Cited by 260Ethics and Social Impacts of AIDigitalization, Law, and RegulationExplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 142 of the 142 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 144 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The Fallacy of AI Functionality

Open access
Raji, Inioluwa Deborah, Kumar, I. Elizabeth, Horowitz, Aaron, Selbst, Andrew·2022·2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency

Abstract

Deployed AI systems often do not work. They can be constructed haphazardly, deployed indiscriminately, and promoted deceptively. However, despite this reality, scholars, the press, and policymakers pay too little attention to functionality. This leads to technical and policy solutions focused on “ethical” or value-aligned deployments, often skipping over the prior question of whether a given system functions, or provides any benefits at all. To describe the harms of various types of functionality failures, we analyze a set of case studies to create a taxonomy of known AI functionality issues. We then point to policy and organizational responses that are often overlooked and become more readily available once functionality is drawn into focus. We argue that functionality is a meaningful AI policy challenge, operating as a necessary first step towards protecting affected communities from algorithmic harm.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that AI policy and ethics discourse often assumes deployed AI systems function, and that this assumption obscures a broad class of harms from dysfunctional or non-working systems. It builds a taxonomy of AI functionality failures from 283 cases and argues functionality should be treated as a primary policy and legal concern.

Key findings

  • The “functionality assumption” appears across AI ethics guidelines, trust framing, democratization efforts, and debates about misuse or autonomous agents; critiques often engage in “criti-hype” and skip the prior question of whether systems work.
  • From 283 cases (2012–2021), the paper develops a failure taxonomy: impossible tasks (conceptually and practically impossible), engineering failures (design, implementation, missing safety features), deployment failures (robustness, adversarial attacks, unanticipated interactions), and communication failures (falsified/overstated and misrepresented capabilities).
  • Examples include Michigan’s MIDAS algorithm falsely flagging over 20,000 people for unemployment fraud; ETS voice recognition identifying 97% of UK tests as “suspicious,” classifying 58% of 58,459 tests as “invalid” and 39% as “questionable,” with disputed error rates from 1% to 30% and only 3,600 of 12,500 appeals won; Amazon Rekognition falsely matching 28 members of Congress; IBM Watson at MD Anderson costing $62 million with no results; and Indiana welfare automation producing a 54% increase in denials.
  • The paper points to overlooked responses: FTC Section 5 unfair/deceptive practices authority, products liability, warranties, fraud, internal audits/documentation, product certification and standards, procurement requirements, safety culture, and monitoring tools.

Methods

  • Systematic review of case studies using the AI, Algorithmic and Automation Incident and Controversy Repository (AIAAIC) spreadsheet; from over 800 cases, filtered to 283 cases from 2012 to 2021 based on whether the technology claimed to be AI/ML/data-driven and whether harm was due to a technology failure, focusing on artifact-connected failures rather than infrastructural or environmental “meta” failures.
  • Iterative tagging procedure to develop the taxonomy; tags were updated, merged, and grouped in meetings between tagging sessions, then known media and academic case studies were selected to illustrate failure modes.
  • Qualitative taxonomy-building and legal/policy analysis; no quantitative model or experiment is reported.

Limitations

  • The paper states functionality is difficult to define precisely: “fitness for a product’s intended use” is incomplete because some intended uses are impossible, vendor performance claims may be insufficient, and “meeting stakeholder expectations” is too broad.
  • The methodology relies partly on AIAAIC, a crowdsourced repository from journalism professionals; filtering and tagging are interpretive, and the analysis focuses on artifact-connected failures while excluding infrastructural or environmental “meta” failures.
  • The paper states self-regulatory organizational interventions are far from adequate oversight due to conflicts of interest, and internal audits rarely communicate results externally, with disclosure neither mandatory nor incentivized.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3531146.3533158

Cites

142 of 142 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

87 Sources not found · 84 Own interpretation · 19 No basis given · 3 Not checked yet · 1 Own result

Show all 77 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 74
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 65
117 of 117
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The iterative tagging procedure reliably and validly categorizes each case into the failure modes of the taxonomy.

    “We split up the rows in the resulting set and used an iterative tagging procedure to come up with categories that associate each example with a different element or cause of failure.We updated, merged, and grouped our tags in meetings between tagging sessions, resulting in the following taxonomy.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The selected case studies from media and academic literature accurately illustrate and characterize the failure modes they are assigned to.

    “We then chose known case studies from the media and academic literature to illustrate and best characterize these failure modes.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Poorly vetted AI products permeate our lives.

    “Poorly vetted products permeate our lives, and while many readily accept the potential for harms as a tradeoff, the claims of the products' benefits go unchallenged.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The claims of AI products' benefits go unchallenged.

    “Poorly vetted products permeate our lives, and while many readily accept the potential for harms as a tradeoff, the claims of the products' benefits go unchallenged.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    AI operates as a general purpose technology prevalent in many industries.

    “Thankfully, as AI operates as a general purpose technology prevalent in many of these industries, there already exists a plethora of governance infrastructure to address this issue in related fields of application.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Functionality is a safety risk aligned with profit-oriented goals.

    “Also, as functionality is a safety risk aligned with profit-oriented goals, many model logging and evaluation operations tools are available for organizations to leverage in the internal inspection of their systems -including tools for more continuous monitoring of deployed systems [154,169].”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    AI hype will continue absent effective regulation.

