, small One Time Password (OTP) generation hardware is used by enterprises to authenticate users towards cloud services [47].”
BackgroundAn attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
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“Lowe [165] showed that, contrary to its intention, the protocol fails to ensure authentication.”
BackgroundA survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems
Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M., & Halgand, Y. (2015) · Reliability Engineering & System Safety · doi:10.1016/j.ress.2015.02.008 · Cited by 375
Lessons from building static analysis tools at Google
Sadowski, C., Aftandilian, E., Eagle, A., Miller-Cushon, L., & Jaspan, C. (2018) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3188720 · Cited by 242 · cited 5×
“In Reference [218] the authors report on a verified design of an experimental browser using the Maude tool and rewriting logic, and the authors of Reference [184] show that x86 native code executed by arbitrary clients conforms with a predefined sandbox policy when using Google Chrome’s Native Client service.”
MethodInfluentialScaling static analyses at Facebook
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“Particularly targeted to the security domain, the authors of Reference [84] report a static analysis tool, Zoncolan, in collaboration with the Facebook App Security team.”
MethodSoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
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Cited by
Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning Approach
Bin Sarhan, B., & Altwaijry, N. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app13010259 · Cited by 111
“Formal verification is an approach used to prove a system’s compliance with the required security properties [5–7].”
MethodPrivacy Risk Assessment of Smart Home System Based on a STPA–FMEA Method
Wang, Y., Zhang, R., Zhang, X., & Zhang, Y. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23104664 · Cited by 28
Shaaban, A. M., Chlup, S., El-Araby, N., & Schmittner, C. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app12115653 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Kulik, T., Dongol, B., Larsen, P. G., Macedo, H. D., Schneider, S., Tran-Jørgensen, P. W. V., & Woodcock, J.
- Venue
- Formal Aspects of Computing
- Published
- 2022-03-31
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-39
- ISSN
- 0934-5043 (ISSN-L)
- 1433-299X
- OpenAlex
- W3196878016
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 6.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Kulik, T., Dongol, B., Larsen, P. G., Macedo, H. D., Schneider, S., Tran-Jørgensen, P. W. V., & Woodcock, J. (2022). A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security. Formal Aspects of Computing. https://doi.org/10.1145/3522582
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