    “Communication failures often co-occur with other functional safety problems, and the lack of accountability for false claims -intentional or otherwise -makes these particularly pernicious and likely to occur as AI hype continues absent effective regulation.”
7 of 7

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

2 of 2

Citations

Cites

Show all 130 references

Research works printed but not linked: 31

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  2. 2019. Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgment, and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:19-cv-2184, Docket 2-1 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019) (fining Facebook $5 billion for violating a prior consent decree).
  3. ACLU. 2018. ACLU Comment on New Amazon Statement Responding to Face Recognition Technology Test. https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-comment-new-amazon-statement-responding-face-recognition-technology-test. Accessed: 2022-1-12.
  4. Paul Berger. 2019. MTA’s Initial Foray Into Facial Recognition at High Speed Is a Bust. The Wall Street Journal(2019).
  5. Joseph Bernstein. 2021. Bad News. https://harpers.org/archive/2021/09/bad-news-selling-the-story-of-disinformation/. Harper’s Magazine (2021).
  6. Bryan H Choi. 2019. Crashworthy code. Wash. L. Rev. 94(2019), 39.
  7. Ángel Díaz and Laura Hecht. 2021. Double Standards in Social Media Content Moderation. https://www. brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Double_Standards_Content_Moderation.pdf. New York: Brennan Center for Justice(2021).
  8. Will Douglas Heaven. 2020. AI is wrestling with a replication crisis. MIT Technology Review (Nov. 2020).
  9. Alex C Engler. 2021. Independent auditors are struggling to hold AI companies accountable. FastCompany.
  10. 10.1145/2783258.2783311 · DOI · Paper page
  11. Clare Garvie. 2019. Garbage in, Garbage out. Face recognition on flawed data. Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology (2019).
  12. M Harris. 2019. NTSB investigation into deadly Uber self-driving car crash reveals lax attitude toward safety. IEEE Spectrum (2019).
  13. Nicolaus Henke, Jordan Levine, and Paul McInerney. 2018. You Don’t Have to Be a Data Scientist to Fill This Must-Have Analytics Role. Harvard Business Review (Feb. 2018).
  14. Alex Hern. 2018. Cambridge Analytica: how did it turn clicks into votes. The Guardian 6(2018).
  15. Matthew Herper. 2017. MD Anderson Benches IBM Watson In Setback For Artificial Intelligence In Medicine. Forbes Magazine (Feb. 2017).
  16. F Patrick Hubbard. 2014. Sophisticated robots: balancing liability, regulation, and innovation. Fla. L. Rev. 66(2014), 1803.
  17. David Jeans. 2020. ScaleFactor Raised $100 Million In A Year Then Blamed Covid-19 For Its Demise. Employees Say It Had Much Bigger Problems. Forbes Magazine (July 2020).
  18. Frederike Kaltheuner, Abeba Birhane, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Razvan Amironesei, Emily Denton, Alex Hanna, Hilary Nicole, Andrew Smart, Serena Dokuaa Oduro, James Vincent, Alexander Reben, Gemma Milne, Crofton Black, Adam Harvey, Andrew Strait, Tulsi Parida, Aparna Ashok, Fieke Jansen, Corinne Cath, and Aidan Peppin. 2021. Fake AI. Meatspace Press.
  19. Margot E Kaminski and Jennifer M Urban. 2021. The right to contest AI. Columbia Law Review 121, 7 (2021), 1957–2048.
  20. Lauren Kirchner and Matthew Goldstein. 2020. Access Denied: Faulty Automated Background Checks Freeze Out Renters. The Markup (2020).
  21. Lauren Kirchner and Matthew Goldstein. 2020. How Automated Background Checks Freeze Out Renters. The New York Times 28 (May 2020).
  22. Kumba Kpakima. 2021. Tiktok’s algorithm reportedly bans creators using terms ’Black’ and ’BLM’. https://i-d.vice.com/en_uk/article/m7epya/tiktoks-algorithm-reportedly-bans-creators-using-terms-black-and-blm. The Verge (2021).
  23. Colin Lecher. 2018. What happens when an algorithm cuts your health care. The Verge (2018).
  24. David Lehr and Paul Ohm. [n.d.]. Playing with the data: What legal scholars should learn about machine learning. https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/51/2/Symposium/51-2_Lehr_Ohm.pdf. Accessed: 2021-8-10.
  25. National Audit Office. 2020. Investigation into the response to cheating in English language tests - national audit office (NAO) press release. https://www.nao.org.uk/press-release/investigation-into-the-response-to-cheating-in-english-language-tests/
  26. Jesse O’Neill. 2021. Facebook cracks down on discussing ‘hoes’ in gardening group. https://nypost.com/2021/07/20/facebook-cracks-down-on-discussing-hoes-in-gardening-group/.
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  28. Rashida Richardson, Jason M Schultz, and Vincent M Southerland. 2019. Litigating Algorithms: 2019 US Report. AI Now Institute, September(2019).
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  30. J Shane. 2019. Janelle Shane: The danger of AI is weirder than you think TED Talk, 10: 20. Katsottu 8.8, 2020.
  31. Luke Stark and Jevan Hutson. 2022. Physiognomic Artificial Intelligence. forthcoming in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal XXXII (2022). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3927300

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Metadata

Authors
Raji, I. D., Kumar, I. E., Horowitz, A., & Selbst, A.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
  • Brown University (US)
  • American Civil Liberties Union (US)
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Venue
2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency
Publisher
ACM
Published
2022-06-20
Pages
959-972
OpenAlex
W4283156811
Cited by
251
References
130
Citations by year
2026: 50 · 2025: 93 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 4
FWCI
49.94
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Funders
Mozilla Foundation
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
Keywords
AI policy, algorithmic harms, value alignment

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